The British Prime Minister ( Churchill ) to President Roosevelt 33

383. Para 1. Your 324. I send you my thoughts in the form in which I submitted them to the war cabinet obtaining their full approval.

Para 2. I don’t think myself that we should be too particular in dealing with any Non Fascist Government even if it is not all we should like. Now Mussolini is gone I would deal with any Non Fascist Italian Government which can deliver the goods. The goods are set out in my memo herewith. My colleagues also agreed with this.

Thoughts on the Fall of Mussolini by the Prime Minister and Minister of Defence

  • Para 1. It seems highly probable that the fall of Mussolini will involve the overthrow of the Fascist Regime and that the new government of the King and Badoglio will seek to negotiate a separate arrangement with the Allies for an armistice. Should this prove to [Page 333] be the case it will be necessary for us to make up our minds first of all upon what we want and secondly upon the measures and conditions required to gain it for us.
  • Para 2. At this moment above all others our thoughts must be concentrated upon the supreme aim namely the destruction of Hitler, Hitlerism and next [Nazi] Germany. Every military advantage arising out of the surrender of Italy (should that occur) must be sought for this purpose.
  • Para. 3. The first of these is in the President’s words “The control of all Italian territory and transportation against the Germans in the north and against the whole Balkan peninsula as well as the use of airfields of all kinds.” This must include the surrender to our Garrisons of Sardina, the Dodecanese and Corfu as well as of all the naval and air bases in the Italian mainland as soon as they can be taken over.
  • Para 4. Secondly and of equal importance the immediate surrender to the Allies of the Italian fleet or at least its effective demobilization and paralysis and the disarmament of the Italian air and ground forces to whatever extent we find needful and useful. The surrender of the fleet will liberate powerful British naval forces for service in the Indian Ocean against Japan and will be most agreeable to the United States.
  • Para 5. Also of equal consequence the immediate withdrawal from or surrender of all Italian forces in Corsica, the Riviera including Toulon and the Balkan Peninsula to wit, in Yugoslavia, Albania and Greece.
  • Para 6. Another objective of the highest importance about which there will be passionate feeling in this country is the immediate liberation of all British prisoners of war in Italian hands and the prevention which can in the first instance only be by the Italians of their being transported northwards to Germany. I regard it as a matter of honour and humanity to get our own flesh and blood back as soon as possible and spare them the measureless horrors of incarceration in Germany during the final stages of the war.
  • Para 7. The fate of the German troops in Italy and particularly of those south of Home will probably lead to fighting between the Germans and the Italian army and population. We should demand their surrender and that any Italian Government with whom we can reach a settlement shall do their utmost to procure this. It may be however that the German divisions will cut their way northward in spite of anything that the Italian armed forces are capable of doing. We should provoke this conflict as much as possible and should not hesitate to send troops and air support to assist the Italians in procuring the surrender of the Germans south of Rome.
  • Para 8. When we see how this process goes we can take a further view about the action to be taken north of Rome. We should however try to get possession of points on both the west coast and east coast railways of Italy as far north as we dare. And this is a time to dare.
  • Para 9. In our struggle with Hitler and the German army we cannot afford to deny ourselves any assistance that will kill Germans. The fury of the Italian population will now be turned against the German intruders who have as they will feel brought these miseries upon Italy and then come so scantily and grudgingly to her aid. We should stimulate this process in order that the new liberated Anti-Fascist Italy shall afford us at the earliest moment a safe and friendly area on which we can base the whole forward air attack upon south and central Germany.
  • Para 10. This air attack is a new advantage of the first order as it brings the whole of the Mediterranean Air Forces into action from a direction which turns the entire line of air defences in the west and which furthermore exposes all those centers of war production which have been increasingly developed to escape air attack from Great Britain. It will become urgent in the highest degree to get agents, commandos and supplies by sea across the Adriatic into Greece, Albania and Yugoslavia. It must be remembered that there are 15 German divisions in the Balkan Peninsula of which 10 are mobile. Nevertheless once we have control of the Italian Peninsula and of the Adriatic and the Italian armies in the Balkans withdraw or lay down their arms it is by no means unlikely that the Hun will be forced to withdraw northwards to the line of the Save and Danube thus liberating Greece and other tortured countries.
  • Para 11. We cannot yet measure the effects of Mussolini’s fall and of Italian capitulation upon Bulgaria, Roumania and Hungary. They may be profound. In connection with this situation the collapse of Italy should fix the moment for putting the strongest pressure on Turkey to act in accordance with the spirit of the alliance and in this Britain and the United States acting jointly or severally should if possible be joined or at least supported by Russia.
  • Para 12. The surrender of, to quote the President, “the head devil together with his partners in crime” must be considered an eminent object and one for which we should strive by all means in our power short of wrecking the immense prospects which have been outlined in earlier paragraphs. It may be however that these criminals will flee into Germany or escape into Switzerland. On the other hand they may surrender themselves or be surrendered by the Italian Government. Should they fall into our hands we ought now to decide in consultation with the United States and after agreement with them [Page 335] with the USSR what treatment should be meted out to them. One may prefer prompt execution without trial except for identification purposes. Others may prefer that they be kept in confinement until the end of the war in Europe and their fate decided together with that of other war criminals. Personally I am fairly indifferent on this matter provided always that no solid military advantages are sacrificed for the sake of immediate vengeance.
  1. Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.