740.0011 European War 1939/6579: Telegram

The Minister in Ireland (Gray) to the Secretary of State

99. Referring to my telegram No. 98,13 had confidential and friendly talk with Walshe, External Affairs, who lunched November 7 before Prime Minister statement regarding Irish ports. This statement as foreshadowed in our telegram has received warm approval throughout country, memorandum of Walshe conversation being forwarded by pouch.14

Walshe stated that Irish Government would never give England the ports. Aside from question of neutrality his Government believed that they would never get them back. That also was his belief, unless there were American guarantee. I asked what would happen if United [Page 169] States were attacked and so brought into war and needed Irish air and sea bases. He said he thought that could be arranged without great difficulty. Discussed these same points the following day with Dillon, Opposition leader and member of Defense Council, who lunched here Friday. He said that if he proposed giving England the ports De Valera would beat him 14 to 1. That if he proposed giving the United States the ports and De Valera opposed it he would beat De Valera 3 to 1. He said that De Valera had told him he would lease the ports to no one.

One practical difficulty not discussed but important alike to De Valera’s supporters and opponents is the defenselessness of Irish cities from air attack. Eire has no anti-aircraft guns or fighter planes. Adequate defense of cities would be prerequisite to taking over ports. Armament discussion with Great Britain continues in [a?] circle. Premier complains he is not trusted and cannot get arms. British feel they cannot supply essential kinds of armament to Government which withholds sympathy. Such arms might be used against them. Premier says they would not be so used unless Irish sovereignty were menaced. England says such a step if taken would only be for Irish protection. De Valera answers, “Give us arms and we will protect ourselves and you too,” so on endlessly.

Referring back to conversation with Walshe I told him that I thought his Government must be prepared for support of Great Britain in the American press in case Churchill, moved by what he conceived to be a necessity, announced that he would occupy the ports by force after presenting publicly his brief which would probably include what is reported to be Chamberlain’s undocumented understanding at the time he surrendered them,15 that in case of need the harbors would be available.

Walshe suggested that if we should be brought in against our will the approach to bases should be along the lines of regrouping of democracies after victory, an enterprise in which his Government would be glad to participate. He said that his Chief was thinking in this direction. He suggested even permanent American air and sea bases in Ireland for the control of the North Atlantic. He would want us evidently as a buffer against England.

As we see it here any attempt by Churchill to negotiate for the ports will be hopeless. He has the choice between seizing them and paying the price in possible bloodshed and certain hostility and doing without. If he said that he could not any longer supply Ireland in British vessels it would probably bring home the situation to the Irish people and cause discontent with the Government but De Valera would probably capitalize it for his own political advantage. His whole [Page 170] power is based on his genius for engendering and utilizing anti-British sentiment. His administration otherwise is generally unsuccessful. He is probably the most adroit politician in Europe and he honestly believes that all he does is for the good of the country. He has the qualities of martyr, fanatic and Machiavelli. No one can outwit him, frighten or blandish him. Remember that he is not pro-German nor personally anti-British but only pro-De Valera. My view is that he will do business on his own terms or must be overcome by force.

Gray
  1. Dated November 8, 6 p.m., not printed.
  2. Transmitted by the Minister in Ireland as an enclosure to his despatch No. 96, November 13, not printed.
  3. By agreement of April 25, 1938. Neville Chamberlain was British Prime Minister at the time.