Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1940, The British Commonwealth, The Soviet Union, The Near East and Africa, Volume III

761.6211/232: Telegram

The Chargé in Iran (Engert) to the Secretary of State

Tehran, October 3, 1939—2 p.m.
[Received 4:30 p.m.]

112. Legation’s 103, September 18, 10 a.m. and despatch No. 1694, September 28,¹ in the last pouch.

(1) The Iranian Government views the Russo-German² and Russo-Estonian³ treaties with the greatest alarm. For over a month German and Soviet diplomacy has been bending every effort to undermine Iran’s morale and weaken her will to resist blandishments and threats from Berlin and Moscow. The partition of Poland⁴ and the virtual loss of independence of the Baltic States^4a have created fear that the Soviets will next turn their attention to the Black Sea and Caspian and that crucial days are ahead for Iran. But while hitherto the Iranian Government believed that the situation merely called for considerable diplomatic skill, there is now serious recognition of the fact that as one sensational event becomes the precursor of another it may have to adapt itself to a role which will be forced upon it by influences far beyond her control.

(2) I am reliably informed that Iran has already capitulated on practically all points in connection with the new commercial agreement with Russia which is also to give Germany transit rights for her exports to Iran. It has not yet been signed but only because the new Soviet Ambassador^4b at the eleventh hour formulated a demand that exclusively Russian oil be used in the northern provinces and that all Communists imprisoned in Iran be released. He also protested against the concentration of Iranian troops in the north.

(3) There is a rumor for which I cannot vouch that the Ambassador likewise demanded recognition of Russia’s “special rights” in Azerbaijan and Ghilan and if necessary the passage of troops to protect such rights.

(4) Nobody knows what precisely the Shah’s^4c state of mind is but he is reported to be showing increasing irritation at the hollowness and hypocrisy of both German and Russian propaganda. He has always taken a strong line against communism and is now more than ever afraid of the doctrine of world [domination?]. Ordinarily he would of course want to defend Iran’s neutrality, territorial integrity, and independence by force of arms but there is a strong pro-German element in the army which has great respect for German ability and efficiency and which believes the German entente with Russia spells the doom of the democracies. The Government therefore may not feel strong enough to reject Soviet overtures or to indulge in heroic gestures.

(5) Japanese Military Attaché^4d who is now in Khorassan reports to his Legation that Russia seems to be concentrating troops in Turkestan. This and similar rumors are causing considerable nervousness among better informed political circles who fear danger of recrudescence of events of 1918 to 1921 when the Soviets threatened Tehran. Consequently although there is of course no cause for immediate panic many wealthy merchants are already sending their families south.

Engert

1. Neither printed.
2. Treaty of Nonaggression, signed at Moscow, August 23, 1939, Department of State, Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939–1941, p. 76.
3. Pact of Mutual Assistance, signed at Moscow, September 28, 1939, Department of State Bulletin, November 11, 1939, p. 543.
4. See Foreign Relations, 1939, vol. i, pp. 477 ff.
5. See vol. i, pp. 357 ff.
6. Matvei Y. Filimonov.
7. Reza Shah Pahlavi.
8. H. Fukuti.