761.6711/3–2145: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State
[Received March 22—7:05 a.m.]
853. Background of Russian denunciation of Soviet-Turkish treaty of friendship, in so far as apparent here in Moscow, is as follows:
According to the protocol of November 7, 1935 the treaty itself was renewed for 10 years, to be prolonged by tacit consent for further 2-year periods unless denounced 6 months before expiry. If therefore the treaty were not to remain operative until at least November 7, 1947 it would have to be denounced by one party or the other by May 7 of this year, at the latest.
It has been anticipated in Turkish circles in Moscow that the Russians would wish to denounce the treaty, and the Turkish Ambassador had advised his Government to this effect 1 or 2 months ago. There were indeed a number of points in respect to which it had not proved possible for one side or the other to observe the letter of the agreement or of its various protocols, and parts of it had clearly become of doubtful applicability to present circumstances.
The denunciation itself was therefore not a surprise but the circumstances in which it took place were unexpected. The Turkish Ambassador had arranged to return to Turkey for a period of consultation which was expected to last several weeks. He was scheduled to depart March 25. On March 19 he told Kavtaradze9 that he would be glad to call on Molotov to say good-by although he had nothing to discuss with him. To his surprise, he was invited to call the same day. Molotov informed him of the denunciation of the treaty and told him that the Soviet Government had intended to take this step at a some [Page 1222] what later date but in view of his impending departure had decided to act at once, in order that he might be able to discuss Turkish-Russian relations with his Government against this background. Molotov’s attitude was consistently friendly and correct, and there was no intimation on his part that the action reflected ill feeling or any tendency to bring pressure on Turkey.
The Ambassador inquired Molotov’s views as to the ways in which the present treaty might be “improved”. Molotov was unwilling to commit himself on this point and said that after the Ambassador had talked with his Government he would be glad to learn how the Turkish Government felt on this point.
By way of background to this Russian move, it may be said that the information reported in Ankara’s message to the Department on March 9, 7 p.m., repeated to this mission as No. 12, to effect that Molotov had expressed to the Turkish Ambassador the Soviet desire to discuss revision of the Montreux Convention was substantially correct. This conversation took place 3 or 4 weeks ago. When the Ambassador pointed out to Molotov that the Montreaux Convention was an international agreement to which a number of other countries, including Japan, were parties, and that this would complicate a discussion of its revision, Molotov said that he hoped the Turkish Ambassador would not make too much of a point of the necessity of consulting the Japanese. The Ambassador replied by pointing out that Turkey was at war with Japan and that he had no intention of defending Japanese interests. Molotov appeared to attach much significance to this statement and greeted it with satisfaction, saying that it was a distinct step in advance. The Ambassador thereupon reiterated that his remark was based on the state of Turkish relations with Japan and did not imply a view of his Government as to the modalities of possible discussions looking toward the revision of the convention.
In the view of this Embassy, the main factors underlying Soviet policy toward Turkey at this moment are probably (a) the Soviet desire to obtain a revision of the regime of the Straits more favorable to Russian prestige and security than the present one and (b) the assumption that such revision will probably not be readily acceptable to Turkey and that considerable pressure may therefore eventually have to be applied.
In denouncing the treaty at this time the Russians undoubtedly have in mind the anticipated discussion of the Montreux Convention at the first meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the three Allies.10 The denunciation of the treaty makes it possible for them to insist on the [Page 1223] early redefinition, in a new agreement, of their relations with Turkey, and thus opens up a channel of pressure on the Turkish Government which may prove useful as the question of the Straits again comes under discussion. The Soviet-Bulgaria policy seems pointed in the same direction.11 It is evidently Russian tactics to maneuver the Turks into coming forward first with their ideas on the redefinition of Turkish-Russian relations. What will come after that is impossible to predict, but the Russians would of course then be free to accept or to criticize the Turkish suggestion as they liked, and issues might be raised in the course of these discussions which would provide opportunities for the exertion of strong political pressure. This in turn opens several possibilities. Turkey might be asked, for example, to accept, in advance of any broader discussions, a given set of Soviet views with respect to the regime of the Straits, on the assumption that it would be difficult for any outside power to challenge or ignore a program advanced by the two countries most directly concerned.
Sent to Department as 853 repeated to Ankara as 18.
- Sergey Ivanovich Kavtaradze, Soviet Assistant People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs.↩
- This had been agreed upon at the Yalta Conference; see Conferences at Malta and Yalta, pp. 903–904.↩
- For documentation regarding the relations of the Soviet Union with Bulgaria, see vol. iv, pp. 135 ff.↩