765.84/1711: Telegram

The Ambassador in Italy (Long) to the Secretary of State

686. In case the Italo-Ethiopian plan is not settled at Geneva you should be prepared for a possible sudden outbreak of hostilities between Italy and England. Even if the final resolution at Geneva should permit each member to take such steps to enforce sanctions as that member deems appropriate and should so permit England to operate under the guise of League authority, the struggle would still be between England and Italy and the world would soon imagine it as such.

I am not one of those who discount the effectiveness of Italy in the Eastern Mediterranean. There is no doubt Mussolini has a definite confidence in his army and in his air corps. He, no doubt, realizes the inferiority of his fleet compared ship for ship with that part of England’s fleet now in these waters, but neither he nor anyone else knows the effective possibilities of heavy fast bombers with modern explosives operating against vessels of war.

The position of Italy is concentrated and strategic. Only 90 miles separate Sicily from Tunis. Halfway across the Italians have the strongly fortified Island Pantelleria and on Sicily they have strong air bases. With those two features and their considerable superiority in submarines, Italy could conceivably cut the Western from the Eastern Mediterranean. She would immediately commence operations [Page 668] against Egypt, advancing on Alexandria and Port Said from Libya and detach part of her forces now in Western Eritrea to operate against Khartum. The English would have difficulty in replenishing their forces in Egypt—at least during some months—for her transports would have to pass the Sicily-Tunis barrier. In the meantime, the Italian air bases in Libya, the Dodecanese Islands and Southern Italy would be flying at the British ships while the Italian Navy would be temporarily in a defensive operation waiting till and hoping for the sinking of a sufficient number of British ships so that Italy would have a superiority. It is also probable that Greece would be a battle ground to establish air bases.

The Italian fleet is now one-third in the Dodecanese, one-third in the Taranto, and one-third in Northern Sicily. The British fleet is three-quarters in the Mediterranean and one-quarter in the Red Sea.

The superiority of the British fleet and the known quality of British naval personnel is generally recognized. But one is apt to forget that the Italy of today is quite a different thing from the Italy of the past. They have been worked up to a fever heat and have a deadly hatred of England whom they see now athwart their path to success in East Africa and whose control of their neighboring waters is deeply resented. The Italians will be fighting for life and will demonstrate in action the fervid attachment they feel for a cause which to them has many of the motivating influences of a religious fervor. Youth will coolly contemplate certain death in many an effort to cripple the sea power of the antagonist whose warships block their advance.

No one can visualize this who has not lived in this new Italy, known these leaders, realized their determination and their desperation and understood their spirit. Italy is today a veritable war machine 40,000,000 strong directed by something akin to genius and committed to that leadership with an unanimity, a fervor, and a fanaticism almost incredible. Most reports of dissensions and anti-Fascist strength are of British origin and should be discounted 90 percent. The nation is organized throughout and its armed forces are equipped with every modern apparatus. It is a dangerous enemy today for any nation to tackle and while the resources of the British Empire must be counted in the long view a deadly stroke might be delivered against it in the first stages.

Considering their strategic position, their concentrated organization, their modern equipment and their fanatic adherence to a leader who represents their national aspirations and their continuing economic existence, they cannot be easily dismissed even in conflict with the British fleet. The internal groups in Egypt are not so loyal as painted by the British but even if they were loyal to that extent the Italians are flanked on Egypt and on the Sudan in numbers and with [Page 669] equipment sufficient to constitute a definite present superiority and a continuing superiority over anything the British could produce in land forces for months to come.

It is easily conceivable they could penetrate to the Canal in which case England’s fleets would be hopelessly separated.

So that while Italy may be inferior in some respects, on the local sea they have a definite superiority in the air and on land both in Europe and in Africa and they are in a position from which they may achieve a success at least temporary and which might be prolonged by virtue of any control over the Suez Canal.

There are constant references in the Italian press and in the papers of other European countries to the close cooperation between the United States and England. The attitude of the American Government in the present circumstances is ascribed to a desire to cooperate with England but I think we must consider the probability of a definite conflict between Italy and England when our neutral policy will begin immediately to operate vis-à-vis England as well as continue vis-à-vis Italy. And considering this probable future development we might complicate our position if we failed to adopt toward England the same attitude we have adopted toward Italy. Considerations of neutral policy would suggest that we act so promptly in the matter that it would leave no implication of partiality nor establish a position which might be construed as lacking in neutrality. I venture to bring this whole view to your attention and to suggest that your contemplation of the entire problems include the very definite possibility that Italy may emerge from it all in at least temporary control of the Eastern Mediterranean and of the Red Sea and the Suez Canal.

The potentialities of the situation suggest the possibility of our having to deal on a friendly basis in the future with a much more important Italy.

This is not a prediction. It is only a survey. It is presented for your consideration in connection with the war now progressing as well as in connection with the characters aspiring to suddenly spring into being. At the same time, I desire to submit that while the action of Italy in the present conflict is in violation of a covenant to which the American Government is a party (The Kellogg Pact) a conflict between Italy and England would be a violation of the same treaty by both parties. Whereas the American Government would have enjoined upon it the policy of neutrality resolved by the Congress a prompt announcement of its position such as was done at the beginning of the Italo-Abyssinian war would help to relieve us of the Chargé of partisanship now generally circulated and which would be given substance and possibly construed as an unfriendly attitude if we withheld or delayed the announcement.

Long