500.A15a4/3½

The Chairman of the American Delegation on the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference (Gibson) to the Secretary of State

Dear Mr. Secretary: As the work of the Preparatory Commission draws to a close, plans for the General Disarmament Conference are taking rather definite shape and I feel I ought to tell you something as to what sort of Conference is in prospect.

[Page 472]

It seems to be generally accepted that the Conference cannot be expected to achieve more than a minimum program as regards limitation, that there will be no reduction, and that the most that can be hoped for is to approximate a stabilization of existing armaments. Even if Russia is represented at the Conference, it will not be for the purpose of entering into any commitments which will reassure the other European countries, nor will its commitments, if any, be trusted. Germany has served notice that any limitation of land armaments on the lines recommended by the Preparatory Commission, will afford her no incentive to be a party to the Treaty. There is a considerable possibility that a Treaty on land armaments, along the lines of our present draft, would be used by Germany to justify precipitating the whole question of revising the military clauses of the Versailles Treaty.79 Extreme nervousness on this subject has been manifest in the speeches of the delegations representing the European military Powers, and more than one intimation in the same direction has come from the German Delegation. Therefore, we have to face the possibility that the Continental military Powers will lay down figures based on the assumption that Germany will seek to free herself from the disarmament clauses of the Versailles Treaty.

Unless, between now and the opening of the Conference, existing political and naval questions are settled between France and Italy,80 it seems pretty clear that Italy will be a serious stumbling block in the way of anything in the nature of reduction or even agreement. If there is any development of the present trend toward Italian understanding with Germany, Russia, Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey, the European countries may go to the Conference divided into two clearly defined camps which will not make for conciliation and good understanding. The States bordering on Russia have made it clear that unless Russia is satisfactorily bound by the Treaty, they must be exempt from many essential provisions of that Treaty until such time as there may be some agreement with Russia. The French, who have claimed leadership in the disarmament movement, feel that their primary concern is security, and as matters now stand they find security only in adequate armament for themselves and their allies; Belgium, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Roumania and Yugoslavia.

While I was writing this letter, in the course of to-day’s debate it was decided that the reports of the Committee on Security, should be forwarded to the General Conference for consideration in connection with the limitation and reduction of armaments problem. The speeches in this connection made it clear that the problem of security on the Continent [Page 473] will be brought to the fore quite as insistently as the problems directly connected with the limitation of armaments. There are as many separate phases of this problem as there are States in Europe, and each one, I fear, will have to be debated exhaustively both in its relation to figures and its insistence upon Treaties for arbitration, mutual guarantees and assistance in time of danger, etc., to say nothing of bringing in the consideration of sanctions.

These are some of the principal obstacles in the way of limitation which will face the Conference when it meets, and even if it is not completely disrupted by political considerations, it is difficult to see how it can achieve more than an agreement to stabilize armaments at existing levels during the life of the general Treaty.

In spite of this discouraging situation, it is recognized that some effort must be made. Disarmament is one of the principal missions of the League of Nations, and if, after twelve years of existence and the conclusion of the work of the Preparatory Commission, no effort is made to reach an agreement, the League will suffer a serious blow. Furthermore, if the whole question were allowed to go by default, no matter what practical difficulties existed, Germany would inevitably seize upon this as a pretext for demanding a revision of the disarmament clauses of the Versailles Treaty on the ground that the other powers had no intention of carrying out the general measures of disarmament foreshadowed in the Preamble of Part V of the Treaty of Versailles. The Germans have built up a belief in their own country, and to some extent in other countries, that this provision of the Versailles Treaty was in the nature of a contract between the Germans and the Allied Powers, and that if those Powers made no effort to carry out their part of the contract Germany should be released from her present obligations. Whatever the foundation in law or fact for this contention, it is recognized that German propaganda on the subject has created a situation where the Powers must make an effort to get a treaty of some sort which will help them to insist on the maintenance of the disarmament clauses of the Versailles Treaty. So they feel that by all the disarmament talk of the past years, the member States have manoeuvered themselves into a position where they must meet in conference no matter how small the prospect of success. It is felt that the League can claim to have accomplished something if it puts a stop to the expansion of armaments, sets up a Permanent Commission to handle information in regard to armaments, and gets the Governments committed to the idea of periodic meetings in the future for the purpose of achieving further measures of limitation and reduction.

What concerns us chiefly is the American role in the coming Conference. So far as naval limitation is concerned, we are already [Page 474] bound by existing Treaties. As regards land armaments, it is not conceivable that measures of limitation will be generally adopted which will bring the other Powers down to a level where our army would be affected. No measures of limiting air armaments have thus far been devised which seem in any way effective, and here again we shall probably remain inside the scope of any measures of limitation which may be agreed upon.

Therefore, it would seem that our role in coming to the Conference will be that of a Power limited in its one formidable arm, and with land and air armaments at such low levels that they will not be affected. In other words, the strength of our actual armed forces will not enter into the calculations of the Conference. All that we can hope to do is to exercise a helpful influence from time to time. We can and should, of course, make clear at the beginning of the proceedings, our views as to the methods which must be adopted before there can be any real limitation and reduction of armaments, but no matter how sound our views on these questions, we know in advance that we shall not persuade certain other countries to accept them; to agree to abolish peace time conscription, to limit trained reserves, and to accept the direct limitation of materiel in service and in stock. We can do something useful by drawing attention to the methods which alone can lead to real limitation and reduction, and make it clear that the measures now under discussion offer little hope of real achievement, but neither by pleading nor threatening can we hope to accomplish any more.

A great many people in our country are bound to feel that because certain measures are desirable, we should insist on their adoption, just as was the case when we were urged at London to insist on the abolition of battleships and submarines. These people tell us things that should be done, but neglect to tell us how they are to be accomplished.

Our people are inclined to feel that the American Delegation at such a Conference should play a distinguished and dominating role, but so far as I can see there will be very little glory for the American Delegation, and the best we can hope for is to exercise a wholesome influence and avoid on the one hand the imputation that we have blindly acquiesced in half way measures, and on the other hand the resentment caused by bulldozing methods which cannot achieve their purpose. For that reason I hope you will give thought to the desirability of sending a delegation which will be as small in numbers as is consistent with carrying out its mission.

So far as we can see from the present tentative plans, the Conference will be divided into three committees on land, sea and air armaments, together with an important political committee, which will have at its disposal, experts in law and drafting and which will handle [Page 475] all save strictly technical questions. Confidentially, it seems probable that Beneš81 will be Chairman of the General Conference to act as a sort of Field Marshal and keep the work of the various committees coordinated and moving. Our chief delegate would have the duty of acting as spokesman in the plenary meetings, sitting on the political committee, and presumably on the steering committee which is also under consideration. As regards the committees dealing with the three categories of armaments, we need men who can hold a watching brief for us, but they should be men who are thoroughly versed in the technical aspects of the question.

So far as we can now gather, the Powers represented here seem to have the intention of considering even the land, sea and air committees as primarily political in character, and it is to be expected that they will have civilian spokesmen on these committees aided by technical advisers. This seems a reasonable procedure, and you may consider it well that we should have for each of these committees either a delegate, or a civilian of sufficient seniority and authority, to act as our spokesman.

From our conversations with Drummond,82 Beneš and others best qualified to express an opinion as to the duration of the Conference, it would seem that plans will be made for a minimum of four or five months with the possibility of adjournment at the end of that period, and a further concluding session after the meeting of the Assembly in September, 1932.

Naturally, the War and Navy Departments will have to give detailed and prolonged study not only to arrive at the figures which we will suggest for insertion in the tables, but also to map out what plans they can, and to see how far they can go to meet the needs of other nations. But perhaps of greater importance, the political representatives of the United States will have to have a considerable period of time in which to familiarize themselves with the attitudes which have been adopted and the theses which have been maintained by the various groups on the Continent during the course of the debates of the past five years, and the reasons for these various theses. Obviously, the discussions will center to a large extent around these previous debates. I venture to point this out in order to indicate the necessity of deciding on the composition of our delegation far enough in advance of the Conference to permit this detailed and difficult study.

The necessity for this is all the more obvious when one remembers the difficulties and intricacies of the London Conference83 involving [Page 476] only five nations and part of one category of armaments, whereas the General Conference will involve all categories of armaments as they affect some fifty powers, as well as bringing into play various conflicts of States and groups of States, and the issue of security in far more acute form than it was brought out in the London Conference.

I am sorry if the picture I have presented appears dark and discouraging, but it is in fact less pessimistic than much of the comment which is current here. I feel that in connection with all the difficulties, we can find some comfort in the thought that even such a minimum program as stabilization of armaments at existing levels, together with the setting up of new machinery to deal with information in regard to armaments and the application of the Treaty, will tend to accustom public thought to the idea of disarmament as a practical measure, and cause it to look to periodic conferences to bring about still more effective measures of limitation and reduction. This, while doubtless a great disappointment to public opinion which has set its heart on reduction, will nevertheless be a material improvement on the existing situation.

Very respectfully yours,

Hugh Gibson
  1. Treaties, Conventions, etc., 1910–1923, vol. iii, p. 3329.
  2. See pp. 358 ff.
  3. Eduard Beneš, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Czechoslovakia.
  4. Sir Eric Drummond, Secretary-General of the League of Nations.
  5. See Foreign Relations, 1930, vol. i, pp. 1 ff.