740.00119 EAC/l–1845

The British Embassy to the Department of State

Aide-Mémoire

His Majesty’s Government have had under consideration the forum and machinery for inter-Allied discussion of long-term policy towards Germany.

2.
It seems to His Majesty’s Government to be essential to have and use inter-Allied machinery of the character of the European Advisory Commission to prepare the way for decisions on long-term policy towards Germany, which will of course have to be taken at the highest level. British studies of long-term German problems have shown how complex they are and how difficult it is to decide on the best way of obtaining the common objective that Germany shall never again be able to embark upon aggression. These problems need to be fully [Page 393] debated between the major Allies so that the various alternatives and their pros and cons can be submitted to the Governments as raw material for the necessary high-level decisions.
3.
Without such preliminary Allied study it is difficult to see how satisfactory and lasting decisions could ever be taken. The major Allies are agreed upon the broad objectives, namely, the destruction of German power to make war and proper retribution for Germany for her crimes against the Allies, but there are an ever increasing number of alternative ways of reaching these objectives. The decision between the various alternatives invariably depend upon intricate questions of detail—geographical, political, military and economic—which should be thoroughly studied before the heads of governments are asked to give a final decision on them. For example, it is generally agreed that some form of permanent control should be established over German industry’s war potentialities in the Ruhr-Rhine area; when it comes to deciding how this should be done, alternatives are presented ranging from the suggestion to turn the area into a pastoral community to the idea of setting up some form of separate state under Allied control whose industry would be made to work as hard as possible to repair the damage done to Allied countries.
4.
His Majesty’s Government believe that the European Advisory Commission is the right body to devil these very difficult questions for the Governments. The Commission as at present constituted has the great advantage that it includes the French on an equal footing which is essential if any lasting plans are to be made about Germany.
5.
It is true that the European Advisory Commission has hitherto worked slowly. In the view of His Majesty’s Government the remedy is to reform the working of the Commission rather than to duplicate the Commission or to attempt the impossible task of discussing these complicated problems by diplomatic correspondence.
6.
The German problem is of course well within the terms of reference of the Commission which cover “European questions connected with the termination of hostilities which the three Governments may consider it appropriate to refer to it”.78 Long-term German problems have indeed already been laid before it. After the decision of the Tehran Conference in December 194379 to refer the question of dismembering Germany to the Commission, the United Kingdom representative raised the matter at the Commission. The United States Government have suggested that reparation and economic security should be studied under the aegis of the Commission. The Soviet representative [Page 394] in October last submitted a plan of work for the Commission which included the abolition of “the Hitlerite regime” and the control of German economy.80
7.
This question of machinery and procedure for the study of long-term policy towards Germany is one which it will be essential to discuss at the next high-level meeting.81 His Majesty’s Government think the United States Government may care to consider their view set out above before this meeting takes place. They are hopeful that the United States Government will share their view that the European Advisory Commission is the proper forum for inter-Allied discussion of long-term policy towards Germany.
  1. See annex 2 to the Secret Protocol of the Tripartite Conference of Foreign Ministers, signed at Moscow, November 1, 1943, Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. i, p. 756.
  2. For documentation regarding the conference at Tehran, November 27–De-cember 1, 1943, see Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943.
  3. See telegram 9227, October 26, 1944, from London, Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. i, p. 369.
  4. The Yalta Conference, February 4–11, 1945.