661.9131/183: Telegram

The Chargé in Iran ( Engert ) to the Secretary of State

77. Legation’s 63, April 5, 9 p.m.16 It seemed best to await completion of English and French translations before commenting.

(1)
Immediate result of the signing of the treaty was a distinct détente in Irano-Soviet relations. Feeling of optimism has taken the place of fear of grave developments which were freely predicted only a few months ago. Although the exact nature of the difficulties which have for nearly 2 years been found insurmountable has never been divulged, enough has leaked out to show that Moscow originally wanted an agreement of much wider scope than a simple treaty of commerce. Ever since the Soviets established military domination over the Baltic States, the Iranian Government has been expecting similar treatment. Moscow had already hinted that political relations with Iran could be “improved” by means of a so-called nonaggression or mutual assistance pact or even a military alliance. The present treaty has therefore been hailed as a pleasant surprise and as a welcome sign of a definite easing of the tension. Please see also my despatch No. 1694, September 2816 and telegrams 120, October 17 and 152, December 1.
(2)
Informed diplomatic circles express the view that had Finland yielded like the Baltic States, Iran’s turn would probably have come next but the Finnish war—as stated in the Legation’s telegram No. 40, March 7, 9 p.m.—had a direct influence on the negotiations. Iran adopted a somewhat firmer tone and avoided being drawn into political discussions. It seems also certain that Great Britain and Turkey lent their moral support and expressed great interest in the maintenance of the status quo in Iran. On the other hand, they are said to have advised the Iranian Government to make every possible concession consistent with her independence and neutrality in the hope that the Soviets might postpone pressing any political claims. The mere fact that the treaty was signed in Tehran instead of Moscow is considered by Iranians as a great diplomatic victory.
(3)
Although the Foreign Minister denies that there are any secret clauses, it is generally believed that certain promises have been made by the Iranian Government such as, for example, the release of Communist prisoners reported in the Legation’s 60, April 216 and facilities in case Russia should find it necessary to invoke articles V and VI [Page 630] of the treaty of 192119 (see my despatch 820, February 2, 192220) it has been tacitly assumed by Iran that article VI had become a dead letter but it is clear from two specific references to the 1921 treaty that the Soviet Union wished to stress the fact that it considered the old treaty in full force.
(4)
The clauses in the new treaty which worry Iranians most are those giving the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics the right to maintain trade representatives with diplomatic immunity and to establish filling stations. Distrust inspired by recent tendencies in official Soviet policy is so great that it is firmly believed these rights will be abused and exploited for propaganda purposes. So long as Russia’s plans and ambitions remain obscure and subject to sudden change Iran feels she will have to keep the closest watch on her every move.

Comments regarding technical questions will be made by mail.

Engert
  1. Not printed.
  2. Not printed.
  3. Not printed.
  4. Treaty of Friendship, February 26, 1921, League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. ix, p. 383.
  5. Not printed.