740.0011 European War 1939/28233: Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

382. For the President and the Secretary. I have just received the following letter from Mr. Eden, dated January 14:

“Thank you for your letter of the 24th December last (Department’s 6536, December 23, 7 p.m.) in which you conveyed to me the views of the Department of State on the recent Italian ‘peace feelers’, about which I wrote to the Ambassador on the 17th December (Embassy’s 7188, December 18, 4 p.m.).

I am glad to notice that the State Department agree with the decision we have reached not to pursue negotiations with representatives of the Fascist regime such as the Italian diplomats at Lisbon. I fully concur in the view of the State Department that the guarantees required by the Duke of Aosta would need fuller investigation both from the military and the diplomatic point of view. In order to furnish the State Department with the views of His Majesty’s Government [Page 319] on the attitude which should be adopted towards any opposition leaders who may come forward, I think it will be necessary for me to summarize briefly the general policy which His Majesty’s Government are in favor of pursuing towards Italy. Any conclusions should not, of course, be interpreted as hard and fast rules, and in fact it is our view that our policy towards Italy must to a large extent be opportunist and readily adaptable to take advantage of any change in the situation.

Our aim must be to knock Italy out of the war as quickly as possible and this could be achieved with almost equal effect whether Italy made a separate peace or whether dissatisfaction and disorder within the country attained such serious proportions that the Germans were forced to establish a full scale occupation. In the latter event it is to be expected that the Germans would not only have to provide troops for the occupation of Italy but would also be forced to replace the Italian troops on the Russian front, in France and in the Balkans. Our own military authorities share the doubts expressed in your letter as to the value of Italy even as an ally against Germany. In their view it may well be in our interest that Italy should, as a member of the Axis, develop into a German commitment and become as such an increasing drain on German strength.

We have considered the possibility of a party arising in Italy which would be willing and able to conclude a separate peace. Before this situation could occur, two prerequisites would in our view be essential. The Germans would have to be so weakened as no longer to be able to control events in Italy, and a national leader would have to emerge with sufficient strength to displace Mussolini. Such evidence as we have recently received does not suggest that either of these prerequisites are likely to be fulfilled in the immediate future. In particular, there is as yet no sign of an alternative leader to Mussolini appearing. Of the Italians outside Italy, Count Sforza8 has probably the most influence, but we feel that he has been out of the country for so long now that he could count on very little support in Italy. In Italy itself there seems little prospect that the Church will take a stand against the regime. The King is regarded as a willing tool of Fascism and the Italian people appear no longer to be looking to him as a leader. In spite of the recent approach by the Duke of Aosta, we remain extremely doubtful of the willingness or ability of any of the royal family to lead a revolt against Fascism. A general with sufficient following in the Army, such as General Badoglio, might at the right moment be able to overthrow the Government, but our reports do not indicate that dissatisfaction in the Army has yet reached the stage which would make this a practicable possibility. Finally, there is the possibility that the moderate members of the Fascist Party itself might take a stand against Mussolini. Such evidence as we have, however, tends to show that the leaders of the Fascist Party as a whole are still united and still convinced that cooperation with Germany and the prosecution of the war is essential if their own position is to be maintained.

The view of His Majesty’s Government is, therefore, that we should [Page 320] not count on the possibility of a separate peace but should aim at provoking such disorder in Italy as would necessitate a German occupation. We suggest that the best means of achieving this aim is to intensify all forms of military operations against Italy, particularly aerial bombardment, and to support the military operations by a firm line in our propaganda.

We have given careful consideration to the question of attempting to detach the Italian people from the regime by promising them lenient peace terms, but we have decided that the moment has not yet come to make any such assurances. The minimum which would be likely to appeal to the Italian people would be a guarantee of the pre-war frontiers of Metropolitan Italy, but since it may be desirable after the war to effect frontier rectifications in favor of Yugoslavia and possibly of Austria, it would in our view be most unwise to commit ourselves on this point. Any assurances which fall short of this would be likely to react against us by providing the Fascist Government with a powerful weapon of propaganda. We hold, therefore, that our own propaganda policy should be aimed at convincing the Italians that we shall win the war and that they will suffer most grievously so long as they remain our enemies. We may hope that once the Italian people have been convinced of this they will be ready to take a stand against the present Government either without prior assurances from us or on such terms as we shall be disposed to offer them when the time comes.

The view of His Majesty’s Government is, therefore, that no reliance may be put in the possibility of a separate peace in the near future. Should offers be received they would be examined on their merits and military considerations would naturally weigh very heavily in the balance. Meanwhile, we should aim at provoking an internal collapse in Italy. In pursuance of this policy we should as far as possible intensify our military attack on Italy, stress in our political warfare the hopelessness of Italy’s military position and the determination of the United Nations to pursue the war with the utmost vigour against Italy, and generally encourage and help the discontented elements in Italy itself whenever we are able to do so without unduly committing ourselves on political issues.

I shall be very glad to receive the views of the United States Government on the policy suggested in this letter.”

Matthews
  1. Count Carlo Sforza, Italian Foreign Minister before the advent of Mussolini; leader of Italian anti-Fascists, in North and South America.