837.5122/4
The Chargé in Cuba ( Briggs ) to the Secretary of State
[Received July 13.]
Sir: Referring to my despatch No. 3653 of July 1, 194393 summarizing certain agricultural proposals recently submitted by Minister of Agriculture Martínez Saenz to the Junta Económica de Guerra,94 and in particular to Martínez Saenz’ proposed discriminatory treatment of administration cane,95 (as well as to the Prime Minister’s general endorsement of the eventual elimination of administration as an objective), I have the honor to report that during a conversation with Dr. Arturo Mañas yesterday he expressed the hope that the American Government will see fit to include the protection of administration cane as a point in any negotiations looking toward the purchase of 1944 sugar.
Mañas explained that the Martínez Saenz’ plan would in his opinion ruin the United Fruit Company enterprise, and likewise dislocate production at some of the General Sugar Estates mills (notably Central Vertientes). The attack on administration cane, according to Mañas, is unjustified, not only because the lands were acquired in good faith, and at fair prices, but because estates such as those of the United Fruit Company represent the most economical and efficient way of growing cane which has yet been developed in Cuba. Furthermore, in view of our expressed interest in seeing Cuban sugar costs reduced, [Page 167] administration cane should receive our support on general economic grounds, as well as because of the American interests involved.
Mañas went on to say that on the return to Cuba of Dr. Eamiro Guerra96 he proposes to obtain the Cuban Government’s endorsement of an investigation and report by Dr. Guerra on the large administration cane holdings. Guerra has the general confidence of the industry, as well as of Amadeo López Castro, and in Mañas’ opinion a report on the “real factors involved” should tend to clarify the issues.
According to Mañas, López Castro, through his influence with the President, is the key to the administration cane problem and that while López Castro’s views concerning “social trends” remain somewhat advanced, López Castro agrees with Mañas that an examination of the problem should include consideration of “cañif undios”, that is, the very extensive holdings of large colonos, where Mafias believes that general living conditions are markedly inferior to those on administration cane lands of the large American companies.
It will be recalled that an expression of opinion with regard to administration cane was made during the last sugar negotiations, but that nothing definite came of it. I remain of the opinion that the subject will constantly be agitated by Cuban officials, including those who (like Aurelio Alvarez) are not exactly disinterested. I likewise believe that the agitation against administration cane is generally indicative of a social current which shows no sign of slacking, and finally that the recent Martínez Saenz’ proposals, together with the attitude of the Prime Minister in the matter of Central Tin-guaro (please see despatch No. 3745 of July 8, 194397) indicate the extent of the earthquake which must affect the relations between the Cuban Government and the sugar industry, before the latter can be placed on the really low-cost-of-production basis that the Cuban climate and soil should warrant.
Respectfully yours,
- Not printed.↩
- The Cuban equivalent of the United States Board of Economic Warfare.↩
- Cane grown on large estates owned by individuals (hacendados) or corporations that also controlled the means of converting that cane into sugar or its byproducts.↩
- Ramiro Guerra y Sanchez, Deputy of the Cuban Government attending the Inter-American Advisory Economic Financial Committee meetings in Washington.↩
- Not printed; for details concerning Central Tinguaro, see pp. 197 ff.↩