851.01/965

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State 13

The British Ambassador14 called at his request. He said that Foreign Minister Eden communicated to him a report to the effect that he tried to stop De Gaulle from making his radio broadcast and general public statement of January second15 but that he had failed.

The Ambassador then said that one of our radio commentators, Mr. Eric Sevareid, had recently stated that the De Gaulle and North African matters had now become a real difference between the British and the United States Governments. The Ambassador added that it would be most unfortunate for friction to arise between our governments on this account and that he hoped Mr. Sevareid could be induced to correct this impression. I thereupon took up and repeated the entire differences of attitudes on the part of the British Government toward De Gaulle and what he is standing for and doing, and the American Government in dealing with the North African situation and refusing to deal with De Gaulle politically on the other hand. I said the public in this country is rapidly reaching the conclusion that De Gaulle is primarily interested not in winning the extremely crucial battle in Africa but in dismissing the military side of the battle while negotiations are carried on to settle his demands for political supremacy in one form or another in the French Empire. It is reported here that the entire British press and radio and many British leaders of public thought devoted the better part of the two days following De Gaulle’s broadcast, shouting their approval; that these acts and utterances relating to De Gaulle’s political aspirations were being carried on during the past four days in Great Britain while the battle for most of Africa and the western Mediterranean area especially has become increasingly serious and while the American and French generals in command must give up their military emergency duties and go to the rear in an effort to calm a confused situation and discuss the political aspirations of De Gaulle, when approached by his representatives there. In conclusion I said that this impression about the British supporting De Gaulle in this movement for political preferment at the expense of the prosecution of the African battle will soon create enough differences between our two [Page 28] countries and that no one, I know, will regret such a development more than the British Ambassador and myself. The Ambassador seemed to be quite impressed with what I had said and assured me that he would take it up at once with his Government.

C[ordell] H[ull]
  1. The substance of this conversation was sent to London in telegram No. 146, January 7, 2 p.m. (not printed), with the instruction that the Ambassador read it to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and also telegram No. 104, January 5, 11 p.m., infra, and that he might at his discretion leave paraphrases of the telegrams. (851R.01/57)
  2. Viscount Halifax.
  3. For text of public statement, see Documents on American Foreign Relations, vol. v (World Peace Foundation, Boston, 1944), p. 570.