852.00/10664

The Ambassador in Spain ( Hayes ) to the Secretary of State

No. 761

Sir: I have the honor to enclose a strictly confidential memorandum outlining a plan aimed at securing a modification of Spain’s present relationship with the Axis which somewhat limits the field for some of our activities, such as publicity, et cetera, in Spain, and which gives [Page 603] the impression among certain groups in Spain and especially abroad that Spain is actually pro-Axis.

While the relative freedom with which German agencies and pro-German elements in the Falange have been allowed to operate in Spain has not, I think, had the effect of fostering pro-Axis sentiments in Spain at large, but, on the other hand, has synchronized with a growing friendship and dependence on the democracies, I believe nevertheless that the impression created abroad that Spain is a partisan of the Axis has had considerable propaganda value to the Axis, and that our general position would be greatly improved if the Spanish Government should take steps to counteract this impression. It has been this Embassy’s belief, and likewise the belief of the British Embassy and of many sincere friends whom we have in the Spanish Government, that it would have been a mistake to make an issue of the matter up to now, particularly since, as pointed out in the memorandum, the Germans have tended to overplay their hand and to produce a reaction within Spain fundamentally favorable to us.,

As events progress, and as and when our military position further improves, it may be in our interest, however, to make an issue with the Spanish Government. In the enclosed memorandum the Embassy has endeavored to outline some results which might possibly follow.

I do not recommend that this plan be put into effect today, and it may be that changing circumstances will make it unnecessary or undesirable ever to carry it into effect. However, I have begun to lay the basis for it if and when it should appear desirable (see my despatch No. 746 of March 29, 1943). I would assume, of course, that no such plan would be undertaken without the Embassy’s prior consent and that of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Like everything else with which the Embassy occupies itself now, the plan envisages the possibility of obtaining additional military advantages to us in Spain, and, of course, it should be studied with that objective in mind.

I have shown the plan to Colonel Hohenthal, who approves it as a basis for study and for possible action if events should appear to make action of the kind suggested desirable.

Respectfully yours,

Carlton J. H. Hayes
[Enclosure]

Memorandum by the Ambassador in Spain ( Hayes ) to the Secretary of State

It is rumored in Madrid that Count von der Schulenburg, thoroughgoing German Nazi, who came to Madrid as representative of Hitler [Page 604] to Ambassador von Moltke’s funeral, will be named Ambassador to Spain to succeed von Moltke. If this is true, we may anticipate strengthened Nazi pressure on Spain in the future, if not to bring Spain into the war or to obtain military facilities from Spain, then at least to secure minor favors from Spain and to limit Spain’s concessions to the democracies.

Whether or not von der Schulenburg is named Ambassador it is still likely that the above will be Germany’s attitude toward Spain during ensuing months.

We have already reported to the Department that Franco is giving indications that he is trying to establish a basis for maintaining himself in power indefinitely. The press has given prominence to a long lecture by a Madrid University professor endeavoring to demonstrate that “Caudillaje”, the present “system of government” in Spain, is itself a legitimate system, having roots in Spanish “reason” and tradition, and that it differs no less from Naziism and Fascism than from democracy (Embassy’s despatch No. 762, April 2, 194317). Franco himself told the Cortes that the legitimacy of his power was that which pertained to one who had rescued a society (Embassy’s despatch No. 694, March 20, 194317).

There is little doubt that when Franco was named by a group of generals Chief of Government of the Spanish State while the civil war was still going on, it was in no one’s mind that he would convert himself into Chief of State for life or that a new form of government was in the making in Spain, or that its chief bulwark would be a pro-German “Falange”. It was generally accepted that the civil war would end in restoration of the Monarchy, and “Viva el Rey” was a battle cry of the Nationalist armies.

General Franco, however, with what he probably considered rare political sense, and undoubtedly encouraged by the then German Ambassador, made a national hero out of José Antonio Primo de Rivera and fostered the latter’s relatively small “Falange” and built it up as the sole political party in Spain. Falange is probably now the only organization in Spain which would whole-heartedly support Franco in any effort to perpetuate himself in power or to perpetuate the present political system.

Falange has never been really popular in Spain, either with the Army, which saw in it a possible rival with its semi-military organization, or with the Spanish people, little addicted to totalitarianism and regimentation.

The outbreak of the present world war gave Franco a perhaps unexpected opportunity to consolidate himself in power. Spain was broken economically and divided politically as a result of three years [Page 605] of bitter civil war, and the possibility that Spain might become involved in the world war induced nearly all sectors of the Spanish population to support Franco in the hope that some order might be brought out of the existing chaos and that Spain might be spared entry into the international conflict.

From the beginning, Franco identified himself closely with the Axis powers, both as a means of strengthening his own position in Spain and as insurance against Spain’s being invaded. The Spanish people soon sensed that with all his apparent friendliness to the Axis General Franco was actually endeavoring to keep out of the war. This policy was heartily supported by the Spanish people.

Yet Spain, under Franco and the Falange, became a fertile field for Axis agents and Axis propaganda. The Germans, with practically complete freedom in the propaganda field, overplayed their hand, and as the Nazi menace revealed itself to the world there was a revulsion of public opinion in Catholic Spain which was directed not only against the Nazis, but against their artificial counterpart in Spain, Falange. This revulsion erased to a large extent the gratitude of Nationalists for the military help received during the civil war from Germany and Italy, which, of course, had been in large part responsible for the success of the Nationalist Movement.

As time has gone on, therefore, Franco, who has continued to be pro-Axis in his public statements, and Falange, which has continued to identify itself ideologically and sentimentally with the Axis, have steadily lost popular favor. This has been a progressive phenomenon although it has never been translated into effective action against the regime because (1) Franco’s policy of staying out of the war has continued to receive general support; (2) economic conditions within the country have slowly but steadily improved; (3) close police supervision and the feeling that any disturbance in the domestic political situation might still result in German intervention and possible Spanish involvement in the war have continued to discourage opposition elements from getting together.

Now, as Allied military prospects improve, and particularly when the Axis is thrown out of Africa, it is logical that Spanish determination to resist Axis aggression will be reinforced. The Government itself has officially expressed such determination, the Spanish public is aware of our own guarantees, and it would be dangerous under the best circumstances for the Government to recede from its pledge to us. Furthermore, as our military plans develop and prosper, the danger of German aggression will decrease, or at least will appear to the Spaniards to decrease. In fact, the possibility of German invasion is already discounted by a majority of Spaniards.

[Page 606]

As German ability to supply Spain with products Spain must import from abroad decreases—and it is steadily decreasing—our own ability to trade with Spain, and particularly our ability to provide Spain with petroleum products18 vitally needed in Spanish industry, agriculture and transportation, constitutes an increasingly powerful weapon in our hands. It is probably a more powerful weapon than any Germany can use against Spain, especially since German invasion in the face of probable Spanish resistance will involve grave military risks for the Germans, and German submarine warfare against Spanish shipping, which Germany has used as an active weapon in the past, can be limited in its effectiveness by convoying once the Spaniards feel safe to engage in such practice.

Because of our superior ability to trade with Spain, and our effective economic program, we have built up in Spain an economic dependence on us which constitutes a weapon in our hands waiting only to be used at the proper time. Meanwhile, as a result of past pro-Axis utterances of General Franco and of his continuing tolerance of the pro-Axis Falange, we have a number of legitimate complaints against Spain which we can press at the proper moment. These include the pro-Axis partisanship of the government-controlled Spanish press, radio and newsreels, other facilities given to the Axis in the Spanish propaganda field, Falange interference with our own informational activities in Spain, and, if we care to use it, the presence on the Eastern front of a Spanish volunteer division actively fighting the Russians.

It is recommended that we bear in mind the desirability at the proper time of exerting pressure on the Spanish Government to remove all such obvious discriminations against us. Such pressure may succeed, in which case we shall have made a net gain and shall have a fuller field for activities of all kinds in Spain.

On the other hand, it is possible that the Spanish Government, in the face of Falange and German pressure which it is anticipated will be exerted on Spain, may persist in its discriminations against us. In that event, we may decide to slow up, or even to interrupt, deliveries of American products, including petroleum, to Spain. We might simultaneously intensify our propaganda in Spain and complain publicly against the pro-Axis policies of the Spanish Government so that it would become apparent that there was a relationship between those policies and the reduction in Spanish-American trade.

Franco would in that event be in an extremely weak position. It would probably be too late for him to appeal for help from the Axis. The popular will to resist Axis interference, which has been cultivated [Page 607] by the Government, itself, would be too strong, and he could not expect support from the Army.

The Spanish people, already anti-Axis in their feeling, would be aware, as in fact they are aware already, that we had real grievances against Spain, and there is a good chance that the odium for the economic crisis which would ensue in Spain would fall on General Franco, who is held to be personally responsible for the pro-Axis attitude of the Spanish Government.

The desire to overcome the economic crisis, which would in itself threaten to bring about popular revolt in Spain, might be the factor needed to bring the diverse anti-Franco and anti-Falange groups in Spain together. The Army, with monarchist support, might carry out a coup which would restore the Monarchy. If this opportunity were missed, the possibility of mass rebellion would become imminent.

A revolt against the present regime would be a revolt against the Axis because of the regime’s close identification with it. As between the Axis and ourselves we would be in a favored position if we were able to take military advantage of our opportunity. If the Axis entered Spain we might enter also, without being guilty of committing an aggression. We would, in that event, have a ready-made second front without in any way repudiating our pledges to Spain.

Portugal would most probably be in a mood to accept our military aid, and both the Portuguese and Spanish islands in the Atlantic would become available for use by us as bases.

In creating the conditions for these developments we could not be accused of having committed an aggression against Spain because we have no obligation to continue our economic relations with Spain in the face of the pro-Axis attitude of many agencies of the Spanish Government. In fact, this attitude deprives Spain of any just claim to continued treatment as a neutral and we have a perfect right to reduce or suspend our trade with Spain so long as these Spanish agencies are allowed to persist in their pro-Axis partisanship.

  1. Not printed.
  2. Not printed.
  3. See pp. 668 ff.