Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, 1931, Volume I

500.A15a3/1458½

Senator Dwight W. Morrow to the Secretary of State

Naples, March 25, 1931.

Dear Mr. Secretary: I left London early Sunday morning, March 22, coming through to Naples without stopping at either Paris or Rome. We are leaving tomorrow for Palermo, where we plan to have a real holiday.

This report of the status of the Disarmament Question may be out of date when it reaches you. It will, however, give you my impressions at the time I left London.

I. The Effect of the Franco-Italian Accord on the Washington Treaty

On this point there is little to add to our cable of March 18th¹ and the cable drafted on Saturday, March 21st, which was probably dispatched to you on Monday, March 23d,¹ after I had left. It is quite clear that France has the right as against all signatories to the Washington Treaty to build three capital ship units of 23,333 tons each. She wants to complete one of these units and possibly two of them before Dec. 31, 1936. What shall she scrap? When she finishes the first 23,333 unit, she is not required to scrap anything. This first unit will be a replacement of the France already sunk. When she completes the second unit she would naturally scrap one of the Jean Bart class. Instead of scrapping nothing when she completes the first unit and a Jean Bart when she completes the second unit, France proposes to scrap one Diderot when she completes the first unit and another Diderot when she completes the second unit. She is not retaining average tonnage in excess of the Washington scrapping table, but she is retaining different average tonnage by changing the specific ships contemplated to be scrapped if she had employed her tonnage in constructing 35,000 ton units.

The draft of joint declaration which was handed us on March 23rd² was prepared to meet the Japanese position. Kuriyama,³ who represented the Japanese, wanted to be certain to avoid any change in the treaty that would involve submitting the changes to their Privy Council. He was inclined to feel that France could build 35,000 tons by reason of the loss of the France and that it would not be necessary for her to scrap anything until she completed another 35,000 tons. This would mean that when she finishes the third 23,333 ton unit she would have to scrap the Jean Bart and the Courbet. But as this third unit could not be completed until after 1936, why bother about it at all now? I give you this position of Kuriyama without expressing my assent to it.

II. The Effect of the Franco-Italian Accord Upon the London Treaty

It was understood by all that the agreement covering the cruisers, destroyers and submarines should not be made a part of the London Treaty. When I left London, however, the jurists had not started upon this paper. The technical experts were still wrestling with the actual substance and the jurists committee were waiting. This will probably result in a joint declaration by France and Italy limiting themselves inter se in a field in which they are now unlimited. There was evident in London, however, a strong desire on the part of the French and Italians to have England participate in some way in this declaration or agreement and to have some formality and dignity attend the consummation. It was even suggested that Briand and Grandi come to London for a ceremonial signing. I think this was desired for the possible effect upon the Disarmament Conference in 1932.

III. The Disarmament Conference of 1932

There is a very real interest in the coming 1932 conference on the part of the French and also upon an important section of British opinion. I think France looks upon this accord with Italy on naval programs as of importance chiefly in connection with the general League of Nations Disarmament Conference in which she has been the most interested party for many years. Moreover, I think France is ready to make some important steps to keep Italy’s goodwill. There is talk of a settlement of the French-Italy difference in Northern Africa. There is a possibility of a loan from French institutions to Italy. There is even talk of a three-power Mediterranean agreement between France, Italy and Jugo-Slavia providing for amity and arbitration of differences. This might well be along the lines of Locarno.

The chances of a successful conference in 1932 will undoubtedly be increased if France and Italy enter that Conference with their differences settled. There will still be necessary however a great deal of additional preliminary work if anything substantial is to come out of the conference. If you have read Viscount Cecil’s report to Henderson under date of Dec. 10, 1930,⁴ you will see how many troubles may arise before a large group of nations make a reality out of the League of Nations draft by inserting some real figures therein. Serious people on this side are aware of these difficulties. The French wanted Benes⁵ of Czecho-Slovakia to be appointed Chairman of the Conference of 1932 so that he could spend a year of preparation, visiting all of the most important countries. This did not meet with favor in Great Britain because Beneš is so close to France, nor in Germany for the same reason. Henderson himself is planning to take up the preparation with some of the more important countries. You may have heard by the time this reaches you that the Germans have been invited to visit London. I was told this confidentially.

I hope you will get a chance to read carefully the Report of the Preparatory Commission set out in Cecil’s report above referred to. It is a document of some 100 pages. What is to happen when England and France are face to face with their old difficulty of “security” preceding or accompanying “disarmament”? Does Henderson really represent British opinion on this point? What general theorem can apply to France and Germany? How many political questions will have to be settled between France and Germany before they are ready to begin on disarmament? What of Russia and the group of little states to the west of Russia?

I wonder whether the governments involved are leaving enough time for preparation? Henderson has great confidence. MacDonald seems to me to have doubts. Obviously the first step now is to have England and France and Italy see whether Germany is in accord with them.

Remembering our own meeting of a year ago in London, I should prefer that France, Italy, Germany and Russia (possibly) deal with Land Disarmament first and that the League plan come later. However, Henderson and Briand and Grandi have done a good job in the French-Italian Naval Accord. They are in a better position to talk with Germany if they stand together than if they split up into camps. I think there is much more of a disposition to be generous with Germany than there was a year ago.

Sincerely yours,

Dwight W. Morrow

1. Not printed.
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2. Not printed.
3. Shigeru Kuriyama, Counselor of the Japanese Embassy in France.
4. Great Britain, Cmd. 3757, Misc. No. 3 (1931), League of Nations: Despatch from Viscount Cecil of Chelwood enclosing the Report of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference and the Draft Disarmament Convention, Geneva, December 10, 1930.
5. Eduard Beneš, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Czechoslovakia.