890F.0011/102
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Alling)
| Participants: | Amir Faisal, Saudi Arabian Minister of Foreign Affairs |
| Amir Khalid | |
| Shaikh Hafiz Wahba, Saudi Arabian Minister to London | |
| Mr. Stettinius30 | |
| Mr. Berle31 | |
| Mr. Murray | |
| Mr. Alling |
The Acting Secretary received the two Arabian Princes and the Arabian Minister to London. On behalf of the President of the United States the Acting Secretary presented a gift for King Ibn Saud, which he requested Amir Faisal to be good enough to take to his father. The Acting Secretary also presented a present to each of the Princes on behalf of the President. He then inquired whether there was anything we could do to be helpful. Through his interpreter Amir Faisal said that his father and he were very much interested in American policy in the Near East, as, just as during the last war, everyone in that part of the world needed help. Above all, his father wanted to say that the Near and Middle Eastern countries wanted to be independent and happy. On several occasions King Ibn Saud had explained his views to special representatives of the President. In return, he hoped to know something of American opinion, since in dealing with his friends the King did not like to take any action which might interfere with their policies. The King was not quite clear as to the trend of American policy with respect to some of the Arabic countries. The Amir inquired whether there was anything he could carry back to his father, particularly with respect to American policy regarding the independence of Arabic countries. The Amir gave assurances that anything the Acting Secretary might be able to say would be held in strict confidence by his father and himself.
To explain somewhat further some of the problems of Saudi Arabia, Amir Faisal said that King Ibn Saud had information that the [Page 846] Hashimite family32 was trying to add to the territory under its control. For example, that family is said to be working toward a union of Palestine, Iraq and Syria. King Ibn Saud believed that the Hashimite family did not represent the people in the countries where they were ruling. The King also had the strong opinion that the Hashimite House was trying to surround Saudi Arabia and to strangle it. The King did not know the policy of the Allies with respect to the expansion of the Hashimite territories. If it was the policy of the Allies to support this expansionist move, he could do nothing to stop it. Nevertheless, he would look upon such support with great regret. On previous occasions the Turks, and then the Hashimite House, had tried to surround the Saudi Arabian territories but, with the help of God, their pretensions had been stopped. It was the policy of his father to be friendly with all of his neighbors, since he considered that to be to the best interest of all of the Arab peoples. (At this point the Acting Secretary was obliged to take leave of the Princes, since he had a previous engagement. The discussion was continued in Mr. Berle’s office.)
In reply to the remarks of Amir Faisal, Mr. Berle said that the United States had no interest in making dynastic alliances against his father or anyone else. Neither did the United States have any interest in furthering aggressive designs. Certainly it would have no part in any movement intended to encircle Saudi Arabia. What we had at heart in the Middle East, as in other parts of the world, was building up a “Good Neighbor” policy, not only as between the United States and those countries, but also among those countries themselves. To illustrate our general attitude regarding the question of Arab union, Mr. Berle read a paraphrase of a message (telegram no. 1605 of October 26 to Cairo33) to the American Minister at Cairo authorizing him to inform Shaikh Youssef Yassin of our general attitude. After the telegram was read, Amir Faisal asked if he could have a paraphrase to take along with him as an informal statement. Mr. Berle agreed to this and such a paraphrase is being prepared. Mr. Berle made it perfectly clear that it was contrary to our policy to form a block against any country, either in the Near East or elsewhere. Amir Faisal replied that neither he nor his father believed that the United States would form such a block. As we knew, the Saudi Arabs were the friends of Great Britain and [Page 847] her allies; they hated the Nazis, whose tenets were against the Moslem religion and the social life of Islam. Above all, Ibn Saud wished to keep peace with his neighbors and he hoped for the same consideration from his neighbors.
Amir Faisal made it clear that his father was especially suspicious of Nuri as-Said, Prime Minister of Iraq and of Amir Abdullah of Trans-Jordan. The Amir said that if the Allies withdrew their support from those two so-called leaders, it would not take long to see whether those two men had the support of the people of their countries. Mr. Berle said that we had no knowledge that any of the Allied powers were seeking any dynastic changes. If anything of that sort happened in those territories, it would be because the people wished it and not because the United States proposed it. Our policy was in accordance with the terms of the Atlantic Charter,34 that each people should have a government of its own choosing. If there were to be any union, whether social, cultural, or political, among the Arab countries, it was our view that such a process should take place only with the entire agreement of the peoples concerned and in accordance with the terms of the Atlantic Charter. Amir Faisal remarked that this was a very wise policy. He hoped that in the future people of every country would be asked what kind of government they wished. Mr. Berle replied that this was also our hope and was one of the things we were fighting for.
Amir Faisal said that he and his father knew that the Arab world faced many changes and that they would like to have our help and cooperation and that of our allies. Above all, the Arab peoples, and particularly Saudi Arabia, wished to take as their course a golden mean.
The Amir went on to say that he now had an understanding of our views. He hoped that we would continue to keep his father and him informed if any changes took place in our views. Mr. Berle said that we should be glad to do this and suggested that Amir Faisal talk from time to time with our representative at Jidda. If the latter didn’t know the answers, we should be glad to supply them, since we had no secret policies. Amir Faisal again expressed his thanks and remarked that everyone knew that we did not deal in secrecy but, like his father, dealt in frankness.
The Amir said that the foregoing covered the principal matters which he wished to discuss. There were some secondary matters which he wished to go over. These are covered in a separate memorandum.35
- Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Acting Secretary of State.↩
- Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State.↩
- The family of Hussein, Sherif of Mecca and guardian of the Moslem holy places in the Hejaz, who, in alliance with the British, led the Arab revolt during World War I which resulted in the detachment of the Arab lands of the Ottoman Empire from Turkish sovereignty. Although Hussein’s claim to be “King of the Arabs” was never recognized by Great Britain and France, and Syria and the Hejaz were lost to the family by 1920 and 1925, respectively, Hashimite dynasties were successfully established by sons of Hussein in the new states of Iraq and Transjordan.↩
- Post, p. 853.↩
- Joint Declaration by President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Churchill, August 14, 1941, Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. i, p. 367.↩
- Infra.↩