865.30/71
Memorandum by the American Ambassador in Spain ( Hayes ) of a Conversation With the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs ( Jordana )83
I said there was just one matter I wished to take up today but that it was very important. It was the matter of Italian warships and merchant ships in Spanish ports. They had been held by Spain for a long time and, in my Government’s view, unjustifiably.
[Page 720]With reference to the warships, I had submitted a Note on the subject on September 13, nearly three months ago. The Foreign Office had replied on October 6. I had sent a further Note, elaborating my arguments and asking for reconsideration, on October 12, nearly two months ago. More than sufficient time had elapsed for consideration of the matter, and I urgently requested a favorable response.
I said I would like briefly to review our basic argument.
The problem was not complex, but very simple. The Italian ships had put into Spanish ports for two reasons: (1) to land dead and wounded, and (2) to obtain fuel to enable them to continue their voyage.
Fuel was not made available for their departure within 24–48 hours. The question from the outset, therefore, has been one of making fuel available. I wished to make clear to the Minister that there was certain to be a most unfavorable reaction in the United States if Spain, to which the United States makes fuel available, does not, in turn, make fuel available to allow these Italian warships to depart within 24–48 hours thereafter, in accordance with international law.
I said there was also a political consideration which I wanted to present to him.
General Franco,84 and more recently the Minister, himself, had assured me that the Spanish Government sympathized with the United States in its war against Japan. They had said that Spain was benevolently neutral and wished, so far as it was able, to cooperate with us.
If the Italian warships were released, they would replace certain American ships in the Mediterranean, and the latter could be used in the Pacific against Japan. This could be done through Spanish cooperation and without violation of Spanish neutrality. Spain’s action would be in strict accordance with international law.
I said there was a third consideration. There were more than a thousand crew members on these Italian war vessels. They had been idle and cooped up on the ships for more than three months. As a result, there had been a great lowering in morale which, if continued, would become a very troublesome matter for the Spanish Government.
The Minister said he could not agree that the matter was quite as simple as I had alleged. He said there was a big question involved in interpreting the 24- or 48-hour rule. It was whether a neutral country not having fuel available could indefinitely prolong the period in which the ships could remain without internment in order to obtain fuel.
In addition, it had not been clear to him at the outset why the Italian ships had put in to the Balearics. The Ministry of Marine had supplied [Page 721] him with the alleged reasons originally, and these were at variance with the reasons later assigned by us.
In view of the technicalities involved, he had submitted the matter to a group of technical experts and to the Ministry of Marine. On the basis of their findings he had sent me his Note of October 6. Back of this Note was his decision that the ships should be interned.
However, following the receipt of my Note of October 12, he had resubmitted the matter to the technical experts and to the Ministry of Marine. Both had carried on an elaborate investigation and study with special reference to precedents in international law pertinent to the case and to the statements of Italian and Spanish officers in the ports where the ships arrived concerning the reasons for putting in at those ports.
He had already received the report of the technical experts, but he had not yet received the report of the Ministry of Marine. He had requested the report just before I called on him on December 1, and since my call he had made a second and very peremptory request that the report and recommendations be hurried.
He said he was greatly interested in the political considerations I had presented. He wanted to repeat that I had a correct impression of the assurances given by General Franco and him concerning Spain’s attitude toward Japan in the war between Japan and the United States.
At the same time, he felt that the case of the Italian warships must rest on a solid legal basis, and that he thought it might be extremely serious for Spain if any publicity should be given to Spain’s being moved by any such political consideration.
I said that I was in perfect agreement that the release of the Italian warships should be made on a solid basis of international law, and that I had no thought, and my Government had no thought, of giving any publicity to the political consideration advanced. I had advanced it for his own personal use and in order to show him how Spain would be cooperating with the United States, just as General Franco and he had said Spain wished to cooperate, and still do it in strict conformity with Spain’s position as a neutral.
The Minister said he would take this into consideration and that he was grateful for the assurance that we had no purpose of making public use of it. He sympathized personally with the object in view and hoped very much that the report which he expected to receive very soon from the Ministry of Marine would establish a legal basis which would justify Spain in meeting the wishes of the United States Government. He would notify me as quickly as he had the report and could reach a decision.