862.50/2–1545

Memorandum by the Adviser on German Economic Affairs (Despres)2

The attached memorandum, prepared by Mr. John deWilde,3 reviews the development and present status of economic planning work for Germany. Of necessity, it takes no account of the decisions reached at the recent conference at Yalta.

Apart from the conference, the progress to date on economic planning for Germany has been slight. Not only has discussion at the intergovernmental level been meager, but divergences among government departments on basic issues have prevented the formulation on an agreed American position. This lack of definition is due to disagreement over (1) the responsibilities and functions of the occupying powers, and (2) policy with respect to economic weakening of Germany.

1. Functions of Military Government

The conception of military government which is now ascendant, and is embodied in the latest U.S. general directive4 forwarded to Ambassador Winant for negotiation in E.A.C, is one of limited liability. The occupation authorities should concern themselves exclusively [Page 413] with matters of direct interest to the Allies, such as demilitarization and denazification; they should concern themselves with the functioning of the German economy only to the extent of preventing such unrest or disease as would endanger the occupying forces. The War Department favors this limited definition of the Army’s tasks because (1) they favor a simple, clear-cut military occupation, (2) they wish, by limiting the task, to minimize the need for consultation and negotiation among the commanders of the several zones of occupation, and (3) they wish to keep the job within the capabilities of the occupation forces. The Treasury supports the doctrine of limited liability because (1) they consider that extreme disruption in Germany is not in conflict with Allied interests, and (2) acceptance of any responsibility for the minimum functioning of the German economy would cause us to make compromises with respect to elimination of Nazis.

The Department, while sharing the view that denazification should not be tempered by administrative expediency, has sought to oppose the principle of limited liability. This issue, though it arises most sharply with respect to the economic directives, is essentially political in character. It is envisaged that the execution of any Allied program for Germany will require Allied machinery for surveillance and enforcement over a considerable period of years. We have an interest, from the beginning, in preventing the development of an unmanageably chaotic situation, and, thereafter, in fostering the emergence of a German government which will carry out the peace settlement imposed on Germany, subject to necessary Allied surveillance.

Because of this basic interest, and secondarily, because of the need for maintaining German production of civilian necessities in order to minimize the diversion of United Nations supplies and transport while the Far Eastern war is in progress, we cannot avoid responsibility for the functioning of the German economy. The speed and success with which we can discharge this responsibility will depend, of course, upon the character of German collapse; such tasks as, for example, prevention of inflation may prove in the circumstances to be beyond the capacity of the occupation forces. However, the greater these difficulties, the slower will be the process of bringing a German government into existence. If we are slow in recognizing the nature of our responsibilities, the process will be needlessly prolonged. The notion that the major powers can assume supreme authority over Germany and follow a “hands-off “policy is the major factor hampering advance planning for the economic aspects of the occupation.

If a broader view of the nature of our responsibilities with respect to the German economy is adopted, the need becomes evident for avoiding interzonal barriers to the movement of goods and for the largest practicable uniformity in economic policy throughout Germany. It is [Page 414] also evident that the occupation forces cannot carry out by themselves a broad program to assure the minimum functioning of the German economy. Reliance must be placed on German agencies. Recognizing this need, the British have been inclined to limit the scope, or adjust the timing, of their planned denazification in order to preserve existing institutions. An implication of our position on denazification is that we must either pick out new executive and administrative personnel to replace dismissed Nazis or permit the German people to select such personnel. Existing U.S. draft directives, however, instruct the occupation authorities both to remain aloof and to restrict drastically any political activity on the part of Germans.

2. Economic Weakening of Germany

It is essential that our policies with respect to “economic disarmament”, reparation and abolition of German high-cost, self sufficiency production should be mutually consistent.

Abolition of high-cost production will have to be postponed for a considerable period in the interest of more immediate Allied objectives. In the beginning the necessity of meeting minimum civilian needs will be largely controlling; although production of a few industrial items, such as synthetic oil and rubber may be discontinued, German agricultural production will have to be maintained so far as possible. For a considerable period thereafter, the largest practicable portion of export proceeds will be earmarked for reparation, and imports will be held to a minimum. If, in addition, an attempt is made to curb German heavy industry, the integration of Germany into world trade on the basis of efficient specialization will be further postponed. Abolition of German high-cost production implies enlarged dependence on exports, and tends to conflict, therefore, with restrictions on industries in which Germany is predominant and with reparation. In the long run, we should aim at the assimilation of the German economy into the world economy on a non-discriminatory basis. For some years, however, this will be impracticable.

The more immediate problem is that of reconciling reparation and “economic disarmament”. The task of keeping Germany disarmed is primarily one of enforcement, not economic disablement. If other countries are prepared to act promptly in response to an unambiguous step toward rearmament nothing more is required; if it is doubted that other countries will respond to an unambiguous step by Germany, there is even more reason to doubt that an ambiguous step, such as erection of a blast furnace or machine tool factory, will evoke any action in response. It is extremely doubtful that other countries would be willing to enforce comprehensive economic controls over Germany for much more than a decade. Nevertheless, reduction of Germany’s [Page 415] underlying economic potential has a strong, present appeal as a security measure. It is also allied with other objectives, such as elimination of German economic domination, industrial development of liberated European countries and removal of competition with British and American exports. Along with this demand for economic restraints on Germany, there is an insistent demand for reparation. The two demands are not in conflict so long as reparation is confined to transfers of existing capital assets and labor services, but the possibility of conflicting demands arises when reparation from current production is also envisaged. Restraints on German production and exports will have to be reconciled somehow with the necessity of securing payment for such imports as may be needed for the minimum functioning of the German economy and the production of reparation goods. Unless Germany is allowed to export enough to pay for such imports, the United States may have to supply necessary foodstuffs and raw materials to Germany at its own expense.

Our program for Germany should “add up” within itself, and it should add up at a figure which leaves to the Germans the opportunity of achieving a tolerable living standard even during the period of economic controls. Our measures for reducing Germany’s underlying economic potential should be subject to continuous review and adjustment, and should be so framed as to permit the eventual removal of economic discriminations when and if the victorious powers become convinced that German aggressiveness has been destroyed. Finally, economic controls over Germany should be directed toward the objective of accelerating the reconstruction and economic development of the United Nations. This implies integration of the program of German reparation and economic disarmament with positive programs for the industrial development of other areas.

Such a program would call both for German reparation deliveries of existing capital equipment and some types of current production, and for restrictions on other categories of German exports to protect the new industries being developed in other countries. Germany is, above all, predominant in the metallurgical, chemical, electrical equipment, machine tools and allied industries. With respect to these industries, we would have to investigate where non-German capacity could soundly be strengthened and developed. Decisions on this question would largely depend on the availability of raw materials and markets and of adequate labor, engineering skill and know-how. A country like Yugoslavia, for example, might be enabled to build up an aluminum industry since it has bauxite and hydroelectric power resources susceptible of development. In Britain, France, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Union, the machine tool industry might be strengthened. The iron and steel industry might be further [Page 416] developed in Poland, France, Belgium and the Soviet Union. Czechoslovakia and France could be assisted in developing their output of high-grade alloy steels. Countries in Eastern and Southeastern Europe where industrial development might be retarded by lack of engineering skill and know-how could be provided with technical assistance by the industrially advanced countries.

It would be highly desirable if the forthcoming reparation conversations in Moscow5 resulted in the formation of an Allied organization to develop and supervise the execution of policies with respect to reparation and economic disarmament, along the broad lines indicated above. There is ground for hoping that agreement can be reached on the need for an Allied organization to carry out this task. Indeed, it may provide a basis for attaining the long-range objectives which were envisaged in the proposal for a European Economic Committee.6 In the process of formulating an agreed economic program for Germany, it will be necessary to reach agreement on economic problems over a much broader field.

[Annex]

Memorandum by the Assistant Adviser on German Economic Affairs (deWilde)

This memorandum reviews the present status of the work on the economic treatment of Germany. It is intended to survey the preparations made for the Allied government of Germany and the progress achieved in determining basic long-term policies toward that country.

The Government of Occupied Germany

In determining the machinery and directives for the administration and treatment of occupied Germany a distinction has been drawn between a pre-surrender period and a post-surrender period. In the first period the primary objective of the occupation will be to facilitate further military operations against the enemy; in the second period the principal objective will be to disarm Germany and to enforce the terms of the final settlement which will be imposed on that country. Before final surrender military government will be in [Page 417] the hands of officers attached to the operating armed forces. After complete surrender, or cessation of organized resistance, Germany will be governed by the four principal powers—the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and France—operating within the framework of an international agreement and in accordance with the terms of unconditional surrender whether or not these are signed by competent German authorities.

A. The Pre-Surrender Period

The directives which will govern the administration of German territory falling under the control of SHAEF during the pre-surrender period have been the subject of negotiation in the Combined Civil Affairs Committee (CCAC) of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. In April 1944 the Combined Chiefs of Staff issued a basic pre-surrender directive7 to General Eisenhower in his capacity as Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces (SCAEF). This directive is couched in very general terms. It provides for the establishment of a purely military government on captured German territory and clothes the Supreme Commander with unlimited legislative executive and judicial authority and power. It contains directions on the dissolution of the Nazi party and affiliated organizations, on the denazification of the German administration, the arrest and detention of certain categories of persons, and the release and treatment of Allied prisoners of war and foreign workers. Provisional measures governing the use of occupation currency and the control of banking and government finance are also included. In general eco-omic and relief measures are to be limited to those strictly necessary to prevent serious disease and civilian unrest which would endanger the occupying forces and the accomplishment of the objectives of the occupation.

While SCAEF is expected to take no steps that would prejudice the attainment of “ultimate objectives”, the directive gives military government officers no guidance on the adoption of interim measures of reparation and restitution. Nor does it define the degree of responsibility which these officers should assume for the functioning of economic life or the extent to which they should utilize and adapt existing administrative machinery and economic controls. In particular it offers little or no guidance on the attitude which military government officers should take toward the continuation or resumption of non-war production, allocation of available raw materials, prices and wages, and similar subjects.

In a subsequent clarification of the pre-surrender directive SCAEF was instructed to take no steps looking toward the economic rehabilitation [Page 418] of Germany except for those immediately necessary in support of military operations and to keep no active Nazis or ardent sympathizers in office for purposes of administrative convenience or expediency.

B. The Post-Surrender Period

Plans for the joint control and administration of Germany during this period have been the subject of negotiation in the European Advisory Commission (EAC) in London on which the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union have been represented. France has recently been admitted to full membership in this Commission. The recommendations of EAC are subject to approval by the governments concerned. Ambassador Winant, the American member of the Commission, has been assisted by a staff of political, military, naval and air advisers. Recently the State Department and FEA8 have jointly designated an economic adviser, Mr. William T. Stone, who also directs a newly organized Division on German Economic Affairs in the American Embassy.

The EAC has drafted, and the three principal powers have approved, the surrender instrument for Germany.9 This is almost wholly a military instrument by which the German authorities would agree to the cessation of hostilities and would undertake to withdraw all military forces outside the pre-1938 boundaries of the Reich and to put at the disposal of the Allies all armed forces, army, navy and air installations, all shipping and all war material. Moreover, they would be obliged to accept any additional political, administrative, economic, financial, military and other demands which the Allies might subsequently present. Actually there is considerable doubt as to whether competent German authorities will be found after collapse in Germany to sign this instrument. Failing signature, however, its terms will simply be announced to the German people by proclamation.

The EAC has also formulated agreed recommendations on the machinery to be set up by the occupying powers for governing Germany10 and on the delimitation of the zones to be occupied by the armed forces of each of the participating powers.11 These recommendations at present provide for tripartite control and occupation, [Page 419] having been drawn up prior to the participation of France in EAC. France has approved them in principle, but they are to be revised on a quadripartite basis. By the terms of these recommendations, the Commanders-in-Chief of the armed forces of each occupying power would be military governors in their respective zones and would together constitute a supreme authority in Berlin. This supreme authority, called the Control Council, would have within its jurisdiction all matters “affecting Germany as a whole” and would supervise the German central administration to the extent that this would be utilized for military government purposes. It would also control the administration of the Greater Berlin area through a quadripartite “Kommandatura”. A permanent Coordinating Committee, consisting of Deputies of each of the Commanders-in-Chief, would be set up under the Control Council for the purpose of supervising day-to-day work. This Committee would be assisted by a staff composed of a number of divisions each of which would be headed by a directorate on which each of the participating powers would be represented.

A nucleus of the quadripartite control machinery has been organized in London. The American element in this nucleus (the U. S. Group Control Council headed provisionally by General Wickersham) is still small compared with the British element. The Russians have promised to participate in this project but thus far no Russian (or French) elements have joined the nucleus control group. The extent of civilian participation in the control machinery for Germany remains uncertain, particularly in the case of the United States. While the British have enlisted the participation of numerous civilians in their military government organization and have placed this organization under the direction of the War Cabinet rather than the War Office, the War Department has tended to insist on a government more military in character and controlled strictly by the army.

However, the agreement on control machinery does provide for a civilian political adviser to each of the Commanders-in-Chief and Mr. Robert Murphy has been designated to fill this position on the American side. Mr. Murphy has also been named as Director of the Political Division in the U. S. Group Control Council and a substantial part of his staff in that division will consist of Foreign Service Officers. In an effort to get wider civilian participation, the State Department and the FEA agreed last November upon the joint designation of Mr. Leon Henderson as United States Adviser on German Economic Affairs to operate under the general supervision of Mr. Murphy in his role as Political Adviser and with a civilian staff supplied by the two agencies. However, the War Department has never accepted this arrangement and Mr. Henderson’s trip to London and Paris to survey German economic work on behalf of [Page 420] the FEA was arranged only as a temporary expedient. If Mr. Murphy in his capacity as Political Adviser is not to have an economic staff of some sort, the Department’s representation in Germany on the economic side must take the form of the assignment of economic officers to the Political Division or possibly to the Economic Division. However, specific arrangements of this character cannot be made until an overall decision is reached on the extent of civilian participation in military government.

When agreement was reached on a short surrender instrument, the three powers undertook to supplement it by more detailed proclamations and directives which were to be negotiated in EAC. Late in October the Soviet Government agreed to the discussion of these matters in EAC and also expressed a readiness to start the consideration of (a) questions concerning the repatriation of prisoners of war belonging to United Nations’ forces, (b) additional military requirements concerning the arrangements for the disarmament and demilitarization of Germany, (c) requirements concerning abolition of the Hitlerite regime and the surrender of war criminals, and (4) [(d)] provisions concerning control of the German economy. The American government, however, has on the whole not been prepared for detailed consideration of these questions.

The American Joint Chiefs of Staff have issued a general directive, known as JCS 1067, designed to cover the brief period which might elapse between surrender and the establishment of the quadripartite control machinery. The British took the position in CCAC that the pre-surrender directive would be adequate for this brief period, and JCS 1067 was accordingly issued to General Eisenhower only in his capacity of Commander of the American forces. However, the State, War, and Navy Departments, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff have recently produced a revised version of JCS 1067 which has been transmitted to Ambassador Winant for negotiation in EAC as an over-all quadripartite directive. The financial section of this directive has not yet gone forward and is still under consideration in Washington.

A number of more specific directives have been elaborated in London, for ultimate submission to EAC, by a planning staff attached to Ambassador Winant, acting in cooperation with the U. S. Group Control Council. Some of these directives dealing with purely military and political matters have been cleared in Washington by the State, Navy and War Departments and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. All of the economic directives, except one dealing with transportation, have been held up. The U. S. draft directives approved in Washington, as well as a large number of British draft directives on specific subjects, have been circulated informally among all members of the EAC.

[Page 421]

A large number of Civil Affairs Guides have been completed at the direction of the Civil Affairs Division (CAD) of the War Department. These Guides, most of which have been prepared by OSS12 and FEA under the general guidance of CAD and the State Department, cover most aspects of the economy, administration and government of Germany and are intended primarily to furnish American military government planning officers with the basic background information they need. While almost all the Guides contain recommendations on policies and procedures, these are only suggestive and in no sense definitive directives.

A considerable number of immediate questions are still awaiting decision. The chief among these are briefly described below.

1. Degree of Responsibility for German Government and Economic Life.

The present U. S. draft for an over-all quadripartite policy directive would confine the occupation authorities to a rather narrow role in the administration of the German economy. They would be di rected to assume only such responsibilities as are required to stop the production of implements of war, to prevent sabotage and to insure the production of goods needed for the prevention of epidemics or serious unrest endangering the occupation forces. Except to the extent necessary to accomplish these purposes, the “German people and the German authorities” would be left with responsibility for “such economic problems as price controls, rationing, unemployment, production, reconstruction, distribution, consumption, housing or transportation”. This statement has produced widely varying interpretations as to how much responsibility the occupation authorities need exercise to accomplish their objectives. Since the State Department has proposed that no central German government shall be recognized during the period of occupation, the military government may be unable to escape a substantial measure of responsibility for a minimum functioning of the German economy.

2. Division of Authority between the Control Council and the Zone Authorities.

The present directive tends to relegate the Control Council to a secondary role and implies that substantial autonomy would be given to the zone authorities. The present German economic system, however, is highly centralized, with uniform national controls over raw materials, manpower, industrial and agricultural production and distribution, and finance. While a considerable degree of decentralization should probably accompany the ultimate reconversion of the German economy, central controls will remain indispensable for some time, particularly during the initial period when the supply situation [Page 422] will be one of acute scarcity. Provisions for interzonal exchange of goods and services will almost certainly be necessary to the effective utilization of available German resources.

3. Extent of Denazification of the German Administration.

The American government advocates sweeping elimination of active Nazis from positions of influence in the German administration and economy, while the British tend to favor restraint in the realization of this objective in the interest of administrative convenience.

4. Utilization of Existing Control Machinery.

While the draft directives prepared by the British for EAC emphasize the importance of retaining and utilizing existing controls and control machinery in the interest of maintaining order and facilitating the task of administration, the War Department is less interested in seeking to maintain German administrative machinery.

Pending the issue of detailed directives on these and many other questions that will confront the occupation authorities, the military government is generally expected to take no steps that would prejudice the attainment of “ultimate objectives”. This makes it all the more imperative that the ultimate objectives that we intend to pursue with respect to Germany should be clarified.

Clarification of Ultimate Objectives

One of the first attempts to clarify our economic policies with respect to Germany was made by the Executive Committee on Economic Foreign Policy (ECEFP) which approved a paper on this subject in August 1944.13 This document emphasized that our fundamental interest in the preservation of peace would be best served by adopting certain safeguards against renewed German economic preparations for war and by creating conditions under which Germany would make a maximum contribution to the reconstruction of Europe and the development of a peaceful and expanding world economy. While opposing enduring controls over the German economy as undesirable and impracticable, the ECEFP proposed supervision of imports to prevent stockpiling of strategic materials, measures designed to maximize Germany’s dependence on foreign supplies, conversion rather than dismantling of German industry, and destruction of the privileged positions of the Junkers and the industrial oligarchy. It suggested prohibition of discriminatory trade practices and adoption of measures against German cartels in order to prevent Germany from achieving domination over economically weak countries. The document advocated the fullest possible measure of restitution and proposed “heavy” reparations, predominantly in kind. Such payments, [Page 423] it held, should be limited to a period of five to ten years and should be so designed as to make a maximum contribution to the rehabilitation of European countries. The proposals on reparation and restitution were elaborated in greater detail in a separate document.

It soon became evident, however, that this general line of policy was considered too “soft” in some quarters. Renewed discussion and reconsideration was precipitated by the presentation of the “Morgenthau Plan” to the President last September. This Plan proposed that Germany should be divided into three parts (1) an international zone comprising the Ruhr and surrounding industrial areas and Western Germany up to the Kiel Canal, (2) an independent South German State which would be allowed to enter into a customs union with Austria, and (3) an independent North German State. Germany would be compelled to cede the Saar and area between the Rhine and Moselle Rivers to France, East Prussia to the Soviet Union and Poland, Southern Silesia to Poland, and the territory north of the Kiel Canal to Denmark. The plan also provided for elimination of the chemical, metallurgical and electrical industries.

On September 15 the President indicated in a memorandum to the Secretary of State14 that he and Prime Minister Churchill had agreed at Quebec that the Saar and the Ruhr should be put under an international organization which would dismantle the metallurgical, chemical and electrical industries. This proposal, the President added, looked toward converting Germany into a country primarily agricultural and pastoral in character.

Subsequently the State Department prepared a memorandum for the President dissenting from the views of the Treasury.15 In another memorandum, dated September 29,16 the President tempered considerably his previous views on the economic disarmament of Germany. While reiterating his opinion that rather complete controls should be enforced in the Ruhr and the Saar, the President stated that no one wanted to make Germany “a wholly agricultural nation” or to eradicate completely German industrial capacity in the two areas.

Some additional policy guidance was given to the Secretary of State by the President in an informal memorandum of December 4.17 In this memorandum the President indicated that he was against reparations but in favor of restitution and that he would let Germany come back industrially to meet her own needs, but not do exporting for some time until we knew better how things were going to work [Page 424] out. While this memorandum gave only very general guidance, it seemed apparent that the President wished to subordinate reparation to the economic disarmament of Germany.

The most recent statement of Department views is contained in two memoranda written early in January as part of the preparation for the President’s conference with Marshal Stalin and Prime Minister Churchill. A document on “Economic Policies toward Germany”,18 prepared by Mr. Despres, gave some emphasis to measures of economic disarmament. In addition to prohibition of the manufacture of armaments and aircraft and the destruction of specialized facilities for their manufacture, it stated that consideration should be given to prohibiting during a control period the production of a few key industrial items and restricting exports of metals, metal products and chemicals. Subject to these restrictions, it favored conversion of German industries to peacetime production, particularly of reparation goods for the rehabilitation of European countries. A document on “The Treatment of Germany”,19 prepared in EUR, made it clear that the Department did not favor drastic territorial dismemberment or truncation of Germany as a means of limiting that country’s economic war potential. It held that partitioning of Germany would be impracticable.

Meanwhile, the Foreign Economic Administration, acting under instructions from the President, has launched a series of studies on methods of controlling the war-making power of Germany. The program of studies, which has been cleared with the Department, is based on the working assumption that economic disarmament, going well beyond the armament industry proper, will be included in our program for Germany.

February 13, 1945.

  1. Addressed to the Assistant Secretary of State (Clayton) and his Deputy, Mr. Edward S. Mason.
  2. Assistant Adviser on German Economic Affairs.
  3. Directive … regarding the military government of Germany in the period immediately following the cessation of organized resistance (post defeat). January 6, 1945, p. 378.
  4. Article III of the Communiqué issued at the end of the Yalta Conference provided for the establishment of a Reparation Commission which would carry on its work at Moscow. For text of Communiqué which was released to the press on February 12, 1945, see Conferences at Malta and Yalta, p. 968. For documentation regarding the negotiations relative to German reparations, see post, pp. 1169 ff.
  5. For documentation regarding Anglo-American-Soviet discussions relating to the establishment of a European Economic Committee, see Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. ii, pp. 614 ff.
  6. For text of the directive to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, in respect of military government in Germany for the pre-surrender period, see Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. i, p. 217.
  7. Foreign Economic Administration.
  8. For text of the instrument of surrender for Germany, approved by the European Advisory Commission on July 25, 1944, see Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. i, p. 256. For documentation regarding governmental approval of the surrender instrument, see ante, pp. 160 ff.
  9. For text of the agreement between the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union, signed at London, November 14, 1944, see Department of State, Treaties and Other International Acts Series (TIAS) No. 3070, or United States Treaties and Other International Agreements (UST), vol. 5 (pt. 2), pp. 2062–2066.
  10. For text of the protocol between the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union, signed at London, September 12, 1944, with amending agreement signed at London, November 14, 1944, see TIAS No. 3071, or 5 UST (pt. 2), pp. 2078–2089.
  11. Office of Strategic Services.
  12. For text of the memorandum by the ECEFP entitled “Germany: General Objectives of United States Economic Policy with Respect to Germany” designated ECEFP D–36/44 and dated August 14, 1944, see Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. i, p. 278.
  13. For a summary of and excerpts from President Roosevelt’s memorandum of September 15, 1944, see The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, vol. ii, p. 1610.
  14. For text of the memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt, dated September 29, 1944, see Conferences at Malta and Yalta, p. 156.
  15. Ibid., p. 155.
  16. Ibid., p. 174.
  17. Conferences at Malta and Yalta, p. 190.
  18. Ibid., p. 178.