462.00R296A/1: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Germany (Sackett)

[Paraphrase]

193. A joint statement containing the following paragraph was issued upon the conclusion of the recent conversations between M. Laval and the President:34

“In so far as intergovernmental obligations are concerned we recognize that prior to the expiration of the Hoover year of postponement, some agreement regarding them may be necessary covering the period of business depression, as to the terms and conditions of which the two governments make all reservations. The initiative in this matter should be taken by the European powers principally concerned within the framework of the agreements existing prior to July 1, 1931.”

[Page 334]

Both the President and M. Laval agreed during the conference that Germany would require, during the depression, relief with regard to reparations. They shared the point of view that Germany should seek this assistance by applying for the designation of a special advisory committee under the terms of the second provision of part 8 E of the Young Plan.35 Furthermore, they agreed that if such a committee reported favorably for a readjustment of reparations to relieve Germany, President Hoover would then, and not before, send a recommendation to Congress urging that the debt settlements which the United States made with its various debtors individually be reconsidered. The German Ambassador, Von Prittwitz, informed me yesterday that Laval had talked with him after the conversations with the President. According to the Ambassador, Laval stated that upon his return to Paris he would have consultations with the Cabinet and then probably summon Von Hoesch, the German Ambassador in Paris, to suggest that Germany should immediately ask for the appointment of such a committee. This was in accordance with our own views, I told Von Prittwitz. In our opinion, I continued, Germany should take such action as soon as possible.

In view of the relationship between reparations and the business depression, the President insists that such action should be taken at an early date in order to reestablish general confidence. This is for your confidential information. In our opinion, world confidence would only be further disturbed by the prolonged wrangles, discussion, and repercussion from opposing groups in the several countries that would arise out of an international conference covering debts and reparations.

No advance commitments would be required under the plan which we propose. The need of giving aid to Germany dominates such action. Obviously such assistance should be made available as soon as possible. Inasmuch as the United States is not a party to the Young agreement, it has no voice in this initiative. The proposal and execution of the year moratorium, however, was intended to give time for the proper consideration of such questions, and therefore, in our opinion, we have a right to expect that the governments directly interested will put into action such processes; that the stability of the world will be enhanced by such action. Germany herself must take the initiative; and that such initiative should be taken is important. Our very definite views and the reasons therefor should be presented to Chancellor Bruening by you, if proposals contrary to the foregoing are suggested in the press or elsewhere.

Stimson
  1. Quotation not paraphrased. For complete text of the joint statement, see vol. ii, p. 252.
  2. Great Britain, Cmd. 3343 (1929), pp. 23–25.