Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945, Volume II

J. C. S. Files

Joint Chiefs of Staff Minutes

Potsdam, July 16, 1945, 10 a.m.

[Extracts]

top secret

1. Plan of Joint Chiefs of Staff for “Terminal” Meetings

(J. C. S. 1422 and Memorandum by the Secretaries³)

Admiral Leahy said that J. C. S. 1422 expressed the idea that the Russians should bring up the subjects they wish to discuss and that they should take the initiative in the conversations with the United States Chiefs of Staff.

General Marshall said that there were some subjects which we might wish to bring up also and that it was his understanding that we were not restricted to subjects proposed by the Russians.

In reply to a question by General Marshall, Admiral King said that we should not commit ourselves to completing work with the British before undertaking our discussions with the Russians.

Admiral Leahy suggested that the Secretaries inform the British Secretaries that it would be necessary for the Joint Chiefs of Staff to meet with the Russians at the convenience of the latter and that this might interfere with meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff:—

Approved:

a. The arrangements and attendance for conference meetings recommended by the Secretaries.

b. The memorandum for the President in the Enclosure to J. C. S. 1422.⁴

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4. Proposed Agreement Affecting the Participation of Two French Colonial Infantry Divisions in Far Eastern Operations

(J. C. S. 1013/7 and 1013/8⁵)

Admiral Leahy read the recommendations in the subject papers and said that he considered it wise to get the Combined Chiefs of Staff reaction in regard to the employment of the French troops.

General Marshall stated that the French had offered the troops to the United States for use in the Pacific and expressed the view that if this question was discussed with the British, the question of over-all command might arise.

Admiral Leahy said, in connection with the use of the French troops in Indo-China, that that area was considered under Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

General Marshall said that the use of the French troops involved the question of shipping and the quality of the troops. In reply to a question by Admiral Leahy, he stated that the troops were armed but additional equipment would have to be supplied.

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The Joint Chiefs of Staff:—

Approved the memorandums in Enclosures “A” and “B” of J. C. S. 1013/7 and agreed that the memorandum for the Chief of the French Military Mission to the United States⁶ should be presented to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for comment or concurrence before any further action on J. C. S. 1013/7. (Subsequently circulated as C. C. S. 895.⁷)

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10. Chairmanship of Conference Meetings

General Marshall brought up the question as to who would preside at the Combined Chiefs of Staff meetings in view of the fact that neither U. S. nor British members were in their home territory.

Admiral Leahy stated that he might not always be able to be present and might have to leave before a meeting was finished. He suggested that if he were not present that Field Marshal Brooke should be asked to preside.

General Marshall suggested that the British and United States Chiefs should alternate in presiding.

Admiral King’s view was that when Admiral Leahy was not present Field Marshal Brooke should preside.

Admiral Leahy expressed the view that the British and U. S. members should alternate in presiding. He thought that in meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the Russian Chiefs of Staff the Russians should be asked to preside and that in tripartite meetings the Chiefs of Staff of the three nations should preside in turn.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff:—

Agreed:

a. To propose that for meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff at Terminal , the British Chiefs of Staff and the United States Chiefs of Staff should preside alternately.

b. To invite the Soviet Chiefs of Staff to preside at any meetings with the United States Chiefs of Staff at Terminal .

c. To propose that, for tripartite meetings at Terminal , the chiefs of staff of each participating nation preside in turn.

11. Interpretation of the Presidential Policy on Lend-Lease

Admiral Leahy said that he had discussed with the President the recent policy established in regard to Lend-Lease⁸ since he had been informed that it was impossible to provide British and French forces employed in the occupation of Germany under the terms of the President’s policy. The President stated that there was no objection to using Lend-Lease for the redistribution of forces to the zones of occupation. He had tried to get the President to interpret his directive to cover this movement but the President had not desired to do this formally since a paper had been presented by the civilian agencies concerning the use of Lend-Lease for “proportional reconversion” by the British.⁹ The President had declined to approve this paper. He had said, however, that there was no objection to the use of Lend-Lease for the redistribution of forces to the zones of occupation.

General Marshall said that the question was not only that of redistribution to the zones of occupation but involved also the use of French and British service units for the redeployment to Japan.

General Somervell said this would continue for general items until 1 September and for petrol, oil and lubricants until 1 October. He said that General Eisenhower was attempting to get the French to provide for themselves by 1 August by loan or credit in place of Lend-Lease.

Admiral Leahy said that the idea of the President in establishing the Lend-Lease policy was to prevent the provision of arms and ammunition through Lend-Lease unless such equipment was to be used for the war against Japan.

Admiral King suggested that Admiral Leahy take up with the President as soon as possible the question of Lend-Lease to Russia.

Admiral Leahy said that the question of Lend-Lease to Russia was involved with the date that Russia might enter the war against Japan and that the date might not be determined at this conference since it might depend upon agreement between Russia and China.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff:—

Took note that Admiral Leahy would consider the memorandum on this subject presented to him by General Marshall,¹⁰ with a view to presenting to the President the memorandum contained therein.

12. Relations of the United States Chiefs of Staff With the Chiefs of Staff of Nations Participating in the War Against Japan

General Marshall brought up the question of the command relationship in the Pacific as regards the British¹¹ and inquired as to the views of the Joint Chiefs.

Admiral King stated that there should be no change in status in regard to the Pacific Theater, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should control all operational matters in that area.

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3. Neither printed.
4. Document No. 1275, post.
5. Neither printed. Cf. document No. 1288, post.
6. Major General Auguste Brossin de Saint-Didier.
7. Document No. 1288, post.
8. See vol. i, document No. 542.
9. Not printed.
10. Not printed. For Truman’s “memorandum directive” of July 29 to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, see the enclosure to document No. 1185, post.
11. See vol. i, document No. 604.