Lieutenant Commander G. W. Simpson, commanding the U.S.S. Palos and senior American naval officer present,
in his weekly report of January 15th, 1923, to the Commander of the
Yangtze Patrol Force concurred in the opinion of Commander of the Monocacy in the following words:
The paragraphs in the Naval Regulations referred to as authority by
Lieutenant Commander Nielson read as follows:—
The relations between this Consulate and the American naval officers
present, have been most pleasantly harmonious, both officially and
personally, and the case referred to above was referred to Rear Admiral
Phelps by Lieutenant Commander Nielson with a view to obtaining a
definite ruling upon what appeared to Lieutenant Commander Nielson to be
a conflict in the regulations governing the respective duties of
consular and naval officers. The reply of Rear Admiral Phelps appears to
definitely answer the inquiry, and is accordingly transmitted to the
Department for its information and comment.
[Enclosure]
The Commander of the American Yangtze Patrol
Force (
Phelps
) to the Commanding
Officer U.S.S. “Monocacy” (
Nielson
)
Hankow
,
22 January,
1923
.
Subject: Naval Officers
and Consular duties.
1. On 18 January, 1923, the Force Commander is in receipt of a report
from the Monocacy dated 9 January, 1923, from
which is extracted the following:—
“The Commanding Officer (Monocacy) requested information from the American
Vice Consul (Chungking) regarding the above subject, after
an incident which occurred in Wansien between the Standard
Oil Company and a Chinese. The incident was the collection
of a debt due the Standard Oil Company for which judgment
had been granted in Chungking and also in Wanhsien. It seems
that the Chinese, who owed the money, refused to pay it and,
in this refusal, he was protected by the Chinese general and
of course his appointee, the city magistrate.
The Commanding Officer volunteered his
services to obtain a settlement of the indebtedness, but was
requested to take no action for the reason that the Standard
Oil Company’s representative did not wish to draw the
gunboats into any controversy, unless it were of a military
character.”
The Monocacy thinks that the action of the
Standard Oil Company’s representative was no doubt questionable.
[Page 755]
The reply of the American Vice Consul Chungking simply quoted a
pronouncement of the State Department dated 30 October, 1922,
received by him 23 December, 1922, as follows:
“In order that there may be no confusion as
to the representative capacity of consular officers in
China, the State Department has deemed it advisable to
define, by the present instruction, the relation of consular
officers to those of the United States Court for China and
those of other branches of the United States Government in
China.
The Consular Officers’ position is both
representative and administrative, and it is to him that the
Chinese authorities look as the responsible American
authority in the Consular district; to him that Americans
are to apply in any controversy with the Chinese or with the
nationals of other governments. In the affairs of the
international settlements, in the protection of American
interests and in caring for the welfare of American
citizens, it is the Consul General or the Consul who must
represent the United States Government and the Minister at
Peking.”
The Monocacy lays the situation before the
Force Commander thinking that the consular instructions do not
conform to Navy instructions found in Regs. Arts. 720 (b) and 876; that our duties regarding the
protection of lives and property are clearly defined but in matters
of civil affairs the naval and consular instructions apparently do
not agree; and requests instructions in the premises in order that
no trouble may result between the Consular Body and the Naval Force,
when the latter is carrying out its duties and when the performance
of these duties may be taken, by the Consular and Diplomatic Body,
as an unauthorized assumption of authority on the part of the
Navy.
2. On 30 September, 1922, the Force Commander addressed a letter
(600–2716) to the Robert Dollar Co. and the American West China
Navigation Co. (jointly) and furnished copies to the Palos and Monocacy.
The following is quoted from this letter:—
“If we can conclude that those Szechuanese
who heretofore drew fortunes and livelihood from the River
naturally bitterly resent the surrender of these “their
rights” by treaty negotiated by an authority they have never
recognized, shall we not expect them to show their
resentment by primitive and savage attacks when added
thereto the foreign steamers sink their junks and drown
their people? Doubtless the Szechuanese mind sees only the
steamers to blame. These primitive minds would not be able
to reason that any junk could be to blame, although we know
that in an admiralty court the contrary decision would often
be rendered. And here it is appropriate to recognize the
difficulty the native has of appealing to law. Treaty gives
us extraterritorial rights. That means that the claim of a
native against an American is taken to an American judicial
officer. Where there is an American Consul he acts as such.
In his absence if there is an American gunboat, that power
rests in the Senior Naval Officer. In the absence of both
there is no court of [Page 756] appeal. This is the situation along most of the river,
and it will continue until the government judges that the
situation requires more consuls and more gunboats. And the
river folks can not go up river to Chungking with their
appeals. At least they will not do it. So it is believed
just to say that the natives have much on their side of the
situation.”
It is quite possible, from the too broad language used by the Force
Commander above, that the Commanding Officer Monocacy felt justified in interpreting the Regulations as
vesting broad civil powers in the Naval Officer in the absence of a
Consul. The Force Commander, discussing above the right of a native
to make claim against an American merchant ship for damage or
sinking, had in mind that, in the absence of a Consul, the Naval
Officer might have the complaint of the native laid before him. The
Naval Officer is not vested with the power to settle the suit at
law, as might be understood from the language used by the Force
Commander.
3. The following is the Mission of this Force:—
“To protect the
lives, property and legitimate interests of American citizens within the
geographical limits of the Patrol. Such protection should
normally be afforded by representations to the appropriate
Chinese officials, but Force will be used when considered
necessary by the Patrol Commander (Senior Officer Present).
The cultivation of good relations with the Chinese
people will assist in the accomplishment of the
mission and raise the prestige of the United States.”
The essential parts of this mission are underscored. The parts not
underscored are in the nature of admonitions as to the courses of
action to be followed in accomplishing the mission.
Regulations, Chapter 18, Section 3, Art. 717–728. Intercourse with Foreigners, and Art. 876–879, lay down
also, and set limitations upon, the courses of action to be followed
by a Senior Officer Present.
Article 726 calls upon the Senior Officer Present to “protect all
merchant vessels and advance the commercial interests of this
country”
Thus the idea of protection dominates in the mission of the Force, in
the mission laid down in the Naval Regulations to govern every
Senior Officer Present, and in the State Department’s mission of the
Consular Officer. But the protection to be afforded by the Navy
implies direct action by the display of force, that to be afforded
by the Consular Officer implies indirect action by the pressure of
the power and prestige of the American government on native
authority.
4. I do not think there need be thought to be a conflict between the
mission of the Consul and the mission of the Naval Officer. [Page 757] Rather I think that their
missions are harmonious. Just as the State and Navy Departments work
side by side and support one another, so the Consul and the Naval
Officer are to work side by side each supporting and helping the
other in his work towards a common end. Article 718 of the
Regulations implies this coordination while maintaining the
independence of both.
5. The use of the Navy to protect the lives, property and legitimate
interests of American citizens implies that there exists a lawless
menace to those American rights which the local authorities are
incapable of suppressing.
Article 720 (b) lays it down that
“In the absence of a Consular Officer at a
foreign port the Senior Officer Present has authority to
communicate or remonstrate with foreign civil authorities as
may be necessary.”
I think that an existing necessity to remonstrate with foreign
authorities as contemplated in this regulation implies some lawless
act impending or committed, and does not mean to include a
remonstrance looking to the satisfaction of a judgment of
indebtedness won by an American against a native. On a small scale,
this would be in principle a display of naval force in the
collection of a debt. American precedent is against this. I refer to
the strong objections raised by President Roosevelt’s administration
against the attempt of the combined naval forces of some European
powers to collect debts from Venezuela in 1902.71
Continuing to examine how far the Navy should protect (display force
for) the legitimate interests of American citizens, we note that the
State Department lays it down that it is to the Consul “that
Americans are to apply in any controversy with the Chinese.”
6. I think the deduction is unmistakable that a controversy between
an American and a Chinese, such as the situation giving rise to this
problem, is a matter to be settled, not by the Senior Naval Officer
Present but by the Consul of the district. I think that this policy
is not only sound and expected by the State Department to be
followed, but that it also both holds up the hands of the Consul and
strengthens his prestige. Also, since the aim of this Force is at
present to diminish an ill-will that has grown out of economic
controversies we ought to have the best success along this line if
we ourselves keep from getting involved in any such economic
controversy as the situation presented. Furthermore, it seems to me
that we Naval Officers can best help the Chinese, if we set the
example of refusing to display force to settle economic
controversies (and this is not the same as displaying force to
suppress lawlessness [Page 758]
growing out of economic controversies). One of the things the
Chinese need to learn is to be led to the civil authorities to
settle justiciable matters, to be led away from the idea that the
military autocrat is the arbiter of their controversies.
7. The Commanding Officer Monocacy does well
to conference [confer] freely with the
Consul. In so doing we will operate to strengthen Consul’s hand and
his prestige in his district. In so doing the naval officer will
discover, in the exercise of a sound discretion, what course of
action should be followed, in any economic controversy likely to be
brought to his notice, that will best lend support to the standing
of the Consul among the Chinese and among our own nationals, and
thereby increase the Consul’s power to exact that protection his
mission calls upon him to afford. But the essential thing to guide
us in any situation is always to refer back to our Mission, and to
realize clearly that the Navy comes into action under its mission
primarily when the lives, property and legitimate interests of
American citizens are menaced by the failure of the native
authorities to afford protection or by their wilful disregard of our
rights.
8. The Force Commander desires to make it clear that his decision
herein must be taken to refer only to the problem arising in the
concrete situation presented by the Commanding Officer Monocacy. Like all problems arising under a
mission, each must have its own Estimate of the situation worked out
to a sound decision as to what is the best course of action to
pursue for the particular situation under consideration. This point
ought to be stressed, because the Force Commander does not want
anything herein to operate to stifle the initiative of the gunboat
captains in the execution of their mission.
W. W. Phelps
Rear Admiral
