761.6711/20

The Ambassador in Turkey (Grew) to the Secretary of State

No. 903

Sir: With reference to my despatch No. 901 of December 18, 1929,40 relative to the protocol signed by Turkish and Russian plenipotentiaries in Ankara on December 17, 1929, extending for two years the Turco–Russian Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality signed in Paris on December 17, 1925,41 and for a third year unless denounced six months prior to the end of that period, I have the honor to inform the Department that on December 19, 1929, the Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Numan Menemenli Bey, asked Mr. Crosby42 in [Page 843] Ankara to call upon him at the Foreign Office and requested him to inform me that the Turkish Ambassador in Washington had been instructed to make to the Government of the United States an explanatory declaration regarding the purport of the treaty along the following lines:

“In the protocol which we have just signed with Mr. Karakhan containing provisions as to securing the consent of the other party before concluding political agreements which go beyond normal agreements, we have only Europe and Asia in view and we have been influenced by geographical position.

“As a matter of actual fact it is an engagement more advanced and more accentuated than the requirements of normal relations and furthermore, on account of our policy of peace, we are opposed to alliances.

“In any case, the negotiations which have taken place with our neighbors, the Soviets, are limited to the relations of our two countries and in the protocol which has been signed no country has been particularly envisaged and it in no way applies to America.”

The Undersecretary added that the protocol would not affect Turkey’s peaceful relations with any other state and that he wished especially to observe that the references to states contiguous by land or sea to [Russia or] Turkey had no reference whatever to Siberia or Alaska. He pointed out that the agreements mentioned in Article 2 of the protocol refer only to secret pacts not published and that they have nothing whatever to do with treaties of amity, commerce, residence, establishment, etc. He said that in actual fact the protocol was primarily effective on Russia and Turkey in Europe and Asia and the Near East and that the protocol could and would in no way or at any time affect Turkish relations with the United States with regard to present or future treaty relations between the two countries.

The Undersecretary ended by declaring officially and in the name of his Government that no obstacle whatever exists to the development and the consolidation of Turco–American relations in every domain and that such development and consolidation is in no way whatever opposed by the recently signed protocol.

This statement by the Undersecretary should be accepted in entire good faith. It appears to me obvious from the terms of the protocol—and this is brought out by the comments of the Foreign Office—that the object of the instrument is to prevent either of the high contracting paries from entering into political alliances with a third power or to conclude secret political treaties with other powers without the consent of the other high contracting party. While it undoubtedly tightens the relations between Turkey and Soviet–Russia and while it may be regarded as “an engagement more advanced and more accentuated than the requirements of normal relations”, it cannot, [Page 844] according to the interpretation of the Turkish Government, be regarded in any way as an actual alliance. The Minister for Foreign Affairs has continually dwelt in our conversations upon Turkey’s disapproval of alliances in any form and from the instructions sent to Mouhtar Bey in Washington it appears that he has been directed to inform the American Government that Turkey is opposed to alliances. The purpose of the protocol appears to be primarily to prevent either of the high contracting parties from entering into alliances with other powers.

One current rumor in Constantinople is that the Russian Government was disquieted by the recent visit of the British fleet to Constantinople and by the unusually cordial reception which it received and that the Soviet Government proposed the present protocol out of fear lest Turkey should drift into a political alliance with Great Britain or some other European power. There are however no official indications to support this theory. In fact the same apprehension might equally well exist in the mind of the Turkish Government as regards Soviet Russia.

In any case it is quite clear both from the terms of the protocol and from the comments of the Undersecretary of State reported above that the agreement does not affect normal treaty relations with any power and that it can have no bearing upon our Treaty of Commerce and Navigation42a nor upon the kind of treaties which the United States might in future be disposed to negotiate with the Turkish Republic.

In view of the fact that the Turkish Ambassador in Washington has been instructed by telegraph to make these official explanations to the Department on behalf of his Government it appears to me to be superfluous to send these same explanations myself by cable.

I have [etc.]

Joseph C. Grew
  1. Not printed.
  2. British and Foreign State Papers, vol. cxxv, p. 1001.
  3. Sheldon L. Crosby, Counselor of Embassy.
  4. Ante, p. 838.