883.00/1137: Telegram

The Minister in Egypt ( Fish ) to the Secretary of State

211. Legation’s telegram No. 209, September 20, 4 p.m. Following a meeting of the Egyptian Cabinet on September 21 to discuss the [Page 480] situation arising out of the occupation of Egyptian territory by Italy the four Saadist members of the Cabinet (see this Legation’s despatch No. 2158, July 27 and telegram No. 192, September 314) resigned when the Cabinet refused to accept their proposal that Egypt should declare a state of war against Italy. In the course of the discussion the Prime Minister is reported to have maintained that he perceived no reason for a precipitate change of policy at this time and to have stated that the British Ambassador had assured him that Great Britain was satisfied with the way Egypt was living up to its treaty obligations. However, the Cabinet decided to increase the Egyptian Army by 5,000 men and 500 commissioned officers. (A part of the Egyptian Army is now stationed in the western desert to the east of Mersa Matruh but it is not clear what disposition would be made of this force in case of a further Italian advance. According to recent reports certain Egyptian motorized units being moved further to the rear.) The posts of the resigning Ministers are being filled entirely by reshuffling the present Cabinet. Suliman Pasha, formerly without Portfolio, takes Finance; Sirry Pasha takes Communications in addition to Public Works; Samy Bey, leaves Supplies and takes Commerce and Industry; Ibrahim Bey, formerly without Portfolio, takes Supplies.

In deciding against a change of policy with regard to the involvement of Egypt in hostilities the Cabinet was undoubtedly influenced by the following factors: (1) general opposition of the people to war, (2) the remoteness and relative unimportance of the area affected by the Italian occupation, (3) unpreparedness of Egypt for war, (4) disapproval of participation in the war by most Egyptian Army officers, (5) fear of Italian retaliation, particularly in the form of bombing of Egyptian cities, and (6) feeling that in the event of an Italian victory Egypt would be dealt with more generously if it had not taken up arms against Italy. A point which many Egyptians of all parties stress in this connection is that they would be much more disposed to enter the conflict if Great Britain would now guarantee to withdraw completely from Egypt after the war, i. e., if the reward offered was complete independence rather than the continuance of the less objectionable of two foreign dominations.

Fish
  1. Neither printed.