865.01/647: Telegram
The Consul General at Algiers ( Wiley ) to the Secretary of State
[Received November 2—2:39 a.m.]
1881. From Murphy. In view of the Allied agreement that the transfer of sovereignty need not wait arrival in Rome but will be effected as soon as circumstances permit, the King and Badoglio resolved to proceed at once to form a broader base for the government. The Brindisi administration has become increasingly cautious of the activities of the political groups in Naples and Rome. They have also established secret radio communication with the six parties in Rome. A recent message from the latter signed Bonomi (Democrazia del Lavoro) indicated that the Rome representatives of the parties have not been prepared to serve in a government under a military leader such as Badoglio but would be prepared to assist in the formation of a government under the Crown. It is noteworthy that in reference to the Crown no specific reference is made to the present King. Badoglio fears that the Bonomi group is organizing a shadow government in Rome which might be set up before the arrival of the Allies.
The Naples group under the leadership of Benedetto Croce and Carlo Sforza all refuse to participate in the Badoglio government as long as the King remains. They propose the abdication of the King in favor of the Prince of Naples, who is now in Switzerland, and the appointment of Badoglio as Regent. It is obvious from our recent conversations in Naples that Sforza is being pushed forward as Prime Minister.
Sforza and the Naples group agree that there can be no question of establishing a republic in Italy before the entire country is free [Page 415] to participate in general elections even if it should be possible at that time. Your 1988, October 27, 11 p.m.
Leopoldo Piccardi joined the Badoglio Government in Brindisi about 10 days ago after a sojourn in Naples where he was in contact with the Committee of National Liberation. Badoglio leans on him heavily in matters concerning economics and industry. Piccardi is a favorable and useful element.
Badoglio, about October 22 wrote a letter to the King inviting the latter’s attention to the position taken by Sforza and Naples group. Acquarone is [in?] discussing this matter with our Brindisi mission as well as with Sforza interpreted this letter as an effort on the part of Badoglio to induce the King to abdicate. Acquarone later proceeded to Naples for the purpose of canvassing the political personalities there in the King’s behalf. The Naples group includes individuals only of regional importance some of whom might serve as useful technicians in the government. At present they are taking their directives from Sforza and Croce.
In our recent conversations with Badoglio, he was categoric in his statements that he could not be a party to any movement to force out the King even if a Regency is established. He asked MacFarlane if in a communication he proposed to send to Bonomi in Rome he could include a statement that the Allies do not favor any changes in the form of government at this particular junction. He was referred to the public pronouncements made by the American and British Governments and the importance which they attach to the efforts of driving out the Germans. He will show the text of his eventual reply to the mission before its despatch. Badoglio said that he was loyal to the King and would refuse to cooperate with the Naples and Rome groups if they forced the King’s abdication. He said that he would urge the formation of an administration for national unity for the avowed single purpose of expelling the Germans. Failing this, he would resign and leave some politician to assume his duties.
Notwithstanding Badoglio’s avowals, I believe that an understanding exists between Badogolio and Sforza looking to the abdication of the King and the establishment of Badoglio as Regent for the Prince of Naples.
Badoglio visited Sforza and Croce at Naples on October 31. He immediately thereafter advised MacFarlane that Sforza refused to take part in the government if the King remained. Sforza urged that the King abdicate in favor of the Prince of Naples and also urged the appointment of Badoglio as Regent. Croce was in entire accord. Badoglio also interviewed Rodino of the Christian Democratic Party. The latter maintained that he would not participate in the government unless Croce, Sforza, Orlando or Renauldi were [Page 416] included. As Orlando is in Rome and Renauldi in Switzerland, this means Sforza and/or Croce.
Badoglio’s conclusion now is that no political government can now be formed without Sforza stating that the latter had become clearly a symbol around which the six parties could rally. According to Badoglio he would be unable to fulfill without them the promise he made to the Allies to form a broad base government. Therefore, Badoglio proposes to inform the King of this situation and tender his resignation, recommending that the King ask Sforza to form government. Badoglio takes the position that Sforza and the Liberals must persuade the King to abdicate. He as a soldier would not take this step. If this action is taken appropriately, Badoglio now states that he would accept the Regency.
Before returning to Brindisi November 1, Badoglio planned to see De Nicola on the evening of October 31, but he did not anticipate this interview would change anything.
It appears therefore that our mission is faced with a fairly important constitutional crisis. In dealing with it our first consideration will be maintenance of order and the armistice. We consider it important for purpose of armistice that Badoglio remain at least as Regent. Both Sforza and Croce admit Badoglio’s prestige in the country and with the army and assert that his retention as Regent will be approved by anti-Fascist elements in northern Italy.
Planning for transfer of AMGOT87 territory to Italian administration continues. Allied Control Commission for Italy will be established about November 10 under a directive which will be issued shortly.
Sent to Department, repeated to London, Madrid, Lisbon and Moscow. [Murphy.]
- Allied Military Government, Occupied Territory.↩