740.00119 Control
(Germany)/7–1745
No. 349
Memorandum by the Central
Secretariat1
top secret
[Washington,] July 12,
1945.
SC–145
Proposed Communication to the Secretary at
the Berlin Meeting on the Objective of the United States
Government in the Occupation of Germany
It is suggested that the Staff Committee forward to the Secretary
for his possible use in connection with the Big Three meeting, a
statement of views on the clearer definition of the objective of
this Government in the occupation of Germany. The reason for
such a communication is indicated in the attached draft prepared
and submitted by Mr. MacLeish.
Subject: Objective of the United States
Government in the Occupation of Germany
- (1)
- There are indications that common agreement as to the
American purpose in the occupation of Germany does not
exist. No comprehensive definition of purpose is to be
found in existing documents. Directives to cover the
various phases of the occupation are not based upon
explicit statements of the objective to be
achieved.
- (2)
- It is essential to the proper planning and
administration of the program for occupation that the
end purpose of the occupation should be explicitly
declared.
- (3)
- It is submitted that the purpose of the occupation can
be stated by reference to the factual situation as it
now exists.
- (4)
- There were three logical possibilities open to the
Allies at the moment of the German surrender. They were
determined, in part, by the unconditional surrender of
the German Government; in part by the past conduct of
the German nation[;] and, in part, by the fact that
weapons have become increasingly deadly with scientific
advance and that access to such weapons, by a
scientifically-minded nation which cannot be trusted
with their possession, is, and will increasingly be, a
danger to mankind. The three possibilities were:
- (a)
- To destroy the German nation as a nation which
had proved itself to be criminal and which could
not be trusted to continue to exist in the modern
scientific world with its scientific means of
destruction.
- (b)
- To condemn the German nation to be forcibly
and permanently deprived of the means to make war,
including the industrial and scientific means
which can be readily converted to warlike
use.
- (c)
- To attempt to change the character of the
German nation by changing the mentality of the
German people to the end that Germany might be
permitted to continue to exist as a nation and
might eventually be permitted to live without
surveillance and control.
- (5)
- The third of these three possibilities has, in fact,
been adopted, although certain public statements imply
that the second choice has been made by this Government
and its Allies.
- (a)
- The first of the three possibilities was never
considered. The destruction of the German nation
was unthinkable, at least to the people of the
United States.
- (b)
- The second possibility has, in fact, not been
adopted, whatever forms of language may have been
used. The fact that we propose to destroy the
German war potential during the period of
occupation does not mean that we have thereby
destroyed the German war potential for good. It is
clear, from the history of Germany itself over the
past twenty-five years, that, if the safety of the
world, so far as Germany is concerned, is to be
entrusted to the occupation of Germany and the
policing of Germany to prevent her from rearming
or preparing to rearm, the
policing and occupation must be permanent.
Permanent occupation of Germany by the Allies, and
particularly by the United States, is
inconceivable.
- (c)
- There remains the third possibility. If we are
not prepared to destroy the German nation, and if
we are not prepared to occupy or police Germany
permanently, we have no
choice but to attempt to change the German
character in such a way that the German nation,
when finally freed of occupation and surveillance,
will be a nation which can be trusted with access
to modern industry and modern science, and
therefore to modern weapons of destruction.
- (6)
- The real objective of the German occupation can
therefore be stated as follows: we are occupying Germany
for the purpose of changing the inward character of the
German nation and the German people to such an extent
that Germany can be trusted at some future time with
independent existence as a nation in a world in which
weapons will be more destructive and more difficult to
control than they are today.
- (7)
- It should be noted that this objective conforms to the
objectives of the United Nations Organization and to the
situation which the establishment of that Organization
will create. A peaceful and peace-loving Germany could
be introduced at some appropriate time into the United
Nations where the measures of the Organization for
security and for peace could be brought to play
affirmatively rather than negatively.
- (8)
- The explicit recognition of the purpose defined above
would enable us to plan the various measures of
occupation more intelligently [Page 502] and to administer them more
effectively than we can today. At the present time,
there is a tendency to make a distinction between
political, economic, and military measures for Germany,
on the one hand, and measures for the reeducation of the
German people, on the other. Measures for reeducation
have been treated as though their objective differed
from the objectives of economic and political and
military measures. Actually, if the above analysis is
correct, all aspects of the occupation, whether military
or economic or political or social, have one ultimate
objective, which is largely psychological: to create a
Germany which can be trusted to exist without continuing
occupation and surveillance in the modern scientific
world. All measures taken in the occupation, including
measures for the destruction of the present German power
to make war, are measures of “reeducation” in the sense
that their success should be judged not by their
immediate consequences but by their ultimate effect upon
the German mentality and the German national
character.
- (9)
- If, however, the true purpose of the occupation is the
purpose stated above, then something more is required
than its explicit declaration. The purpose must also be
warmly approved and not shamefacedly admitted. In the
past, the American position has been too frequently
expressed in “realistic” terms which represented
entirely unrealistic thinking. We have played down any
serious intention to reeducate the German people,
protesting that our real purpose is merely to destroy
their power to make another war. As a matter of
realistic fact, we cannot destroy
the German power to make another war unless we are
prepared to (a) destroy Germany,
or (b) occupy Germany
permanently. Since we are not prepared to do either, we
are remitted to the “reeducation” of the German people
as our sole effective means of preventing Germany from
waging another war. Moreover the reeducation we must
bring about is not reeducation in the academic or
educational sense alone. It is reeducation by the use of
every means which can produce the change in German
thinking and German beliefs and German psychology and
German character which we desire.
- (10)
- Furthermore, we must be clear in our own minds, not
only as to the Germany we wish to change but as to the
Germany we wish to put in its place. The soul of man
abhors a vacuum quite as much as nature abhors one. You
cannot replace something with nothing in the mind of an
individual or the mind of a nation. The Russians have no
difficulty on this point. They propose to substitute
Communism for Nazism. They believe that a Germany
converted to Communism will be a Germany no longer
dangerous to them. We presumably believe that a Germany
converted to respect for the worth and dignity of human
beings and a belief in basic principles of [Page 503] justice and in
the right of men to govern themselves would be a Germany
which we could trust. If this, however, is our purpose,
we must recognize it and pursue it consciously. We must
play again the role we played at the beginning of our
history. We must be ready and willing to propagate ideas
of liberty and justice and human dignity.
- (11)
- It has been pointed out in a paper delivered to the
Secretary on the subject of German reeducation3
that it is highly desirable that the occupying powers
should reach an understanding as to the common
denominators of a policy for reeducation in order that
Germany may not be turned, under the occupation, into an
ideological cockpit. If, however, no such understanding
can be reached, it is essential to the success of the
American occupation that we should be clear in our own
minds as to the beliefs we wish to see adopted by the
German people in the interest of peace and
security.
