740.00119 Control (Hungary)/3–2745: Telegram

Mr. Alexander C. Kirk, Political Adviser to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater, to the Secretary of State

1189. This is No. 31 from Squires. While the acceptance of the statutes as a basis for the organization of the ACC in Hungary gave some hope that the difficulties which occurred in Bulgaria and Rumania might be avoided, it is becoming increasingly clear that, although the exact pattern is not being retraced at Debrecen, many of the same problems are developing.

I have been impressed by the manner in which General Key and the members of his staff have approached their duties. They have exhibited a maximum desire to work out a satisfactory arrangement with the Russians. Anti-Soviet comment has been condemned, pro-Russian gestures approved and association with old line Hungarians held to a minimum. The temptation to report the flood of anti-Russian stories has been resisted even upon confirmation. Every effort has been made to play a straight game.

It seems clear that despite these efforts, the Russian attitude remains one of surface moderation combined with essential negation. The specific provisions of the statutes including consultation on directives, consideration of policies in general meetings and transmission of communications reports and documents have at best been half-heartedly fulfilled.

The first meeting of the ACC, for example, was held on March 26, more than a month after General Key’s arrival. Even then matters of serious import were conspicuously absent from the agenda.

It is also known from first hand sources that messages dealing with specific armistice problems, have passed between the Russian and Hungarian authorities. Despite provisions of section 5 (c) of the statutes copies of these communications have not been made available to the American ACC and their existence was officially denied at the meeting on March 26.

As another instance the Hungarian Official Gazette of March 17 published eight decrees implementing certain sections of the armistice. It is known that the Hungarian Government forwarded draft copies of [Page 812] these decrees to Voroshilov and that they were returned with alterations and corrections. The chairman of the ACC, however, did not submit copies of these documents to his American colleague even for his information. When this point was raised at the meeting on March 26, Voroshilov offered to circulate copies of the published decrees available to anyone in the Hungarian Official Gazette.

In administrative matters as well the Russians have failed to exhibit a policy of practical cooperation. Official communications remain unanswered or are carried informally in subsequent conversations. Each query calls for consultation with Moscow or the front line commander. Even the provision that each delegation may determine its own size and composition contained in section 5 (g) of the statutes has been made ineffective by the continuing delay in granting clearances.

In effect the Russians have not seen fit to permit the real work of the ACC to begin and have handicapped even its administrative functions by policies that give the effect of negation and delay.

Pessimistic as this outlook is the possibility remains that the difficulties are all [due?] more to Russian temperament and the military realities of the situation than to a specific program of Russian non-cooperation. Whatever the cause, however, the result is to minimize the value and importance of the ACC. The effect is the same whether caused by Russian intent or Russian mentality.

Unless the policy of negation is replaced by one of active cooperation the ACC seems destined to minimum usefulness at least during the first period. This destiny, however, is not inevitable. It can easily be averted by an active and honest implementation of the statutes and the removal of the irritating road blocks in such matters as clearances. [Squires.]

Kirk