865.01/821
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle)99
Memorandum: Italian Policy
The primary objective in Italy at present is necessarily military: the expulsion of Germans from Italy, and the maximum use of Italian territory and resources for further operations against the enemy.
A second objective, to be developed consistently with the foregoing, is the development of political conditions in Italy under which Italian public opinion can choose the form of government under which it wishes to live, subject to the unstated but implicit reservation that this government shall not be fascist, and that its prevailing methods and philosophy shall not be dangerous to Italian neighbors and to the peace of the world.
Since the military objective and political objective must be pursued simultaneously and must be harmonious, it follows that the process of rebuilding Italian institutions must at the same time contribute to our military effort, and assist in bringing about conditions, groupings and political personalities looking towards the evoluton of an Italian Government drawing its mandate from Italian public opinion.
It would seem that having pledged to Italy the right to create a government of its own choosing, the United States is under an obligation, (military considerations permitting) to assist the return to Italy of the men able to offer themselves to Italian public opinion, state the constitutional and economic issues, and secure (if they can) [Page 424] a mandate from Italian public opinion. Probably, any group appearing now will have a relatively short political life. Their principal function may well be to develop the Italian non-fascists who are relatively unknown in governmental and political life, so that these can in turn present political and social programs to the Italian public, and thus provide steady evolution towards a wider political base.
A beginning in this direction seems to have been made by Count Sforza whose negotiations with Benedetto Croce and with Marshal Badoglio state, in more or less manageable form, the issue presented by the continuous reign of King Victor Emmanuel. The immediate result has been the discharge of General Roatta and possibly General Ambrosio. A further possible result may be the establishment of a regency.
Throughout this evolution, it is essential to maintain the structural integrity of Italian political and military institutions so that while they change, the liberated Italian state nevertheless presents a steady and contributing front against the German invaders.
In view of this necessity the men who are inserted into Italian public life, by return from exile or liberation from prison, must be prepared as a condition precedent to their taking part in the Italian scene, to accept the overall obligation not to weaken the Italian military effort such as it is.
Many Italian opposition figures became either outright anti-Royalists seeking the fall of the House of Savoy or in any event favored the elimination of King Victor Emmanuel and of the Crown Prince. Some of these men state that they could not conscientiously take any oath which bound them to support the Italian monarchy. Some, however, are prepared to accept an obligation of honor not to raise constitutional questions until Italy is liberated, without abandoning the positions they have taken as to the ultimate organization of Italy.
With these considerations in mind, it would seem that the Department can consistently follow a policy (which is almost exactly that followed by Mazzini1 in the days of the unification of Italy) namely:
- (1)
- Liberation of Italy is the first consideration; the form of government at the moment is secondary to this.
- (2)
- The men who recognize this obligation and are prepared to subordinate immediate political considerations to it, are men who can be inserted into Italian political life.
- (3)
- For those who decline to accent allegiance to the monarchy, a formula should be worked out permitting them to accept allegiance and pledge obedience to the Italian military command while it operates in conjunction with the Allied military headquarters, accompanied [Page 425] by an agreement not to press political conventions which might weaken Italian military resistance.
- (4)
- The position of the Department and of the American military and diplomatic representatives should be sympathetic to steady evolution of the Italian state towards government representative of the ascertainable public opinion. Changes making any Italian Government more nearly compatible with this opinion ought to be accepted and supported.
- (5)
- To the extent possible in conditions of active warfare, free discussion of Italian political problems should be permitted.
- (6)
- The idea should be sedulously propagated that the men will deserve most at the hands of Italy who do most to organize and maintain resistance against the invaders.
The operating elements by which we shall be exercising influence on the situation will be:
- (1)
- The American high command; the principal officers in AMG;
- (2)
- Our diplomatic representatives on the Italian Advisory Committee;
- (3)
- The principal representatives in OWI2 in the area.
The OWI has selected an excellent man, Mr. Albert Spalding, best known as an American violinist, but also a distinguished scholar of Italian affairs and (unlike many musicians) a man with a level head, cool judgment, military experience and very considerable business and executive ability. Another man available for this purpose is an Italian-American, Romualdi, who has done an excellent job in handling problems of Italian public opinion in South America for the CIAA,3 and who is widely respected in labor circles in Italy and the United States. Both Romualdi and Spalding would be disposed to work very closely with the Department representatives.