[Annex]
Memorandum by Mr. John D. Jernegan of the Division
of Near Eastern Affairs
[Washington,] January 23,
1943.
American Policy in Iran
This Government has come during the past year or more to play a
relatively active part in Iranian affairs. In the past, the United
States has had no important political interests in Iran and has been
seriously concerned with events in that country only from time to
time. Our recent activity, therefore, is rather a new departure and
has arisen primarily out of our participation in the war and natural
concern that political matters in all theaters of war operations
should develop favorably with respect to the United Nations. Iran
has been, and is, important in this connection because of its value
as a supply route to Russia, its strategic location and its vast
production of petroleum products. When occasion has arisen to set
forth our policy, we have based it upon the foregoing
considerations, and I feel that they constitute ample justification
for the attitude we have adopted.
I believe, however, that it is worthwhile at this time to put down on
paper certain much broader considerations which, it seems to me,
should likewise impel us to follow a positive policy in Iran, not
only while the prosecution of the war is still foremost in our minds
but also in the period when victory is in our grasp and we come to
the conclusion of the peace.
I should like to suggest that Iran constitutes a test case for the
good faith of the United Nations and their ability to work out among
themselves an adjustment of ambitions, rights and interests which
will be fair not only to the Great Powers of our coalition but also
to the small nations associated with us or brought into our sphere
by circumstances. Certainly, nowhere else in the Middle East is
there to be found so clear-cut [Page 332] a conflict of interests between two of the
United Nations, so ancient a tradition of rivalry, and so great a
temptation for the Great Powers concerned to give precedence to
their own selfish interests over the high principles enunciated in
the Atlantic Charter.
For considerably more than one hundred years, Russia has been
pressing down upon Iran from the north, repeatedly threatening new
annexations of territory, repeatedly attempting in one way or
another to dominate Iran. Three times in the present century alone
Russian troops have entered Iranian territory against the will of
the Iranian people.
For the same period of time, Great Britain has opposed the Russian
movement southward, fearing for her position in the Persian Gulf and
Indian Ocean and especially fearful of the potential threat to
India. British troops have been on Iranian soil at least twice since
the turn of the century and British influence has been exerted over
and over again to counter the Russian expansion.
Although Russian policy has been fundamentally aggressive and British
policy fundamentally defensive in character, the result in both
cases has been interference with the internal affairs of Iran,
amounting at times to a virtually complete negation of Iranian
sovereignty and independence. It is superfluous to point out that
this has created an ingrained distrust of both powers in the Iranian
people and has not been without effect upon the attitude of the
other weak peoples of the Middle East.
If this were merely history, it would be of no importance.
Unfortunately, there are signs that history may be in the process of
repeating itself. The basic factors are unchanged: Russia is still
without a warm-water port; Britain still clings to her predominant
position in the Middle East and east of Suez. Even if we assume the
eventual independence of India and Burma and a British withdrawal
from Iraq, Palestine and Egypt, there is every reason to suppose
that Britain would not welcome an advance into that area by
Russia.
Once again Russian and British troops are in Iran, the former in the
north, the latter in the south and center. It is true that their
presence is made necessary by imperative considerations of military
expediency and that their withdrawal at the conclusion of the war
has been solemnly promised, but I need not recall the hundreds of
instances in which the forces of a Great Power have entered the
territory of a weaker nation for one purpose and have remained,
indefinitely, for other purposes.
Largely because of this occupation of Iranian territory, the
governmental machinery of Iran, and its economic structure, have
been seriously weakened. This has become both a reason and an excuse
for direct intervention by the Russian and British authorities in
[Page 333] Iranian political
matters. At the present moment, no Iranian Cabinet can survive
without the direct support of the Allied powers. While it is obvious
that the United Nations could not permit a hostile government to
function at Tehran, it is equally obvious that the Iranian political
and economic organization must be strengthened to a point at which
it will be able to function efficiently by itself, if Iran is to
survive as an independent nation. It is unnecessary to point out
that a political vacuum is as impossible as a physical vacuum; if
Iran falls into a state of anarchy, some power must assume
responsibility for its government, and it may be assumed that the
first to offer themselves for this task would be one or both of the
present occupying powers.
Apart from the general situation in Iran, I believe we should be
fully alive to the character of the present Russian occupation of
the northern provinces. In Azerbaijan, the Soviet authorities have
greatly restricted the operations of the Iranian civil authorities
and have virtually immobilized the small Iranian military forces
which they reluctantly permitted to return to the area. They have
alternately encouraged and discouraged the restive Kurds, always a
thorn in the flesh of the local government. More important still,
they have been so successful in propagandizing the population that
our Consul at Tabriz29 has reported that a soviet could be established
overnight in Azerbaijan if the Russians gave the word. In this
connection, it is well to remember that Azerbaijan is inhabited
largely by a Turkish-speaking population whose cultural ties with
Soviet Transcaucasia and Turkish Kurdistan are almost as strong as
those with the rest of Iran. It is also the most important
grain-producing area of Iran and would be a welcome addition to the
food resources of Transcaucasia.
There are other items which might be mentioned: the strained
relations between the Russian and British authorities in Iran; the
suspicion with which the Russians appear to view every move made by
the British or Americans, for example their obvious hesitancy in
agreeing to our operation of the southern section of the
Trans-Iranian railroad;30 the apparent attempt by the Russian
government to weaken British influence by leaving the British to
bear the brunt of Iran’s economic problems; the continued refusal of
the Soviet authorities in Iran to permit transportation of grain
from Azerbaijan to meet the urgent needs of Tehran; the impending
move by the Russians to take over control of Iranian arms
plants.31
On the British side, the blunt, uncompromising attitude which has
characterized British policy towards Iran does not augur well for a
[Page 334] future amicable
adjustment of Anglo-Iranian relations. Nor is it reassuring to
recall the recent British proposal to arrogate to the Allies power
to modify the Iranian cabinet at will.
It may be that the situation outlined above represents nothing more
than the inevitable result of the stress and strain of coalition
warfare and that once the victory is won all parties will be glad to
revert to their former positions, leaving Iranian sovereignty as
intact as it was before the Anglo-Russian occupation. Both Britain
and Russia have repeatedly promised to do so, and both powers, and
Iran as well, have adhered to the principles of the Atlantic
Charter.
I should like to submit, however, that the United States has a vital
interest in seeing to it that the United Nations do live up to the Atlantic Charter and, consequently, in
making it as easy as possible for them to do so.
What I have in mind is the situation which will arise when the war is
won, or nearly won, and the time comes to think of British and
Russian withdrawal from Iran, with consequent full rehabilitation of
Iranian self-government. Have we not some reason to anticipate that
the respective British and Russian forces may remain suspiciously
eyeing each other, each proclaiming its entire willingness to
withdraw as soon as the other has done so? Is it not possible that
one or both powers will allege, perhaps with reason, that Iran is in
such a state of confusion that she must be “protected” for a time?
And is it probable that either would withdraw and allow the other to
carry out this “protection”?
Carrying this thought one step further, if Russia should really
harbor ambitions for expansion in Iran, is it not all too likely
that she would insist upon Iran’s need for Soviet guidance, and that
she would violently oppose the interposition of another interested
power in the role of tutor? And if Great Britain should give way on
this, would not Britain all the more cling to her position in Iraq
and other parts of the Middle East, as protection against a future
Russian thrust toward Suez, thus checking the progress which we hope
to see in the direction of independence for all Near Eastern
peoples?
I think we may assume that the Iranian Government has long since
thought of all the foregoing considerations and that its
ever-stronger appeal for American assistance is largely based upon
them. So far, we have rested our response to this appeal primarily
upon our interest in winning the war. I wonder if we should not also
begin, privately, to base our response upon our interest in winning
the peace? The United States, alone, is in a position to build up
Iran to the point at which it will stand in need of neither British
nor Russian assistance to maintain order in its own house. If we go
at this task whole [Page 335]
heartedly, we can hope to remove any excuse for a post-war
occupation, partition, or tutelage of Iran. We can work to make Iran
self-reliant and prosperous, open to the trade of all nations and a
threat to none. In the meantime, we can so firmly establish
disinterested American advisers32 in Iran that no
peace conference could even consider a proposal to institute a
Russian or British protectorate or to “recognize the predominance”
of Russian or British interests. If Iran needs special assistance of
a material character, we can provide it and so remove any cause for
claims for compensation by other powers. We can forestall loans
carrying with them control of the customs or other servitudes upon
the Iranian Government. If railroads, ports, highways, public
utilities, industries, are to be built, we can build them and turn
them over to the Iranian people free of any strings.
I realize that objections can be raised to such a policy. Some which
occur to me at the moment are: (a) it is
unprecedented in our relations with the Middle East; (b) it impinges on a “sphere of influence”
hitherto considered exclusively British and Russian; (c) there is no guarantee that it will
succeed; (d) it might involve expenditure and
loss of money; (e) if it came into public
notice, it might arouse domestic criticism on the part of
isolationists.
To answer these seriatim:
- (a)
- The present war and the problems of future peace for the
United States are likewise unprecedented. We have now
realized, and publicly stated over and over again, that we
cannot be indifferent to the welfare of any part of the
world, no matter how remote, because sooner or later it will
affect our own peace.
- (b)
- The very fact that Iran has been a “sphere of influence”
in dispute between two Great Powers, makes it all the more
desirable that a third, disinterested, power should be
called in to eliminate the dispute. Both Britain and Russia
would be relieved of an anxiety and constant source of
friction if each could be assured that the other would have
no special position in the area, and it is not inconceivable
that both would regard this assurance as worth whatever
ambitions might be given up. In this connection, it seems
hardly possible that either could suspect the United States
of having imperialistic designs in a country so far removed
from us and where we could never hope to employ military
force against an adjacent Great Power.
- (c)
- If war cannot be waged without taking risks, I submit that
the same is true of the making of peace. In any case, if we
try and fail, we shall have lost nothing more than if we do
not make the attempt. If the ambitions of Britain and
Russia, their mutual distrust, or their established
interests, are so strong that they would [Page 336] override a purely
disinterested effort on our part to improve conditions in
Iran, then we may assume that peace, in that part of the
world, was doomed from the beginning.
- (d)
- The expenditures involved, even if all of them should be a
total loss, would be insignificant by contrast with the cost
of the present war, and infinitesimal beside the material
and human cost of a failure to make a satisfactory peace
throughout the world.
- (e)
- This objection will be met with in connection with any
effort by the United States to participate in a cooperative
post-war settlement, and we must be prepared to accept it.
In the case of Iran, it could be countered by emphasis on
the humanitarian aspects and should appeal to the normal
American sympathy with anything savoring of assistance to
the underdog. If properly presented, a policy of help for
Iran might, indeed, receive the same sort of popular
approval as has been accorded to our support of
China.
Finally, I should like to reiterate the conviction previously
expressed that if the principles of unselfish fair-dealing
enunciated by the Atlantic Charter are ignored when it comes to
Iran, or any other country in similar circumstances, the foundations
of our peace will begin to crumble immediately. In my opinion, this
is the overriding argument which should lead us to seize every
opportunity to direct events in such a way that there will be no
occasion for power politics or conflict of interests among the
United Nations in their relations with Iran.
If this conclusion is sound, I believe that we should not only comply
to the best of our ability with Iranian requests for advisers and
supplies but should also take the initiative in suggesting the
employment of American specialists and application of American
methods in various fields; further, we should not be content merely
to support or oppose British or Russian policies and demands in
Iran, but should put forward positive suggestions of our own for the
improvement of conditions. To this end, we should regard ourselves
as at least equally responsible with the British and Russians for
the solution of Iranian problems and need not, in any way, leave the
initiative to them merely because they happen to be the occupying
powers. Moreover, here in Washington we should actively enlist the
cooperation of all appropriate agencies of the Federal Government in
support of this policy, and we should not confine ourselves solely
to steps whose close connection with the war effort can be clearly
demonstrated. If necessary, we should make it clear to the other
agencies that we regard measures to promote a satisfactory ultimate
settlement in Iran as being only slightly less important than those
immediately directed towards the winning of the war, and that we
consider it most unwise to defer all such measures until the war is
over.
