851.24/307½: Telegram
The Consul General at Algiers ( Wiley ) to the Secretary of State
[Received February 21—7:05 p.m.]
252. For President and Secretary from Murphy. Our recent telegrams have indicated that we are arriving at a rather critical point in our relations with the French over the question of our program for the rearmament of the French forces. They manifest a growing feeling that they are being hoodwinked. There is a consequent lowering of morale and confidence in us largely because of the uncertainty which prevails. This results from the lack of a definite program other than the allocation by the Commander in Chief prior to Anfa, i. e., 25,000 tons of military equipment monthly.
Giraud believes that in his conversations with Marshall and Somervell at Anfa a far more substantial program was indicated but a month later Giraud is still in the dark regarding our intentions. This situation is clearly set forth in telegrams despatched yesterday and today by Eisenhower to Marshall. At Allied forces headquarters the Rearmament Commission has informed Giraud that it has no authority [Page 62] to make commitments in excess of 25,000 tons monthly. Giraud learns from Bethouart that the composition of these 25,000 tons includes items never requested such as ambulance equipment, projectors and items of a defensive character, but no tanks and little other equipment described as offensive type. This sense of uncertainty has been heightened by unfavorable military developments of the past few days.
The point of this letter is a desire to let you know that throughout the French Army in North Africa the conviction is developing that we are not sincere in the many references we have made through the months to the rearmament of the French forces and also that the military effort is being held back in this area. The French have listened with respectful credence to our various announcements of armament production and they also realize fully the gravity of the shipping problem but what primarily disturbs them is that after three months of our presence in Africa during which time we have of necessity depended on the French for many things no evidence of a substantial program of rearmament is in sight.
They know the de Gaulle forces have been equipped by the British with modern armament and that with British help de Gaulle agents are smuggling quantities of munitions into France (together with propaganda to the effect that the United States is backing a Fascist Pretorian guard in North Africa).
Under these circumstances the American objective is questioned and there is uncertainty whether United States has any real intention of permitting the French African Army to equip itself and whether French African forces will be excluded from the European operation.
We emphasize that whatever immediate increase of armaments shipments is made to this area within the framework of existing shipping possibilities it would in no wise affect your longer term policy regarding the equipment of the French Army in France, a matter of at least 100 divisions. What we are driving at is a few divisions and the necessity now to galvanize the French fighting spirit here for the African operation and the participation even if only a participation in the initial stages of the European invasion. We feel it of the utmost importance that the French African Army be given the opportunity to participate with Allied forces when the time comes to move into southern Europe. Deprived of such a prospect morale will deteriorate to a point where our European operation might be seriously embarrassed.
The Security of the North African base is of capital importance to the success of that operation. We should do everything we can to stimulate the fighting spirit here. Without the allocation of modern armament to the French we cannot expect that essential cooperation.
[Page 63]Some credence is being given by the French to a current report that the United States does not favor the creation of any French Army even after victory is achieved and proposes, with Great Britain and Soviet Russia, to exclude France from real participation in the peace settlement. They point out furthermore in support of their concern that most of the still insignificant quantities of material thus far given by us is obviously designed for defensive purposes and although they previously held a considerable sector of the Tunisian front without modern equipment their units have been withdrawn presumably to be equipped but so far the material is lacking.
Under such circumstances Giraud told General Eisenhower and me yesterday he had no interest in continuing the battle. His primary purpose is the participation in the fight for the liberation of France. If that were to be denied him he preferred to quit now. He has every confidence in your sincerity and that of Generals Marshall and Somervell and Eisenhower, but he feels that somewhere along the line there is opposition if not deception.
General Eisenhower is sending two telegrams outlining the position regarding armament of the French forces as it relates to the critical battle now in progress in Tunisia as well as to the European program. I urgently recommend that we lay at least some cards on the table and enter into franker discussion as to the future of the French participation if this is at all practicable. Our prestige and policy are being challenged.
French officers are beginning to look more and more to England for practical encouragement. There has been some discussion of sending two French African divisions to England for training and eventual equipment. Giraud states that many French aviation officers are applying for permission to go to England where they feel that the prospect of participating in the military action may be brighter than is the case here.
If possible General Eisenhower should have more support; and more tonnage with necessary escort vessels should be allocated to this area. The French have made an important contribution to shipping and considerable progress has been made in port facilities and speed of unloading. [Murphy.]