662.6331/71
Memorandum by the Secretary of State of a Conversation With the German Ambassador (Von Prittwitz)
The German Ambassador came to speak to me about the customs union between Germany and Austria. I told him as I had told the others, that I had not yet received the text officially and I was not prepared to comment on it until I had. I said we would be very careful not to intrude ourselves into the political controversies that might be incited regarding it, and as to the economic questions that might arise in reference to it we should, as we recognized them as very important, proceed with great care and study. He asked me if I had made up my mind at all in regard to our own relations under the most-favored-nation treaties. I told him that that question seemed to be very delicate, and I was going very carefully about it as I found there were differences of view even in my own Department. He then said that it had seemed to be recognized that the customs union did not affect most-favored-nation treaties. I said there seemed to be a very great difference of opinion about that, arising possibly out of the fact that the old most-favored-nation treaties were conditional treaties under which a country could not claim advantage unless it was prepared to reciprocate. I pointed out that, for example, if we had a conditional most-favored-nation treaty with Germany we could not apparently ask for the free import of our goods through her customs union with Austria unless we were prepared to give similar free entry through our own tariff barrier. I suggested that it was possible that the idea that the most-favored-nation treaty did not apply to a customs union grew out of the fact that the only treaties of that kind in existence at the time of the old customs unions were conditional treaties, and the other nations which held them did not seek to press them. I pointed out that the unconditional most-favored-nation treaty, on the other hand, was a very recent product, not dating back any earlier (at least so far as we were concerned) than 1924 or 1925. Therefore, the situation under such an unconditional treaty, which was the kind that we held with Germany, might be very different in its effect upon a customs union than the former kind of conditional treaties; that on that point I was studying carefully and making up my mind with great care. He begged me to let him know as soon as I had decided.
He told me that this customs union was not a new idea at all with Germany; that the question of the abolition of customs barriers had been discussed for a long time as one of the most important steps [Page 573] toward the rehabilitation of Europe; that it was the basis of the Briand proposal and that Germany felt that she was working in the interest of what all had desired. I told him that I realized that but I was aware at the same time of the fear of prominent French international writers, based upon their study of the old zollverein between Prussia and smaller German states; that these French students thought that such a zollverein had been the basis of Germany’s political growth and evidently feared a repetition of it. He said there was no idea on the part of Germany of any such anschluss, and that her whole purpose was economic.
He told me that the American press seemed to have been very restrained in their comment on this situation. I replied that we had taken the utmost care to avoid any comment and to impress upon the press that we did not take any part in these political discussions. I told him that I had seen the report in the Times about a statement of the Department of Commerce, and had telephoned and ascertained that it was entirely untrue; that no such statement had been given out. I told him the only statement in Europe which had impressed me was the fear that this announcement of a customs union might injure M. Briand; if that was so I should be very sorry, because M. Briand was such a power for peace. The Ambassador said he appreciated that but he felt sure that M. Briand could be counted on to handle the matter skillfully; and that we must also remember Mr. Bruening’s1 difficulties. I told him we understood.
- Heinrich Bruening, Chancellor of the German Reich.↩