851R.20/49: Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom ( Matthews ) to the Secretary of State

401. Strang55 showed me this afternoon a telegram sent this morning to Lord Halifax which set forth in some detail the views of the British Government with respect to de Gaulle and suggested that he lay them before the Department. It began by frankly stating that Mr. Eden had not realized the serious cleavage between the British and ourselves on the North African question (presumably until receiving the paraphrases I left with Eden on January 8—my telegram number 192, January 8, 6 p.m.). While this telegram to Lord Halifax set forth the British viewpoint with clarity and was entirely conciliatory in tone, it does not in my opinion serve to remove the important divergencies between us set forth in my telegram number 192 but rather to confirm them. While denying any desire to set up a “provisional government” with or without de Gaulle as its head, it did stress the importance of his following in France, of his service to England in her hour of need, and the improbability that he would be willing to accept a purely military position in North Africa. With respect to this last, the telegram indicated that the British had not advised him to accept a military command in view of the unlikelihood that such advice would be followed (compare paragraph 2 of my telegram 192). On the other hand the telegram to Halifax spoke with frankness of de Gaulle’s difficult temperament, and of the British need for patience in dealing with him. It said that “however Anglo-phobe he might be” or whatever his political ambitions might be, there was no doubt of his firm conviction that Germany is the true enemy of France. For this reason, the telegram continued, he had acquired sympathy largely from Left elements in France “in spite of his own Rightist political views”. (The telegram curiously takes no note of the fact that until some 6 months ago the principal criticism of de Gaulle in London lay in the fact that he was surrounded largely by Right-Wing and Croix de Feu sympathizers and it was only after this criticism had reached the danger point that he made his moves toward the left and played up the adherence of Philip56 and his, de Gaulle’s, supposed strong ties with the Left elements in France). It likewise said that British experience in Syria, Madagascar and Djibouti had shown that once the Vichy authorities had been removed the great majority of the population flocked willingly [Page 42] to de Gaulle, and cited the “popular ovation” just given Legentilhomme in Madagascar.

Strang in discussing this telegram said: “Frankly it is natural there should be a difference in viewpoint between us. De Gaulle stuck by us when we were in desperate need and the collaborationists of Vichy attacked us. We naturally have an emotional feeling about the whole question and about some of the people associated with Vichy that you don’t have. We cannot look at the situation and personalities with the same objective detachment.” He said however that Maillaud of the French Independent News Agency, who has just returned from Algiers, had spoken of the rather strong Royalist sentiment there and the weakness of de Gaulle’s following. He, Strang, agreed with this estimate: saying that “de Gaulle’s small following is largely among the Jews, which further complicates the situation”.

On the other hand I think the British are doing what they can to encourage de Gaulle to meet with Giraud and not to impose impossible conditions to such a meeting. As set forth in this telegram to Halifax, the British have felt that the chances of agreement are better if the first contacts are made on a lower level. They are hopeful that possibly Catroux57 will stop off on his way back to Syria next week, Strang said. Apparently Catroux does not agree with de Gaulle’s rather intransigent attitude toward the North African situation.

Strang remarked that he thought Brendan Bracken’s58 statement should be quite helpful, and I agreed. He thought Macmillan’s interview at Algiers was “in general good, but perhaps a little optimistic about early agreement between de Gaulle and Giraud”.

Matthews
  1. William Strang, Assistant Under Secretary of State in the British Foreign Office.
  2. André Philip, member of French National Committee in London.
  3. Gen. Georges Catroux, Commanding General, French Forces in the Levant.
  4. British Minister of information.