862.00/2947: Telegram

The Chargé in Germany (Gordon) to the Secretary of State

61. From Norman Davis.21 It is difficult to appreciate to what extent Germany has gone through, and still is in the throes of, a real revolution without actually coming here and talking both with the leaders of that revolution and other observers as I have done during the past 2 days. While there was not the spectacular “March on Rome” which dramatized [Page 217] the Italian revolution, many of the essential elements of the situation are similar. The immediate consequences of the revolution chiefly affect internal policy and conditions. Its effect on international policy will make itself felt more slowly and can hardly be determined at the present time. The revolution was undoubtedly attended by certain excesses which has been fully reported and possibly somewhat over-stressed in our press.

In my talk with Hitler I told him frankly that the reports of these excesses had been very disturbing abroad and undoubtedly had reacted very unfavorably on American public opinion. He made no direct reply. Other Government officials alleged that the reports of excesses had been greatly exaggerated but they and private persons with whom I spoke stressed the extraordinary extent to which the various professions, particularly the law, had been monopolized by the Jews resulting in such a nationwide resentment that Hitler could not fully control the anti-Jewish movement which he and his associates had started.

The revolution had brought fundamental governmental changes which have transformed Germany into a completely centralized state and to all intents and purposes made the Hitler Government the supreme legislative as well as the executive body. In fact, this power is so absolute that among the Nazis there is now no prospects of a return to the monarchy as this would limit their power. We may later find the rather extraordinary situation of the Center and Socialistic groups attempting to turn to the monarchy as a protection against the absolutism of the Nazis.

The revolution has not yet resulted in eliminating all of the old functionaries and the Nationalists still remain at least nominal partners of the Nazis. It is possible that such men as Vice Chancellor von Papen, Foreign Minister Neurath and Finance Minister Krosigk will retain their portfolios at least for a time but presumably under careful Nazi supervision. Within the Nazi party there are special bureaus which decreed [decide?] such questions as foreign affairs, finance, et cetera, which will probably have considerable influence and possibly control the ministries still headed by officials of the former Government. We thus find the rather extraordinary situation of looking to the ministers of the Nationalist wing of the Government, who until a short time ago were considered reactionary and monarchists, to maintain some semblance of common sense in internal and international affairs.

It is too early yet to judge the course the revolution will take. It depends upon Hitler’s ability to withstand the radical leaders in his own party and also his hold upon the forces particularly the semimilitary formations which he organized for the purposes of the revolution. Yesterday and today I had conversations with Von Hindenburg, [Page 218] Hitler, Neurath and numerous other persons. My call upon Hindenburg was of a courtesy nature, but I gained the impression that despite his great age his health is sound and he spoke with vigor and directness. He is still a factor to be reckoned with if he should wish to appeal to the people or should decide to declare martial law even though the power which Hitler has assumed under the empowering law has deprived the office of the President of a large share of his prerogatives.

In my conversation with Hitler it was difficult to get him off the topic of the necessity for an immediate revision of the Versailles Treaty. At times he spoke in an excited and oratorical manner. He stressed again and again the intolerable conditions for Germany, exposed as she was to attack on the Polish frontier. In fact, he came back to this so often that it made me wonder whether he did not have a purpose in doing so in order to help prepare public opinion in case later an incident should occur or be manufactured on that frontier. I made it clear to Hitler that while there was considerable sentiment outside of Germany favorable to reasonable modification of the Treaty any attempt to effect a forceful revision would destroy confidence internationally, that by making a public issue of revision he would defeat his own ends and that the only solution I saw was to work quietly toward the rectification of specific points where hardship for Germany might be involved. Hitler stated categorically that Germany did not intend to attempt Treaty revision or, to regain the Corridor by use of force. In one excited moment he did say that irrespective of all opposition Germany will insist upon and obtain the armaments necessary for defense of her Eastern frontier.

In discussing the specific question of disarmament he stated that there was to be no change in the policy which Neurath had laid down and that they wish to achieve their equality through the lowering of the armaments of others rather than by building up themselves.

The following are the significant points of several long talks which we had with Neurath. He feels that the Four-Power Pact is apt to be buried by the French.22 In its original draft as proposed by Mussolini it is considered satisfactory to the Germans. Then MacDonald changed it and it became much less satisfactory to them. He felt that the French memorandum would probably change the original project beyond recognition. Neurath is anxious to press the work of disarmament and is willing to take the British plan as a basis for discussion and he did not reject a suggestion which the French had made to me and which I repeated to him that the proposed treaty should run for 10 and not for 5 years. He and Von Bülow suggested that if the treaty were to continue [Page 219] beyond the 5-year period proposed by MacDonald further measures of disarmament than here envisaged would be necessary. Neurath emphasized the need for private conversations by a small group of powers to prepare the way for Geneva work and he and his associates seemed to have little hope of anything resulting from the publication of meetings at Geneva. He and Von Bülow stressed that it would be wise to let the new German Government have a few more weeks to formulate its policy before pressing them for final decisions on disarmament. Granted this time they feel confident it will be possible to reach a disarmament agreement which they think is essential to political stability and economic recovery and to the success of the Economic Conference.23 They seemed to be impressed with the necessity of reaching an agreement on disarmament so as to quiet the agitation here and give them an opportunity to solidify their position. On the naval side they emphasized that Germany did not wish to build up a navy and I gained the distinct impression that something might be done with them on this score to help tranquilize the French and possibly thus make it unnecessary for the French to carry through the building of the Dunkerque. I feel this point is well worth explöring.

I discussed the Economic Conference with Posse24 and Ritter,25 who informed me that the Germany which originally had desired an early meeting would now much prefer that the preliminary work be carried to a point where the Conference could be assured of success. In fact Posse told me that if at the last moment before the Conference met it seemed doubtful whether positive results could be achieved, Germany would decline to attend the Conference. This I feel is significant of an attitude which we will probably find in dealing with the new German Government which will consider it vital that its first adventures in the field of foreign affairs should be successes so as to strengthen their prestige internationally and their position with their own people. The preliminary conversations in Washington are clearly welcome here and Luther’s designation as Ambassador was for the purpose of permitting them to take an effective part in such conversations.

Unfortunately, Schacht was absent in Basel so I could not get his views on financial problems. I found a general impression here that Germany may shortly have to cut down the service on her funded debt as a result of the force of circumstances following the recently disastrous fall in her favorable balance of trade. Hitler stated, however, that the [Page 220] new Government had no intention of repudiating its financial obligations and would fulfill them to the extent of its ability.

In general, in dealing with Germany we must realize that the new Government is too preoccupied with internal problems to have been able as yet to establish any clear-cut policies in foreign affairs and its eventual policy will be greatly influenced by the course which the revolution has begun. In important matters of policy such as conference with [sic] and preparation for the Economic Conference I feel we would be better advised to allow them a little time to formulate their views because if we press for a decision now they are likely to be improvised and hardly calculated to promote international agreement. The one policy to which the Hitler Government has definitely committed itself is that of trying in every way to effect an early revision of the Versailles Treaty but they seem to have no clear-cut idea as to how they should go about this.

Gordon has collaborated on the preparation of the general political section of this cable and I have had the benefit of several long conversations with Messersmith.26 [Norman Davis.]

Gordon
  1. Telegram in three sections.
  2. Head of the American Delegation to the Disarmament Conference; for correspondence concerning the Conference, see vol. i, pp. 1 ff.
  3. For correspondence concerning the Four-Power Pact, signed at Rome, July 15, 1933, see vol. i, pp. 396 ff.
  4. See vol.i, pp. 452 ff.
  5. Dr. Hans Ernst Posse, official in the Ministry of Economics, who later participated in the London Economic Conference.
  6. Dr. K. Ritter, Foreign Office official in charge of economic matters and the Reparations Commission affairs.
  7. George S. Messersmith, Consul General at Berlin.