Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment

291. Memorandum for the President of Discussion at the 13th Meeting of the National Security Council⁰

Washington, June 17, 1948.

[Here follows discussion of agenda item 1, trade relations with Eastern Europe.]

2. Office of Special Projects (NSC 10/1)¹

Mr. Souers read the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,² which proposed a change in paragraph 4 of NSC 10/1.

Secretary Royall said he had the same doubt as at the last meeting concerning paragraph 3d. He said that he still hates to see any part of the National Military Establishment given the responsibility for policy guidance on such activities during peacetime.

Mr. Lovett recalled that at the last meeting the Council had discussed the choice between the Secretary of Defense or the Joint Chiefs of Staff to represent the military point of view. He thought the Council had agreed upon representation by the Secretary of Defense.

Mr. Souers stressed his belief that the State Department must dominate these activities in peacetime.

Mr. Lovett agreed, but also felt that, as long as we have military and naval attachés, the Agency conducting these activities must have military advice on long-range plans.

Secretary Forrestal recalled that the current proposal was based upon the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Secretary Royall said that he would prefer that military representatives merely be kept advised of these activities but not given responsibility for them as the subject paper appears to do.

Mr. Lovett felt that we would only be kidding ourselves if we think that either the political or military agencies can be relieved of the responsibility.

Secretary Symington thought that there was a great deal in what Secretary Royall said. Secretary Symington felt that the wording concerning policy guidance was very broad and tended to give the military broad responsibility in the field in peacetime. He thought that the National Security Council was the place where the State Department tells the military what our foreign policies are.

Mr. Lovett did not agree with this view. He felt that the NSC was a work room to reconcile advice to the President from both political and military points of view.

Secretary Royall thought that the reference to an Operations Advisory Committee should be stricken from the paper and a general paragraph substituted therefor.

Mr. Lovett expressed the firm belief that the National Security Council would be held responsible for these activities regardless of the language in this directive.

Secretary Royall thought that CIA should ask for advice when it needed it and that the military should give this advice only when military questions were involved.

Secretary Forrestal said that this activity must represent a composite of both political and military interests.

Secretary Royall said that in peacetime this is not a proper field for military operation.

Mr. Lovett believed that the military does have responsibility and must, therefore, be tied in.

Secretary Royall felt that to make the military responsible for covert operations gets into a dangerous field.

Secretary Symington agreed with Secretary Royall. Secretary Symington expressed the fear that these activities would be made public and there would be a tendency to discredit the military agencies more than the civilian.

Mr. Lovett pointed out that the military agencies are now involved in the NSC in the relation of four to one. He believed that the military should be represented on a staff planning level even if they were not in the line of authority. Mr. Lovett pointed out that, if any future Pearl Harbor occurs, it cannot be said that State did not tell the military what was going on. There is now complete interchange of advice through the National Security Council and all members thereof will be held responsible if any future Pearl Harbor occurs.

Mr. Lay suggested, and the Council approved, the deletion of paragraph 3d and amendments in paragraphs 3a and e.

The National Security Council: ³

Approved the directive in NSC 10/1, subject to deletion of paragraph 3d and amendments to paragraphs 3a and e and 4.

Note: Amended directive subsequently issued as NSC 10/2.⁴

[Here follows discussion of agenda items 3–6, Turkish arsenal aid, U.N. temporary commission in Korea, review of the world situation as it relates to the security of the United States, and NSC status of projects.]

0. Source: Truman Library, Papers of Harry S. Truman, President’s Secretary’s Files, Subject File. Top Secret. Prepared on June 18. According to the minutes of the 13th meeting, the following persons were present: Forrestal, Lovett, Royall, Sullivan, Symington, Hill, Hillenkoetter, Souers, and Lay. (Ibid.)
1. See the enclosure to Document 288.
2. Not found.
3. The following paragraph and note constitute NSC Action No. 65. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, Record of Actions, Box 55)
4. Document 292.