740.0011 European War 1939/27782: Telegram

The Consul General at Algiers ( Wiley ) to the Secretary of State

153. For the Secretary and Under Secretary from Murphy. Upon his return from Turkey the British Prime Minister spent yesterday in Algiers. He asked that a message along the following lines be communicated to the President.

The Prime Minister understands how the two memoranda of points agreed at the Anfa Conference (see my 124, February 1, noon) were approved by the President immediately prior to his departure from Anfa which left no opportunity for coordination with the Prime Minister. The memoranda include specific mention of the agreement on the part of the British Government and he considers it important that a text be prepared which can be accepted by the three participants of the conference. The text in its present informal state only represents agreement between the President and General Giraud. Mr. Churchill said that the British Government had prior commitments, notably the recognition that it was [had?] accorded to de Gaulle as representing certain French interests. Having every regard for the President’s direction of affairs in this area, he believed that the President would wish to modify the memoranda slightly to avoid conflict with the British Government’s other commitments.

In consequence the draft which follows in sections 3, 4 and 5 of this telegram75 was prepared jointly by the American and British representatives. It has been approved by the Prime Minister for submission to the President and it further meets with the approval of General Eisenhower. General Giraud is in accord. We feel that the new text provides an improvement over the hastily prepared minute which was discussed at the last moment between the President and General Giraud. The result should be that the British host is equally prepared to provide more complete cooperation than might have been the case if they were to look upon the agreement as primarily bilateral in character.

In his conversation with me the Prime Minister emphasized his intention to treat Giraud and de Gaulle upon an absolute plane of equality. Mr. Churchill did not want to be put in position of appearing to abandon de Gaulle. In giving his full support to Giraud in this area he said he was motivated by two factors of prime importance in the successful prosecution of the military campaign; namely, the necessity of preserving tranquility in local affairs and of maintaining uninterrupted communications. He felt, however, that in building [Page 49] up Giraud position and striving to bring about unity between the different French factions a process which was complicated at times by de Gaulle’s temperament, it was nevertheless important that the latter’s contribution should not be overlooked. In addition to his achievements during the past 2 years he had an army of 30,000 men in the field whereas, in fact it had now become necessary to withdraw French troops from the Tunisian front. It was true that this withdrawal had been necessitated by supply difficulties and lack of equipment and to avoid annihilation of French troops but the result was that Allied forces destined for attack purposes are now being required to hold some former French positions. Mr. Churchill agreed that the French forces at the Tunisian front could not be expected to withstand tank attacks equipped only with light arms, many of them of antiquated manufacture. His estimate of 50,000 men in the field under General de Gaulle is disputed. It is believed that the figure is closer to 30,000 and it is also true that the British have equipped de Gaulle’s forces with modern armament. The Prime Minister acknowledged valuable services rendered to the Allies by Giraud’s forces on the front and in the maintenance of the long line of communications to Tunisia.

Giraud told me this morning that after his long private conversation with the Prime Minister last evening he was disturbed by the thought that this might portend a weakening of American support. He was interested particularly in paragraph 4 of the following text relating to his right and duty to acting as trustee for French interests. In the original memorandum of January 2476 the language is broader than in the present text. He understood from his conversation with the President that the latter favored Giraud’s representation of French interests in the United States and he hopes that this may be true. I told him that in my opinion the present language “the right and duty of acting as trustee for French interests military, economic and financial which are associated or become associated with the movement of liberation now established in French North and West Africa” undoubtedly represented the President’s understanding. This language would seem to me to care adequately for the question of representation in the United States.

The second point which troubled Giraud is the change in wording regarding military supply. The original text approved by the President in principle indicated that improved priority would be granted to the French forces in this area subject to the decisions of General Eisenhower and General Somervell. The present text refers to “priority which their military situation demands and as may be determined by the combined Chiefs of Staff”. General Giraud wanted to know whether this altered the character of the President’s approval. [Page 50] I assured him that it did not but that the new text merely outlined more in detail than [the?] procedure which necessarily would be followed. He said that with these explanations he was prepared to accept the new text and that he was quite agreeable to the insertion in paragraph 4, section II of the reference to the French National Committee under General de Gaulle. He [apparent omission] was giving every day of good faith in a desire to arrive at a friendly and workable union with de Gaulle he hoped that the British would support him in prevailing upon the French National Committee to cease its vindictive and personal radio campaign against certain Frenchmen in North Africa who are wholeheartedly and sincerely engaged in prosecuting the war against the Axis.

I urgently recommend acceptance of the text as now submitted; it should provide a workable basis in the conduct of our affairs in that area.

The amended memoranda reads as follows:

“Memoranda of Points Agreed at the Conference at Anfa Camp Between the President of the United States of America and the British Prime Minister on the one Hand and General Giraud on the Other

I

1.
The intervention of the Anglo-American troops on 8th November on French territory in Africa, brought about at the demand of Frenchmen who, since 1940 have wanted to take up the fight against Germany, was an act of liberation of an oppressed nation accomplished by the United Nations.
2.
The form of the relations between France and the United States of America, the post war consequences of the association of France and the United States in the fight against Germany, the military, economic and financial aid given to France, have all been defined in letters exchanged between the Consul [adviser], R. Murphy, in the name of President Roosevelt, and General Giraud, before the landing.
3.
The French nation and the French people are the only ones who may fix their representation and designate their government. Because it is impossible for the French Motherland to pronounce freely her will, France does not now possess a recognizable government and the question of the future government of France is not capable now of final solution.
4.
In the interests of the French people, in order to safeguard France’s past, her present and her future, the President of the United States of America and the British Prime Minister attribute to the French Commander-in-Chief, with his headquarters at Algiers the right and duty of acting as a trustee for French interests, military, economic and financial, in French territories which are associated or which hereafter become associated with the movement of liberation now established in French North and West Africa. They bind themselves to aid him in this task by all the means in their power.
[Page 51]

II

1.
On the military plane it has been agreed between the President of the United States and the British Prime Minister on the one hand and General Giraud on the other that the French people will receive the equipment which is indispensable to them with the priority which their military situation demands and as may be determined by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and that this shall be made up of the most modern material.
2.
In subsequent talks with General Marshall and General Somervell, it was agreed in principle that the delivery would amount to material for 3 armored divisions and 8 motorized divisions as well as for a first line air force consisting of 500 bombers, and 200 transport planes, and that of this equipment there would be delivered during the weeks to come 400 trucks, and the equipment for 2 armoured divisions, 3 reconnaissance battalions, 3 battalions of tank destroyers, and the 3 motorized divisions and such of the aviation equipment as can come by air. The details are to be worked out with the Commander in Chief, Allied Forces.
3.
In regard to transport it has been agreed in principle with General Somervell that [apparent omission] supplying of French Africa would be assured by the monthly allocation of 65,000 tons (50,000 tons of wheat, 12,000 tons of sugar and 3,000 tons of material) and that the shipment of this material would be made before next summer. France would furnish to the inter-Allied pool a share of 165,000 tons of shipping and the Allies would furnish the remainder necessary for the delivery to be completed within the agreed time. The aviation material would be sent as far as possible by air. The details are to be worked out with the appropriate Allied authorities.
4.
On the political plane it was agreed between the President of the United States, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, General Giraud that it was to their common interest for all French fighting against Germany to be reunited under one authority and that every facility would be given to General Giraud and to the French National Committee under General de Gaulle in order to bring about this union.
5.
In this connection it has been agreed by the President whereas [sic] that the exchange would be brought to 50 francs to the dollar in order to ameliorate the existing differences with the exchange rate given to the territories placed under the control of General de Gaulle it being the strong hope that in the latter territories the rate will be lowered from 43 to 50 francs to the dollar.
6.
It has also been agreed that the necessary propaganda from the North and the West African territory for France in the French language should be carried on by the French authorities in concert with the Allied authorities and that, for this reason, conferences should be held regarding the use of short wave radio stations.”

[Murphy]
Wiley
  1. The draft begins on p. 50.
  2. See telegram No. 124, February 1, from the Consul General at Algiers, p. 44.