862.00/3028
The Chargé in Germany (Gordon) to the Acting Secretary of State
[Received July 21.]
Sir: With reference to my confidential despatch No. 2498 of June 23, 1933, I have the honor to report as follows.
In that despatch I gave a general picture of the tremendous pace at which the new revolutionary wave was sweeping over Germany, with the resultant uncertainty as to the point at which the Nazi leaders would call at least a temporary halt and consolidate their gains before proceeding to a fresh advance.
It now appears that Hitler has decided that such a moment has come and the chronology of the events of the last ten days is of interest.
On June 30, four Nazis, rather prominent as subordinate leaders in Nazi industrial and commercial circles, were expelled from the party and arrested. The ground given was that they had attempted to “rob the Führer of his freedom of decision” by stirring up various personal and business organizations to exert pressure on the Chancellor. It eventually transpired that the object of this pressure was to bring about the appointment of Reich Commissioner for Industry Wagener as Minister of Economics in Hugenberg’s place; it also is generally believed that Wagener, who as such Commissioner had enjoyed great power and influence, [Page 246] was himself arrested and that, though he was shortly afterwards released and is for the moment at large, he is now very much out of favor.
Likewise on June 30, President von Hindenburg roused himself to write an open letter to Hitler, deplöring the conflict in the Evangelical Church and expressing the hope that its unity might soon be reestablished by the Chancellor—a request with which the latter ostensibly lost no time in complying. However, in despatch No. 2516 of July 8,47 going forward in today’s pouch, which deals specifically with this church conflict, I felt constrained to point out that this compliance might well be more apparent than real, and constitute only a slight “face-saver” for the President in return for the bitter pill he had had to swallow in agreeing to the dismissal of Hugenberg and the annihilation of the Nationalist Party. It must, however, be noted that this incident might also be interpreted as indicating that under certain conditions Hitler may find it convenient to use the President’s position and personality as a check on his followers rather than to issue direct repressive orders of his own.
On July 2, the Chancellor held another meeting of party leaders at Bad Reichenhall, the whole tone of which was quite different from that of the party leaders’ meeting held some two weeks previously in Berlin. In his Reichenhall speech the Chancellor took occasion impliedly to rebuke those orators—including incidentally Minister Gobbels—who had recently been indulging in more than the usual inflammatory talk concerning the imminence of a Second Revolution (see pages 5 and 6 of my despatch under reference). He said that he would relentlessly and brutally suppress all attempts by reactionary or other circles to overthrow the present order. However, he would also relentlessly turn against a so-called second revolution, for such a revolution would have chaotic results.
On July 5, in an open letter to the Statthalter of Brunswick, Hitler further cautioned against wholesale arrest and trial of business men and industrialists on charges based largely on personal denunciations and prompted by motives of personal revenge or private business rivalries.
On July 6, the Minister of Labor issued a statement to the effect that in industrial labor disputes the Reich regional trustees of labor, and not the innumerable and irresponsible individual Nazi Cell Organizations, should have competence.
Again on July 6, at a meeting of the various Statthalters held in Berlin, the Chancellor delivered a speech which went way beyond any of his previous utterances in showing his recognition of the need for moderation in the process of making Gleichschaltung experiments in [Page 247] business and industry, and of putting an end to the existing insecurity of business conditions. The salient passages of this speech are reported in despatch No. 2524 of July 10,48 going forward in this pouch.
Two days later, Rudolf Hess, to whom it will be remembered Hitler transferred the active leadership of the Nazi Party, issued an order revoking previous measures adopted against department stores and prohibiting all Nazi activities hostile to them.
The foregoing constitutes a striking week’s record of events. It shows, as I have often pointed out to the Department (see e.g., confidential despatch No. 2428 of May 22, page 548), that what is known here as the “Druck von unten”—that is to say, the pressure from below on the part of the rank and file of the Nazi Party who feel that, with the coming into power of that party, they have in no wise obtained the material benefits which should accompany such a development and which they feel are due them for their past party services—is still a very acute reality. It also indicates, however, that, whatever his motives, and in spite of very certain opposition, the Chancellor has decided to take the bolder and more statesmanlike line of trying to curb the illegalities and excesses of his followers which are doing so much to perpetuate tension and unrest throughout the country.
I do not mean to give the impression that this tension and unrest will be eliminated from the daily lives of Jews or of active opponents of the Nazi régime, but the Chancellor does seem to have in mind a definite effort to allay the uncertainty now existing in the business world.
The entire elimination of all other political parties, which culminated with the dissolution of the Center Party on July 5, thus completing the materialization of the Nazi principle of political “totality”, has of course made it easier for the Chancellor to turn his attention and efforts to putting his own Nazi house in order; nevertheless, he is certain to encounter fierce resistance springing from disappointed egotism, and the big question, determinative of the future course of the Nazi Revolution, still is of the same nature as it always has been, namely, whether the Chancellor will be strong enough to follow along the line which, as hereinabove indicated, it is believed he has now adopted.
Respectfully yours,