852.00/4305: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State
[Received 1:45 p.m.]
34. For Moore.7a This morning from Léger8 who is now in charge of Foreign Office I obtained further confirmation of the statements I made to you last night by telephone.
Léger said: As I knew, for many weeks the French Government had feared that the Germans under cover of sending reinforcements to Franco would send troops to Spanish Morocco and occupy that territory. German occupation of Spanish Morocco would cut French communications with North African colonies; would cut England’s communications through the Mediterranean and would be intolerable for either France or England.
Eight days ago François-Poncet, French Ambassador in Berlin, had discussed the Moroccan situation with Neurath9 and had received assurances that the German Government had no intention of sending troops to Morocco. Neurath had talked in the most amiable and friendly manner; had suggested a continuance of the economic and financial negotiations between France and Germany which has been inaugurated by Schacht10 and had said that he felt the Spanish affair should be turned into an element for the consolidation of friendship between France and Germany rather than an element of discord.
Léger said that Poncet had replied that France was entirely prepared to go ahead with the Schacht conversations and would like to continue them at once. He said that Neurath had then answered that he felt the first step overlooking improvement of Franco-German relations must be the extinguishment of the flames of war in Spain.
The new element which had come into the situation 2 days ago was the information which the French Government had received from its agents in Spanish Morocco that 300 German soldiers had been landed at Spanish Morocco and that contracts had been made by German [Page 218] agents in Spanish Morocco for quarters and food supplies for 3,000 German troops in Ceuta and the neighborhood.
Furthermore at the same time François-Poncet in Berlin and the French Consul in Munich had informed the French Government that they had information that 3,000 Reichswehr troops from Bavaria were about to leave for Spanish Morocco to arrive about January 10.
The French Government had then communicated with the authorities in Burgos reminding them that France as the protecting power in Morocco was responsible for the maintenance of the sovereignty of the Sultan in Spanish Morocco as well as in French Morocco; that under the well known international agreements with regard to Morocco Spain could not permit troops of any foreign country to enter the Spanish zone and could not receive assistance from any foreign country in the Spanish zone. They had warned Franco that France would not tolerate any suspension of privileges with regard to Morocco.
Léger said that he had then sent for the German Ambassador in Paris, Count von Welczek, and had informed him that he had received reports that 3,000 troops of an unnamed country were to be landed in Morocco (without naming the troops as German troops) and had informed Welczek of the communication made by the French Government to the Burgos authorities. Welczek had replied that he was certain that if any such troops were being sent they could not be German troops as he had received the most explicit communication from the German Foreign Office to the effect that the German Government was most anxious not to see the international situation aggravated by events in Spain.
The French Government had communicated with the British Government and had informed the British Government that the French were about to send a portion of their fleet to the coast of Spanish Morocco for observation purposes. Léger pointed out that under an agreement with Spain the French have the right to send their warships to the harbor of Ceuta without even informing the Spanish Government. He said that French ships were being sent to Spanish Moroccan waters to observe very exactly all landings in Spanish Morocco.
He added that Corbin, French Ambassador in London, had talked with Eden11 yesterday and that Eden had said that he believed the British Government also should send ships to Spanish Moroccan waters for the purpose of observation; but had added that he must consult the Admiralty as he was not sure what ships were available and that he would give the French Government a definite reply tonight.
[Page 219]In the middle of our conversation Léger talked with Corbin in London on the telephone and asked him to inform Eden today that the French Government had information from a source which it regarded as entirely reliable that the 3,000 German troops destined for Spanish Morocco would pass, not by way of the Atlantic but via Italy and the Mediterranean.
He instructed Corbin reply to Eden that if this information was correct the action of Italy was scarcely in accord with the recent gentlemen’s agreement. He also instructed Corbin to point out to Eden that the French Government regarded the sending of German troops to Spanish Morocco as entirely different from the sending of German troops to the Spanish mainland. The sending of German troops to Spain could be considered as merely help to Franco in Spain. The sending of German troops to Spanish Morocco must be regarded as an attempt to establish a German base for the eventuality either of war in the spring or German acquisition of a colonial domain.
We then had a long conversation on the general situation which Léger concluded as follows: The French legal position in opposing the presence of German troops in Morocco is absolutely unassailable. The French armed forces now in French Morocco are sufficient to throw out all German troops which may be landed in Spanish Morocco. It is not the intention of the French Government to make this question of the landing of German troops in Morocco the starting point for armed conflict with Germany. France disposed to handle the matter in such a way as not to hurt German sensibilities or German pride. He indicated that the French would probably close their eyes to the presence of the 300 Germans who landed in Morocco 2 days ago and that France will make every effort to persuade the Germans to alter the destination of the 3,000 men now en route from Spanish Morocco to the Spanish mainland.
Léger was in no way excited about the situation and stated definitely that he did not anticipate any very serious results although of course the question contained the seeds of war as France could not and would not tolerate large German armed forces in Spanish Morocco.
Therefore I venture to reiterate what I said to you on the telephone last night, to wit, that I do not believe there is any immediate danger of war springing from the Moroccan question and I feel that it would be inadvisable for our Government to make any statement with regard to the matter at the present time.
Europe is today so tense with expectation of war that we must expect to have an incident of this sort arising every few weeks. You may be sure that if I find the slightest indication of immediate danger I will inform you instantly.
- It. Walton Moore, Assistant Secretary of State.↩
- R. A. Alexis Léger, Secretary General of the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs.↩
- Baron Constantin von Neurath, German Minister for Foreign Affairs.↩
- Hjalmar Schacht, German Minister for Economic Affairs and President of the Reichsbank.↩
- Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.↩