740.0011 P.W./4–1445
The French Ambassador ( Bonnet ) to the Secretary of State
The Ambassador of France in the United States presents his compliments to His Excellency the Secretary of State and has the honor to invite his attention to the following question.
By a note dated April 4, the Department of State, replying to note no. 303, which the Embassy of France had sent to it on March 12, concerning the French resistance in Indo-China, was good enough to give the Embassy, besides the assurance that the said communication had been examined with the greatest care and the greatest sympathy, various items of information with respect to the conditions under which the American Air Forces in China had already been, and still tire, authorized, in order to aid the French, to undertake operations against the Japanese in Indo-China.
The Ambassador of France wishes to thank the Secretary of State for this information, and for the efforts which the American Air Forces have already made to help materially and to support tactically the French resistance in Indo-China. He desires at the same time to set forth exactly, from the French point of view, the conditions under which the action of this resistance is being carried on. Contrary to what has been said, or written in the press, on various occasions, during the last month, it is not the movement of resistance to the Japanese occupation of Indo-China that has provoked the outbreak of hostilities between the French and the natives, on the one hand, and the Japanese, on the other, but an initiative taken by the Japanese Authorities. Thus, the French and native resistance movement which had been organized in secret and was continuing its preparations clandestinely with a view to the moment when, by agreement with the Inter-Allied Command, it might opportunely enter upon concerted action with the Allied Forces outside, was forced to declare itself prematurely and to enter into hostilities against the Japanese under the worst conditions for it.
The Government of the United States cannot fail to appreciate, under these circumstances, the position of the resistance movement in Indo-China—Allied Forces which had been secretly organized in the enemy’s rear in the midst of the greatest dangers, and which courageously accepted the struggle when the latter presented itself, rather than risk missing definitively the opportunity and thus being lost to the Allied cause. They have been carrying on this struggle for more than a month, in spite of the extraordinary difficulties produced for them by the numerical superiority of the enemy, by the considerable [Page 305] advantages which the initial possession of almost all the positions and almost all the means of communication have given to the enemy, and, lastly, by the lack of arms, munitions and supplies of every sort, by adverse geographic and climatic conditions, and by the terrible moral suffering caused to many French soldiers by their anxiety concerning the fate of their families who have remained as hostages in the towns in the hands of the Japanese.
The Government of the United States will surely judge that such an effort and such sacrifices deserve in themselves, and in the name of Inter-Allied solidarity, the most effective support of their comrades in arms by the American fighting forces. The French Government earnestly requests this of the American Government and begs it to have the goodness to maintain and develop, to the greatest possible extent, the efforts already made in this connection.
But the continuance of the resistance in Indo-China does not only raise a question of assistance; it presents likewise a problem of the general conduct of operations, which demands immediate solution.
In conformity with the precedent of Metropolitan France, the Provisional Government, in the preparatory instructions which it had given to the Indo-Chinese resistance movement, had, in case frontal operations could not be carried on, provided for guerilla actions within the country, having particularly in view the destruction of the enemy lines of communication, and it is actions of this sort that the Command of the resistance movement is endeavoring to keep up wherever circumstances permit, since the retreat to China will not take place until the fortune of arms renders it indispensable. These actions can, however, be continued for a long time only on condition that they are effectively supported from without. They are, moreover, chiefly intended to prepare for a possible landing operation. That is why the Ambassador sent to His Excellency the Secretary of State, at the same time as his note mentioned above, the note of the same date No. 304, relative to the conclusion of an agreement analogous to those signed in London on August 25, 1944.
Lastly, the conclusion of such arrangements itself requires the previous adoption of a decision of principle as regards the delimitation of the theatres of operations.
It is therefore a matter of the greatest importance to the French Government, for the orientation which it must give to the operations of its troops in Indo-China, and for the arrangements which it must make for the utilization of its expeditionary forces, to know the views of the American Command with regard thereto, and the results of the deliberations of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
That is why, by order of his Government, the Ambassador of France has the honor to beg His Excellency the Secretary of State to be good [Page 306] enough to intervene with the competent American Authorities in order that the latter may make known, as soon as possible, their opinion in this matter and may, for their part, hasten, within the organizations coordinating the military action of the Allies, the adoption of decisions on which the military effectiveness of the efforts of the French and native resistance in Indo-China depends.
Mr. Henri Bonnet takes pleasure [etc.]