715.1715/440: Telegram

The Minister in Honduras (Lay) to the Secretary of State

51. The following telegram was sent to the Legation, Managua:

March 21, noon. President Mejia Colindres realizes that unless some concession, however slight, is made by the Honduran Government [Page 800] to Nicaragua ratification of the protocol in Nicaragua will fail. I have pointed out to him that a great effort and probably a sacrifice may be necessary by the Government and Congress of Honduras but for a settlement both are more than justified. But remember he is not Ibanez or Leguia.

On the other hand I have tried to dissuade Prado from asking for too much but in spite of his instructions enclosed in your despatch No. 355 of March 616 Prado submitted a memorandum suggesting that in a separate “interpretative” protocol the boundary line should be considered as running a few kilometers north of and parallel to the Coco River instead of running through the middle of its channel this change leaving the villages on the north bank in Nicaragua. He stated to me that these villages have always been Nicaraguan. Prado suggested also that the triangular territory between the Coco and Cruta Rivers be considered in Nicaragua. Prado insists that these would be very small concessions for Honduras but would mean much to Nicaragua and he feels that from his talks with a few prominent Honduran deputies that Congress and the public would offer no serious objection to granting them.

Last night Prado told me that after an hour’s conversation with the President yesterday in the presence of his Cabinet he was told politely but positively by the President that a revolution against the Government here would be started if he, the President, agreed to Prado’s proposals.

I have urged Prado to continue his discussions with the President in the hope that some alternative concession may be given more favorable consideration, something less likely to be interpreted as modifying the award. He says he has only suggested the minimum desired by the majority in the Nicaraguan Congress but will see the President again on Monday.

Prado does not realize or will not acknowledge that although the President and Congress want a settlement they would rather, in the existing political situation here, lose ratification in Nicaragua than grant a concession to secure ratification and thus run the risk of incurring the enmity of the Honduran public. By next session the ground might be prepared for Congress and the President to grant a concession to effect a settlement.

In Tegucigalpa it is quite evident to me from my conversations with him and the attitude he is taking here that Prado is following the policy stated in your telegram of February 20, 4 p.m.,16a and not the more cooperative and generous policy described in despatch above referred to. He keeps insisting on the illegality of the award and that some of its doubtful provisions cannot be left to interpretation by the Commission of Engineers.

Lay
  1. See footnote 15b, p. 798.
  2. See telegram No. 35 from the Minister in Nicaragua, p. 797.