740.0011 European War 1939/2611
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Moffat)
The Greek Minister2 called this morning.
After talking over various phases of the war, he said that from the Greek point of view the matter of greatest interest was Italian intentions. He recognized that the tension in Italy had somewhat subsided and he believed that Mussolini would, in no event, make a move until the Scandinavian campaign had been decided one way or the other.
If Italy moved, however, he thought it would not be against Yugoslavia. He said that the Serbs were magnificent fighters, and even the Croats had no sympathy for the Italians. If Italy moved, he believed it would be on Salonika, probably a march which would avoid violating [Page 525] Yugoslav neutrality. Of course, the Greek Army would resist, and probably the Turkish Army would come to her assistance. If so, he foresaw that the Turks would move through western Thrace and not try to cross Bulgarian territory. If the Italians were fighting alone, the Minister thought that the Bulgarians would remain neutral. If Germany should also enter the Balkans, he felt that Bulgaria would adopt toward the Germans very much the same attitude as had the Danes. He had lived many years in Sofia and professed to know the Bulgars well. They would not want to fight, partly because their experiences in the last war had been unfortunate, and partly because they were very much afraid of the Turks. They were not in favor of a German victory, neither were they in favor of an allied victory. They were playing all their cards on the chance of a negotiated peace. The peace conference, they felt, would give them more than a military campaign.
- Cimon P. Diamantopoulos.↩