851R.00/335
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Reber)
| Participants: | The Secretary of State |
| Mr. Lemaigre-Dubreuil36 | |
| Mr. Georges-Picot37 | |
| Mr. Atherton38 | |
| Mr. Reber. |
The Secretary of State began the conversation by stating that since Mr. Lemaigre-Dubreuil’s previous visit there had been several developments and proposals which had complicated the situation. For example, it was apparent that General de Gaulle was primarily concerned with a political arrangement before achieving military unity and had so stated both publicly in a broadcast and in his suggestions for a meeting with General Giraud. A British proposal had likewise been received which required further consideration.
It was however the view of the American Government that any political arrangements might give rise to discussions which could adversely affect the military situation and consequently they should not be dealt with at the present time. The Secretary added that he was glad to take note of the position of the Mission both in its conversations with the War Department and in Mr. Lemaigre-Dubreuil’s letter to Admiral Leahy.39
Mr. Lemaigre-Dubreuil replied that it was impossible to meet the situation and to answer propaganda criticism emanating from British, de Gaullist, Axis and German controlled French stations which claimed that Africa was “occupied” by the United States. Likewise it was impossible to concentrate on the military situation until certain conditions pertaining to matériel and morale had been fulfilled. The solution of these depended in a large measure upon the United States.
Mr. Lemaigre-Dubreuil felt it was necessary to recall in this instance that the intervention of American troops had been requested, prepared and facilitated by the French, to whom assurances had been given at that time in letters exchanged between Mr. Murphy40 and General Giraud that the necessary matériel would be furnished and [Page 37] that they would be treated as an ally in full possession of their sovereignty. Although it was known that promise to supply arms and equipment to the French forces had been made two months ago the Mission had not yet been able to set a date for shipment of any of these or to determine any quantity of matériel to be furnished the French troops. It was essential that some concrete manifestation of the American willingness to send supplies both to the French forces and the civilian population be forthcoming, as otherwise both military and civilian morale would be seriously affected and real military risk incurred. France had once been defeated because of the lack of matériel and consequently Frenchmen were very sensitive to the danger presented if they could not obtain adequate arms.
The impression in North Africa was growing that it was being treated as an occupied rather than an allied territory. In order to meet this situation it would be necessary that certain changes be effected in the Darlan–Clark protocol,41 notably to include recognition of French North Africa as an ally. It would also be necessary to take into account and modify the rate of exchange which had been imposed and which was markedly increasing prices and the cost of living within the country. Furthermore, Mr. Lemaigre-Dubreuil pointed out, that whereas the United States was represented in North Africa in civil matters as well as in military affairs, there was no reciprocal treatment of the North African authorities in this country since there only existed in the United States at the present time a Military Mission.
Unless some such form of representation were granted General Giraud, General de Gaulle would be able to claim that he was in a superior position as regards civil and political matters since he could discuss them direct with the United States and British Governments and consequently should be regarded as the political leader of French resistance. General Giraud was primarily concerned with the military necessity and of bringing Frenchmen back into active participation in the war. If he could be given support in this position and receive supplies and recognition as an ally, he could then pursue the war with a maximum of efficiency, reassure French preoccupation and establish himself as the leader of French military resistance, thus relegating General de Gaulle’s political aspirations to a secondary place and clearing the entire political situation. Mr. Lemaigre-Dubreuil added parenthetically that although his primary interest and that of General Giraud was the satisfactory conduct of the campaign he nevertheless had found political consideration had been introduced into all of his talks in the United States where the primary concern seemed to be related to General de Gaulle and British political intentions.
[Page 38]In order that General Giraud’s position should be made perfectly clear Mr. Lemaigre-Dubreuil suggested that the former might issue a declaration which would clarify his position and demonstrate its non-political character. The declaration would be of such a nature as clearly to indicate to General de Gaulle that the real problem and the only problem to be solved was of a military and not of a political character until such a time as France and the French people were free to determine their own destiny. Giraud would be regarded as a trustee for French interests until the end of the war and consequently would be free to conduct the military campaign without political complications. In this declaration he could reassure opinion in French Africa and answer contentious propaganda. To be able to make such a declaration he must have received assurances along the foregoing lines, the details of which could be elaborated in further discussions between Mr. Atherton and Mr. Georges-Picot.
If this procedure were to be accepted the terms of the declaration could be agreed with General Eisenhower who would be informed of the immediate return of Mr. Lemaigre-Dubreuil. The latter made it clear that he had been speaking personally but that at the same time what he had said was in conformity with his conversations with General Giraud just prior to his departure from North Africa.
The Secretary answered that he would be glad to give these considerations his prompt attention and to discuss them with the President. He said that it might be possible to obtain some specific information concerning proposed deliveries of matériel before Mr. Lemaigre-Dubreuil’s departure. He expressed his sympathetic attitude in regard to General Giraud and said that latter’s present trip of inspection in French West Africa was apparently producing most successful results. The Secretary added that the American Government wished to do everything in its power to make things easier for General Giraud in his conduct of the military campaign in North Africa which necessarily included some recognition of the fact that he would be in charge of the maintenance of civil order in these territories.
- Jacques Lemaigre-Dubreuil, Chief of the Research Section of General Giraud’s Headquarters, temporarily assigned to General Giraud’s Military Mission to the United States.↩
- Liaison Officer with General Giraud’s Military Mission to the United States.↩
- Ray Atherton, Acting Chief, Division of European Affairs.↩
- Not printed.↩
- Robert D. Murphy, Political Adviser to General Eisenhower, and Personal Representative of the President in North Africa with rank of Minister. For texts of letters exchanged, see Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. ii, pp. 412–422.↩
- For text of the Clark–Darlan Agreement, signed at Algiers November 22, 1942, see Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. ii, p. 453.↩