740.00119 Control (Germany)/6–1845: Airgram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Winant ) to the Secretary of State

A–677. ReDepts 4340, May 31, 7 p.m.13 We took up the repatriation of German officials with the Foreign Office on June 2 and we have now received the following reply which is dated June 16:

“You wrote to Sargent14 on the 2nd June, regarding the problem of repatriating German officials from neutral countries, and emphasized the importance which the State Department attach to urgent action. I may say that we fully agree with the view that this category of personnel should be given the first priority for repatriation, and the recommendations to that effect which we have received from His Majesty’s representatives in Lisbon and Madrid are in the same sense as those from their United States colleagues to which you refer. We have proposed independently through the Chiefs of Staff channel that Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force’s willingness to accept all those German officials who can be deported, as soon as arrangements can be made for their despatch, should be confirmed. The additional request for SHAEF’s assistance in the matter of transport, which you mention that Mr. Murphy has been asked to make will, I hope, secure results. I understand that both these points have now been taken up with SHAEF by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

“As regards approaches to the host governments, we are in agreement with Mr. Murphy’s opinion that it would be inappropriate to coordinate with the Soviet High Command joint notification of recall to the officials whom we wish to repatriate. We do not consider that the actual form of recall is important, since the German officials who would receive it could neglect to obey unless we have obtained cooperation of the host governments in securing its enforcement. As regards such cooperation, experience of the action taken in neutral capitals in recent weeks regarding the disposal of German official property suggests that the right of representatives of the four Powers (or three Powers where the Soviet Government are not represented) to act on behalf of the Allies in Germany is not likely to be challenged. Action may indeed be somewhat simplified as regards the most urgent cases of Spain and Portugal, and in Switzerland as well, by the fact that there are no Soviet representatives in those countries. We are, however, anxious that the Soviet Government, as well as the French Government, should be kept fully informed of the action which is being taken there and elsewhere whether or not they are able to join in it.

“The coordination with the Soviet Government which I suggest that we ought to attempt to achieve, would be as follows: In the first place the Soviet Government should be invited to approve the principle of representations to all host governments to facilitate the repatriation of German officials, secondly, the Soviet Government [Page 791] should agree to cooperate to this end in Stockholm and also in Kabul (where in fact this matter is already being dealt with in local cooperation between the Soviet representative and his United States and British colleagues); thirdly, the Soviet Government should agree to the ultimate destination of the deportees.

“Provided that the third point is satisfactorily covered, the other points seem likely to prove less difficult. But you may share my doubts as to whether the Soviet Government would accept Frankfurt as the destination of all repatriated officials, whatever facilities may be offered to the Russians for interrogation of the deportees at that place, and whatever provision is made for the redistribution of the deportees after interrogation. The alternative plan which I would accordingly suggest is that the Soviet Government should be asked to agree that from countries where they have no relations with the host government, the Germans should be sent back to Frankfurt (or other agreed destinations in the British and United States zones), and that from the neutral countries with which they do have relations, the German deportees should go to the Soviet zone. This would mean that the Soviet Government would receive the Germans from Sweden and Afghanistan only. The plan would, however, have the convenience that there would be no dispute about the distribution of deportees from each place as between the zones, that the Soviet authorities would receive the Germans from foreign countries most accessible to them and that no question would be raised by the governments of neutral countries which have no relations with the Soviet Government about handing over Germans, for whom they are responsible, to Soviet hands. It is, I think, relevant to this suggestion to mention the local arrangement in Kabul, of which you may be aware, and under which the local German officials are already being sent for interrogation to the Soviet Union and presumably for eventual repatriation by the Russian route.

“The Foreign Office agree with the State Department’s view that preliminary action to secure the repatriation of German officials need not depend on the concurrence of the Soviet Government, particularly as there are no Soviet representatives in the countries where the problem is perhaps most pressing. We have received a telegram from His Majesty’s Ambassador at Washington dated 12th June, which indicates that the State Department have already provided for appropriate immediate action. Lord Halifax reports that the United States representatives at Madrid, Lisbon, Tangier, Berne and Stockholm have received authority to request the host government to hold German official personnel under ‘house arrest’ or if necessary under ‘severe restriction’. He adds that this action is dependent on similar authority being received by His Majesty’s representatives. We are accordingly giving this authority and in doing so propose to instruct His Majesty’s representatives to invite their French colleagues to act similarly and also, in the case of Stockholm, His Majesty’s Minister’s Soviet colleague. His Majesty’s representatives are at the same time being instructed, if their United States colleagues have authority to join them, to warn the host governments that these precautions against the dispersal of German officials are required pending arrangements for repatriation in which the host government’s cooperation will be necessary.

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“The next step which I would suggest is that our two Governments’ representatives in Moscow should inform the Soviet Government of this preliminary action and invite them to instruct their Minister in Stockholm to associate herself with the representations which are being made. This approach might be accompanied, or if necessary followed, by a suggestion to the Soviet Government that they should agree to take part, where they are represented, in subsequent approaches to the host governments requesting final repatriation of German officials according to the plan as regards destinations which I have outlined. Once Soviet agreement in principle has been obtained to such a plan, it would be possible for the Soviet Government and for our two Governments to act independently in giving effect to it. For instance, the Soviet Government might make their own arrangements for repatriation of German officials from Stockholm so long as their representations to the Swedish Government, for the necessary cooperation, were backed by His Majesty’s Minister and his United States and French colleagues. Similarly, the United States, French and British representatives in Lisbon, Madrid and Berne could act at appropriate moments in each country in accordance with the stage which arrangements for transport and reception of the proposed deportees had reached.”

Winant
  1. Not printed.
  2. Sir Orme Sargent, Deputy Under-Secretary of State in the British Foreign Office.