Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1943, Europe, Volume II

854.24/95: Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom ( Matthews ) to the Secretary of State

London , March 5, 1943—noon.
[Received March 6—11 a.m.]

1592. For Department and Board of Economic Warfare.

1. On the first of March the Swiss Minister here⁸² informed Dingle Foot⁸³ of Ministry of Economic Warfare that according to his information the American Government was now inclined to take a “milder view” of Switzerland than heretofore and to regard more sympathetically the claims of the Swiss Army. The Minister then handed over a list of supplies urgently required for the army which are oats, wool, leather and or hides, glycerine, castor oil, tinplate, chrome, molybdenum, manganese, these latter either pure or in ferro alloys, stellite, steel plates, iron plates, bicycle chains. The Minister said no quantities were mentioned as he understood how difficult it would be to obtain allocations for some of these products.

2. Foot replied that we had always made a distinction between the needs of the army and other requirements and for that reason navicerts or export licenses for both rubber and toluol have been issued without waiting for Geleitscheine ⁸⁴ of equivalent value. The Minister’s list would receive immediate consideration but Foot pointed out that some of the commodities mentioned, for example chrome, were covered by the compensation deal while others such as oats, wool and leather had been the subject of controversy during the recent negotiations; we had refused to let thru textiles and feeds unless the Swiss either forbade the export of cattle, dairy produce, and clothing or unless they made a progressive reduction in their machinery exports to the enemy. As neither of our requests had as yet been granted it would be difficult for us before reopening the negotiations to permit importation of the precise quantities which has been in issue. Furthermore, it would be difficult for us to continue to ship under the compensation deal while we were receiving no Swiss exports in return.

3. The Swiss Minister replied that he understood the difficulties but in respect of oats he thought his Government could guarantee that these would be fed only to horses actually serving with the army. His information was that the army horses had not the strength to pull the loads. Foot replied that if this request were granted we should need some figures if not of the actual number of horses with the army at least the quantity of oats desired and for how long a period. The Minister replied that the best course would be for his Military Attaché⁸⁵ to obtain figures from the General of the Swiss Army⁸⁶ and meanwhile he would tentatively suggest the import of 10,000 tons of oats.

4. Foot stated that in respect of the other commodities we should demand some indication of the amounts as we could not approach either the supply departments or the CEMB⁸⁷ without such figures. He thought that bicycle chains would not be easily obtainable either in Britain or the United States and was surprised to learn that they were not manufactured in Switzerland. The Minister said the same thought had occurred to him and that he would enquire whether it would not be satisfactory if we were to permit the import of the raw materials.

5. Foot then enquired when the delegation might be expected back in London. The Minister had no information on this but said the delay might be a result of Heller’s [Keller’s?] illness.⁸⁸ The Minister said that the delay need not trouble us as we were allowing nothing to pass thru the blockade. Foot answered that he must correct this impression and said that our principal endeavor in the negotiations had been to obtain a limitation in the export of machinery to the Axis. This was a matter to which we attached the greatest importance and in the meanwhile as the price to be paid for the compensation deal we were prevented from exercising further pressure on machinery firms although the deal itself had not yet begun to operate in our favor. In these circumstances the continued delay was certainly not to our advantage.

6. In his memorandum requesting the commodities the Minister said that “the Board of Economic Warfare might favor such imports in the present circumstances.” We should be interested to learn whether the statement of the Minister accurately reflects such information as may have been given to the Swiss Legation in Washington. While the policy of giving certain support to the Swiss Army is well understood here the Embassy must observe that this Swiss approach has the appearance of an effort to obtain under the guise of army needs certain commodities which were refused in the negotiations for the reason that the Swiss were willing [unwilling?] to make us equivalent concessions. We should be interested to have your comments on this proposal before Ministry of Economic Warfare makes any more definite policy to the Swiss Minister.

Matthews

82. Walter Thurnheer.
83. Parliamentary Secretary of the British Ministry of Economic Warfare.
84. Licenses or guarantees of safe conduct.
85. Capt. Charles Schlegel.
86. Gen. Henri Guisan.
87. Combined Raw Materials Board.
88. Presumably reference is to Prof. Paul Keller, Swiss Delegate in charge of trade agreements.