867N.01/1689

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Murray)

Participants: Dr. Chaim Weizmann;
Mr. Murray;
Mr. Alling;
Mr. Childs.
[Page 837]

Dr. Weizmann, President of the World Zionist Organization and ex-officio President of the Jewish Agency, stated that he had come to this country, with Palestine as always uppermost in his mind, to raise $4,000,000 outside the United Palestine Appeal for strengthening the Jewish community in Palestine.

It was to be anticipated, Dr. Weizmann said, that at the end of the war there would be at least 2,500,000 Jews seeking refuge. Of these perhaps 1,000,000 would represent Jews with a future and the others Jews whose lives were behind them—“who were but little more than dust”. He believed that it would be possible to settle in Palestine 1,000,000 of these refugees, so far as possible those with a future, one-fourth on the land, the remainder as an addition to the urban population. It was true that Palestine was not rich in the raw materials which were conducive to industrial development but Palestine did possess in its Jewish population the very quintessence of intellectual ability. It was not too much to expect, he thought, that Jewish brains might develop Palestine industrially in a way to make it fill the needs of the Near East in such items as pharmaceutical products for example. He had discussed this possibility in Turkey when he was there recently and had met with a favorable reaction to it.

Dr. Weizmann expressed the view that the most advantageous settlement of the Palestine question in his opinion would be the division of the country into Jewish and Arab cantons with wide powers of autonomy and the federation of Palestine and Trans-Jordan into one state under continued British supervision for some time to come. As Jewish cantons he would include Galilee (northern Palestine) and the coastal region of Palestine, and as Arab cantons the hill country and western Palestine, together with Trans-Jordan. The Negev or southern Palestine comprises 11,000,000 dunums of land inhabited by no more than 50,000 Bedouins. At least one-tenth of this region was cultivable and might serve as an eventual place of settlement of large numbers of people. He would leave this area, however, outside the cantonization plan for subsequent disposition.*

The hope was expressed by Dr. Weizmann that eventually such Jewish and Arab areas as might be set up in Palestine and Trans-Jordan could be merged in a larger federation of states, including [Page 838] Syria and Iraq, but he was afraid that the French might be an obstacle to this.

The Jewish leader added that his proposed boundaries for cantonal settlement followed in general the lines of the partition proposals of the Royal Commission. He had succeeded in obtaining the approval of the partition proposals by the World Zionist Congress in 1937 as he felt that those proposals were something in hand which were worth accepting. Unfortunately, the partition scheme had had to be abandoned.

Dr. Weizmann stated that he would be one of the first to admit that the Jews had made many mistakes in Palestine. Twenty years had not been enough in which to reach a durable basis of settlement. It would take many more years than that.

Mr. Murray inquired what Dr. Weizmann’s reaction had been to the statement in Parliament in 1938 of Viscount Samuel that the Arab nationalist movement in Palestine was as genuine as the Egyptian nationalist movement, the Irish nationalist movement, or the Indian nationalist movement.9 Dr. Weizmann replied that he was in entire accord with Viscount Samuel as to this.

Mr. Murray observed that he did not think that Dr. Weizmann’s views as to the advantages of the partition proposals of the Royal Commission or as to the significance of the Arab uprising of the past three years in Palestine were generally shared by American Zionists.

Dr. Weizmann replied that with all due respect to American Zionists he found them either too extreme in their views, on the one hand, or too lukewarm, on the other. By reason of their distance from the practical problems which the Jews had to face, American Zionists were insufficiently informed concerning the day-to-day development of those problems. As a result, American Zionists were either uncompromising in their outlook or completely disillusioned regarding the future.

Mr. Murray asked Dr. Weizmann whether he did not agree that the attainment of an Arab-Jewish understanding was of vital importance to the success of the Jewish National Home in Palestine; whether, in view of the, in general, higher intelligence, superior education and greater social consciousness of the Jews, the responsibility for effecting such an understanding rested to a far greater degree upon the Jews than upon the Arabs of Palestine; whether, in other words, it was not reasonable to expect that somewhere in World Jewry outstanding men of diplomatic skill and negotiating talent could be found to handle this all-important problem and to dispel the fear that had obsessed both Jews and Arabs in Palestine with such devastating [Page 839] effect on the vital interests of both races. Dr. Weizmann replied that he heartily concurred in the views expressed by Mr. Murray and that he would be the first to admit that the Jews must share with the Arabs the blame for what had happened in Palestine. He made the interesting observation in this connection that, while some effort had been made for farseeing Jews to effect a reconciliation with the Arabs, they had been blocked in many quarters not only by Jews but also by certain British officials who seemed to have no interest in the success of such an endeavor. Mr. Murray expressed the view that if the Jews and Arabs could come to an understanding among themselves and could present the world with a plan mutually agreed upon by them it would be difficult, if not impossible, to raise effective objection in any quarter to the execution of such a plan. Dr. Weizmann confirmed this view, and stated that the great obstacle which the Jews had experienced hitherto in dealing with the Arabs was that they had at all times been obliged to deal through British officials instead of direct with the Arabs. He also observed that in order to gain the confidence of the Arabs and to dispel their very real fear of the Jews he felt it would be a wise and farseeing policy for the Jews to devote as much attention and care to the welfare and well-being of the Arabs in the country as had been expended upon the Jews. In other words, he would like to see the Jews set up model villages for the Arabs in the proposed Arab area equal in every respect to those provided for the Jews. In this way he would hope to bring about a lasting spirit of good will and confidence between the two races.

When Mr. Murray mentioned that there were reports of a new spirit animating the Arabs and Jews in Palestine, as evidenced by increasing friendly cooperation, the President of the World Zionist Organization observed that he himself had been heartened by these reports and he had hopes that they would continue. He did not believe that exaggerated importance should be attached to them but they were straws in the wind.

Dr. Weizmann remarked that Mr. Murray had asked him how it was the Jews, with their brains and ability, had not succeeded in coming to terms with the Arabs. The inquiry was a very pertinent one, the Jewish leader observed. He recalled that he himself had entered into negotiations with Feisal10 in 1918 and that the two had signed an agreement with respect to Palestine11 which had never been realized owing to subsequent developments. At that time Feisal was recognized as the spokesman of the Arabs and any agree ment which he signed had the force of authority of the Arab world [Page 840] of the Near East behind it. Since that time, however, Feisal had died and the Arab world, at least so far as Palestine was concerned, had been without any single spokesman; consequently, it had been correspondingly difficult for the Jews to enter into negotiations with the Arabs with a view to reaching an understanding. That, of course, was what was most desired and he had hopes that it might still be possible to achieve it.

He added that while in London recently Mr. H. St. J. B. Philby, the great Near Eastern authority and friend of King Ibn Saud, had called on him and had stated that he would like to take back with him to Saudi Arabia some basis of settlement which the King might be willing to support. Dr. Weizmann said that he had remarked to Philby that the only thing the Jews had to offer was money. If an amount of a million pounds was wanted by the King of Saudi Arabia for enlisting his aid in achieving a settlement for Palestine he, Dr. Weizmann, would answer that the price was much too small; if the sum were fifteen or twenty million pounds he would answer that it was beyond hope of realization by the Jews but if the amount were three to four million pounds as the price of the King’s support of a scheme whereby the Arabs of Palestine would be voluntarily transferred to Trans-Jordan and Iraq, Dr. Weizmann stated that he would prepare to undertake to raise the sum. Philby had promised to convey the offer to the King but Dr. Weizmann had no means of knowing whether anything would come of it. He did feel that King Ibn Saud would be an excellent spokesman for the Arabs and one with whom he could deal. Consequently, he was awaiting with interest information from Mr. Philby as to Ibn Saud’s reactions to the discussions.

  1. According to the Palestine Partition Commission Report, the Negev comprises 12½ million dunums of which from 1,500,000 to 2,000,000 dunums are put under cultivation (one dunum equals 0.2217 acres or a little more than one-fifth of an acre). Well borings in this area, however, have not given promise of the possibility of irrigation from that source of water although Dr. Lowdermilk of the U. S. Department of Agriculture, who visited it recently, is of the opinion that greater utilization of the land might be possible through more scientific use of the rain water available. It may be said that, although the possibilities of the settlement of large numbers in the Negev remains to be demonstrated as feasible, the existence of so large an area comparatively unpopulated in Palestine makes it one of the most attractive potential possibilities for large-scale immigration in that country. [Footnote in the original.]
  2. Statement made by Viscount Samuel in the House of Lords, December 8, 1938. See United Kingdom, Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords, 5th ser., vol. 111, p. 425.
  3. Emir Feisal, acting on behalf of his father, the King of Hedjaz.
  4. Signed at London, January 3, 1919; British Cmd. 5479: Palestine Royal Commission Report, July 1937, p. 26.