Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1943, Europe, Volume II

740.00112 European War 1939/8481: Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

Bern, May 17, 1943—6 p.m.
[Received 6:54 p.m.]

3015. Department’s 1154, May 14, and my 2875 (337 to London) May 10.²²

1. My British colleague has shown me MEW’s²³ telegram 2330, May 15, repeated to Washington.

2. As will be noted this last instruction from London differs from Department’s instruction contained in its telegram under reference mainly in the following features:

1. It suggests omitting the revocation of the validity of existing navicerts or export licenses in respect to goods which are not shipped in 14 days from date of notes’ presentation.

2. It states that though our final policy must depend on outcome of Swiss-German negotiations we should be prepared to raise the embargo provisionally if the Swiss agree to grant no new credits (whereas Department’s instruction adds “whether based on coal deliveries or not”) and provided they give assurance that pending final decision on limitation and reduction of undesirable exports such exports will at any rate be kept below average 1942 levels; latter provision appears to vary from (a) in penultimate paragraph of Department’s telegram under reference in that specifying reduction from average of 1942 it suggests through use of “levels” reduction for each item and not “total volume” as in (a) and does not specify that this reduction shall be “immediate”.

3. Insofar as instructions received by my British colleague differ to extent outlined above from those contained in Department’s telegram under reference, I shall await Department’s instructions as to which formula Department wishes to be employed. My British colleague deems it essential that our statements to Swiss should be identical. In this I concur.

4. I wish to express my appreciation of opportunity offered by Department to give my views in this matter. It is my understanding that our purpose is to obtain substantial reduction in undesirable exports to Axis. We are indifferent as to means by which this is to be obtained. Consequently it would appear to be preferable not to impose specific conditions but rather to leave it to Swiss to meet our demands. They are now in midst of negotiations with Germans. They have given every indication of standing to their guns. If we now impose sanctions, I fear that this will create a situation which can be used by Germans to our disadvantage as pointed out in penultimate paragraph of my 2525, April 12th [22nd].

Both my British colleague and I still feel that it would be preferable to follow a procedure along lines indicated in my 2788 of May 6.²⁴ Such procedure would I believe ensure us a more flexible position in which we would retain initiative and serve our purpose.

Repeated to London.

Harrison

22. Latter not printed.
23. British Ministry of Economic Warfare.
24. Not printed; the procedure suggested was that a communication to the Swiss in the form of a note verbale should be made in either Washington, London, or Bern regarding views of the United States and the United Kingdom on exports to the Axis countries from Switzerland (740.00112 European War 1939/8375).