740.00119 EAC/1–2645: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State
[Received 10:27 p.m.]
947. Personal for Assistant Secretary Dunn. Department’s instruction 4980 of January 13 received.
I have been struck by one peculiar feature in the appended economic directive. It appears throughout to emphasize the idea of operating each zone as a separate economic unit, with a minimum of provisions for consultation with the control machinery, such as those contained only in paragraphs 1–G and 3.
Unless I am able to offer in the European Advisory Commission fuller comment on United States economic policy toward Germany than is contained in the economic directive, it is going to be very difficult to present the United States proposal effectively. For example, paragraph 2 of that directive might be interpreted as requiring the zone commander to establish detailed control over movements of goods, currency, valuables and persons across inter-zonal boundaries and to assume responsibility for organizing all exchanges of goods between his own zone and other zones. At least there is no indication that the Control Council will have anything to do with these matters.
[Page 397]Paragraphs 1–E and 1–G might appear to place on the zone commander complete responsibility for movement of goods and valuables between his zone and foreign countries.
Paragraphs 1–F and 1–G imply that the zone commander is to be solely responsible for the complicated problem of restitution of property found in his zone. In general it can be foreseen that this first official statement of the United States economic policy toward Germany will lead to my being closely questioned on the long-range question of economic unity versus economic dismemberment. I do not find in the instructions so far provided by the Department any basis for dealing with such questions in the Commission.
A policy of economic dismemberment would, I believe, run directly counter to the views so far expressed informally and frequently by the Soviet representative in the EAC. Gousev has regularly stressed, as reported from time to time by me, that Germany should be treated as an economic unit by the victors and that the zone boundaries should in no sense be regarded as economic boundaries. Our draft economic directive may therefore come as a serious shock to the Soviet Government.
If the Russians come to feel that our Government has decided on a policy of economic dismemberment, such feeling might influence their attitude toward the agreement on zones of occupation and the agreement on control machinery, which are awaiting approval by their Government. Until these two agreements have been approved by all three Governments, our one completely firm agreement regarding Germany is the instrument of surrender. The instrument provides for the Allies taking absolute power over Germany but contains no arrangements for allocation of zones or for exercise of Allied authority as among the Allies themselves.
If the Russians should conclude that United States economic policy toward Germany is in direct opposition to the general spirit in which they are approaching the question of controlling Germany and to the achievement of their direct economic aims, they may delay approval of the two draft agreements until Germany has collapsed. Upon that collapse, in the absence of agreed arrangements for occupation and control, any last-minute arrangements made at the military level might be determined by the de facto military situation prevailing at the moment of German collapse, which might greatly complicate execution of present plans for deployment and logistical support.
Because of uncertainty regarding implications which stem from a premature EAC discussion of the Department’s draft economic directive, I am withholding the papers transmitted in Department’s instruction 4980 for the time being, until I can be provided with certain clarifications. It is particularly important for me to be informed, in advance of discussion of the directive in the Commission, whether or [Page 398] not economic dismemberment is a settled aim of our policy.86 I had understood that this was to be discussed at the forthcoming meeting of the three Governments.
- In letters to President Roosevelt and to the Secretary of State, both dated January 28, 1945, Ambassador Winant further elaborated his views regarding the “Directive to Commander-in-Chief of U.S. (U.K.) (U.S.S.R.) Forces of Occupation regarding Military Government of Germany in the Period Immediately Following the Cessation of Organized Resistance”. For the texts of these letters, see Conferences at Malta and Yalta, pp. 130–133.↩