500.A15a4/172½
The Minister in Switzerland (Wilson) to the Secretary of State
[Received June 10.]
Dear Mr. Secretary: I sent you only three telegrams during the session of the Council in Geneva, and they were not of high importance, since Disarmament questions were of secondary interest in the anxious endeavors of all concerned to find some remedy for the economic depression.
Gilbert’s8 reports on the events of the Council are comprehensive, but I doubt whether they can reproduce for you the uniqueness and strangeness of this meeting. As you know, the economic positions of the European nations had been static; for four years innumerable attempts at negotiation among the economic experts had failed because [Page 499] of the impossibility of making any impression upon the political positions of the Governments. Suddenly came the threat of the German-Austrian Customs Union9 and it was as if a solvent had been poured upon a frozen mass. An immediate precipitation brought about for the first time a fluid condition and no one but a prophet can tell what will come out of it. But it does not need a prophet to foresee the possibility of preferential arrangements on cereals which will be repugnant to our most favored nation contentions. For the first time Ministers for Foreign Affairs themselves are discussing economic matters at Geneva. They are embarrassed and nervous and read their speeches instead of speaking extemporaneously. But they are pushed by an excited public opinion which demands that something be done to relieve these conditions. Perhaps the need for economy will push them into real concessions on Disarmament—if so, the cloud of economic depression will have one silver lining.
Except for the British, who are enthusiastic and hopeful for the Disarmament Conference, I could find no one who regarded the prospect with anything but apprehension. They know that it is a dangerous explosive which may go off in anyone’s hands; they know that the evasive talk of years in the Preparatory Commission will have to give way to facts and that the facts will be disagreeable; they know that the military clauses of the Versailles Treaty will be put to the test. They are between the hammer of a public demand for reduction and the anvil of a public demand for security. Most of them would willingly postpone the Conference indefinitely, but they know that Germany’s case for an immediate discussion is so formidable that no one dares to propose delay.
Mr. Henderson is delighted with his appointment as President. He is busy planning the British Delegation and told an English lady in Geneva that he hoped to have representatives of all parties on it. I told her to tell him that he should select Tories for the British Army and Liberals to represent the Navy. He also plans to have as many great figures present as possible for the opening of the Conference and for the first few days of debate in order to impress public imagination with the seriousness of the endeavor. He is planning to bring Mr. MacDonald and hopes to induce Mussolini and yourself to be present at the opening sessions.
Beyond the matters reported in my telegram No. 57, May 16, 1931, 6 p.m.,10 little of interest occurred relative to the naval discussions between England, France and Italy. Mr. Briand was at no time in a position to take decisive measures and I am informed that he and Mr. Grandi discussed the matter during the last days of the session [Page 500] and that both were of the opinion that all discussions should be deferred until a new French Cabinet takes office after June 13.
Very respectfully,