822.796/375
The Minister in Ecuador (Long) to the Secretary of State
[Received July 26.]
Sir: I have the honor to report that during a long conversation last Sunday evening with President Arroyo he stated that Sedta had been encountering difficulties during May and June in continuing operations and was using automobile fuel part of the time instead of aviation gas. Had this condition continued a few weeks longer, he thought Sedta might have suspended.
The recent border dispute (early this month)51a enabled Sedta to stage a dramatic comeback in public opinion when it became necessary to send officers on flying trips within Ecuador. …
Sedta, emboldened by the acclaim received because of its services to the Army, has made an offer to Ecuador to handle mail to Europe for an insignificant rate, asserting connections through Condor52 and Italian lines will give an 8-day service to Lisbon. President Arroyo says he has refused to consider the offer at the moment.
He added that eliminating Quito from international schedules at this moment might release public opinion against Panagra but asserted he was anxious to see Sedta out whenever Panagra would render the same services.
He recommended the following: first, relieve Panagra internal services in Ecuador from having to consult Lima regarding domestic passengers, then have Panagra carry airmail within Ecuador at the [Page 278] same rate as Sedta. Once agreed, he would cancel the airmail part of the Sedta contract—which would leave them only passengers, and shortly thereafter a campaign would be started pointing out the dangers of flying with automobile gasoline, which he thought might be the end of Sedta.
I asked if he was not disposed to make certain the elimination by confiscating Sedta and buying the two Junkers. He replied, “Not at this instant, as the Army is depending upon them for transport; moreover, considering the new grip Sedta feels she has on the public sentiment, she would probably refuse—just now. However, should peace continue with Peru and Panagra regain some of its lost favour through the elimination of the need to consult Lima as to movements of passengers within Ecuador, also to replace Sedta as to handling airmail, conditions might be different.” Arroyo thought it might not take long to remould public sentiment, though there was an underlying apprehension in the minds of many Ecuadorans that once Sedta had been eliminated Panagra would reduce its domestic services.
The President observed that acquiring the Junkers with the idea that Ecuadoran fliers could operate them was fraught with risk, as our Aviation Mission had not given sufficient refresher instruction. Such a step would not be safe. Moreover, spare parts would be a problem. If there was any thought of taking over the Junkers on the expectation that, in the hands of comparatively inexperienced Ecuadorans, they would render efficient service to the Army, he was dubious. Thus it became a technical question, and it might be better to go back to the civilian pilots and two American planes idea—as offered by us a year ago—if Panagra could not render all the service.
This brings us back to the same old circle. Panagra is possibly right in declining to render aviation services that are likely to run it into difficulties. When they made this crystal clear during negotiations last year, our Government, in an effort to defeat Sedta’s proposals, offered to finance the acquisition of two amphibians or hydroplanes and the salaries of two American civilian instructors for the Oriente or military services if I remember correctly.
The memoranda left with Mr. Duggan by me on July 253 referred briefly to the fact that our Aviation Mission was to have trained Ecuadoran fliers—also to the dual character of the aviation here—commercial and military.
Following the receipt of the Department’s telegram No. 127 of June [July] 18, 9 p.m.,54 an effort was made to ascertain how the [Page 279] various people who have to do with aviation might feel with respect to the aviation problems, and our reply, telegram No. 164 of July 21, 9 p.m.,55 gives the more important points. Amplifications appear below.
The Germans operating Sedta, in addition to asking 1500 liters of aviation gasoline per hour while flying for account of the Army, also wished insurance should their pilots, auxiliary personnel, or planes be shot down, also some type of additional compensation to care for the bodies and/or families of personnel wounded or killed in the line of duty.
Ecuadorans, should they confiscate Sedta under a wave of patriotic inspiration, might find it quite difficult to operate efficiently even the two Junkers planes now here. Sedta has a manager, a diplomatic contact man (propagandist), excellent pilots, quite a number of mechanics, efficient radio service, and satisfactory ground crews. Together they have for many months rendered a dependable service and, even in the face of scant aviation gas supplies, have kept going, albeit at considerable risk when fuel stocks were low.
The simple fact that a few Ecuadoran pilots can fly the rebuilt Basic Trainers of ’36 vintage from Guayaquil to nearby airports and get back alive—this without proper radio or instruments—is not proof acceptable to some Ecuadorans that they could intelligently handle the present Sedta system, if confiscated.
In this connection, it has been recalled that the aviation history of Ecuador is filled with too many deaths, and a repetition of past tragedies at this time might react most unfavorably in the public mind, and reflect upon the Administration which caused Ecuadorans to assume the responsibility before its aviators were fully prepared, without sufficient foreign technical guidance.
Now that eliminating Sedta has again been raised, it should be pressed.
Respectfully yours,
- For correspondence on boundary dispute between Ecuador and Peru, see vol. vi, pp. 212 ff.↩
- Sindicato Condor Ltda.; see correspondence printed in vol. vi, section under Brazil entitled “Interest of the United States in the elimination of Axis influence from Brazilian airlines.”↩
- See memorandum by the Minister in Ecuador to the Adviser on Political Relations, July 2, p. 263.↩
- Not printed; it was primarily concerned with the matter of Panagra’s surplus gasoline supply (822.796/369).↩
- Not printed.↩