740.00119 EAC/3–1445
Draft Minutes of a Conference on the Work of the European Advisory Commission and on Plans for Control of Germany, Held at the Department of State, March 14, 1945
Present:
| War Department | Navy Department | |
| Mr. McCloy | Capt. W. H. Vanderbilt | |
| Col. David Marcus | Commdr. Sargent | |
| Col. R. Ammi Cutter | Lt. Harding Bancroft | |
| Col. Richard Wilmer | Mr. Keith Kane74 | |
| State Department | ||
| Mr. James Clement Dunn, Chairman | ||
| Mr. Matthews | ||
| Ambassador Murphy | ||
| Mr. J. W. Riddleberger | ||
| Mr. Philip Mosely | ||
| Mr. Emile Despres | ||
| Mr. Edmund Gullion |
This second meeting further considered Plans for the Interim Period immediately after the Surrender and before the Control Commission began to Function.
Mr. McCloy said that in consideration of the discussion at the previous day’s meeting, he felt more strongly than ever that the immediate problem was to equip the Military Commanders with a directive which might enable them to begin functioning immediately. He feared that, in view of the difficulties of negotiation in the European Advisory Commission and the time which would be required, it might prove impossible to obtain clearance for the thirty-seven various specific directives. He proposed, therefore, that: [Page 451]
- (1)
- JCS 1067 should be modified immediately, in the light of Yalta decisions and the memorandum on control of Germany submitted by the State Department to the President; it should then be established, as a matter of first priority, as the instrument for guidance of SHAEF.
- (2)
- At the same time, but without delaying the issuance of the U.S. directive to U.S. troops, we should concentrate our efforts in the EAC on getting clearance for a similar over-all quadripartite directive.
Mr. Dunn agreed that it was of paramount urgency to get a directive in the hands of the troops, but saw no reason for discontinuing our efforts to get the specified detailed directives cleared through EAC. EAC was set up to consider these directives on a sub-committee basis, and considerable time had been already gained because they had been adopted as bases for negotiation by the other countries’ representatives in the Commission.
The meeting agreed:
- (1)
- As a matter of first priority, to revise JCS 1067 and get it cleared through JCS;
- (2)
- To endeavor to clear a similar quadripartite directive through EAC;
- (3)
- To continue simultaneously to negotiate the various specific directives in EAC as expeditiously as possible. (It was considered that as soon as 1067 was in final form, clearance of any pending specific directives would be accelerated.);
- (4)
- To modify CCS 551 to fit it for a post-surrender interim period on the assumption that SHAEF continues to operate.
The State Department’s Memorandum on Control of Germany
Mr. McCloy had read this document, which had been approved by the President, since the previous day’s meeting. He expressed great concern over the fact that it seemed to trend toward a greater degree of centralized control than the War Department had anticipated or was prepared to admit. The mere fact that the zone commanders would also be members of the Council did not seem sufficient to assure the necessary degree of regional authority. (In the previous day’s meeting Mr. McCloy had been more inclined to find reassurance in this arrangement.)
The State Department representatives at the meeting did not agree that the document was as strongly in favor of centralization as Mr. McCloy believed.
There was an extended discussion on the wording of the memorandum in the light of these conflicting views but no decision was reached. (It appeared probable that the question might be raised again with the President or the Cabinet in the near future. An analysis, dated March 16, of the conflict of views of the Department of State and the Treasury-War Department views is attached.75
[Page 452]The “General Order” or Document on Additional, Non-Military Requirements
Mr. McCloy felt that the present form of the directive gave too little policy guidance and was little more than an “agenda” of things on which Allies would try to reach agreement.
Mr. Dunn referred to the history of this document (See Annex B [2] to Minutes of Meeting of March 13) and said that it represented a compromise.
It was agreed that the wording of the directive ought to be changed to show that its provisions were not final or exclusive. It appeared that this might be done by the addition of a so-called “basket clause” which might refer to the similar clause, reserving opening for further action, which is included in the Instrument for Surrender.