761.6711/3–2645: Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey ( Steinhardt ) to the Secretary of State

418. With reference to London’s 3025 of March 23 to the Department in connection with the notice of termination given by the Soviet Government of the Turkish-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality, in discussing the matter with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, he expressed the opinion that the reason for giving notice at this time was not the impending departure of the Turkish Ambassador from Moscow for Ankara, but more probably the reason suggested in my 385 of March 21 that the Soviet Government deemed it preferable to give such notice late in March rather than immediately prior to or during the San Francisco Conference. It has been understood in Ankara official circles for some time that the Turkish Ambassador in Moscow planned to visit Ankara over a month ago and that he had postponed his departure at the last moment.

Thus it is doubtful that his departure provided the motive for giving notice of termination at this time.

I am constrained to regard Peterson’s statement to Saka that the British Government “has no evidence” of a desire by the Soviet Government for bilateral conversations with the Turkish Government with a view to modification of the Montreux Convention as wishful thinking unless he meant formal evidence. To my mind there has [Page 1226] been ample evidence over the past 5 years that the Soviet Government regards the control and administration of the Straits as an exclusively “Black Sea affair” and resents the fact that non-Black Sea powers are signatories to the Montreux Convention. In consequence, I have long been persuaded that at what the Soviet Government regarded as a propitious time it would seek to induce the Turks to enter into bilateral discussions looking to a modification of the Montreux Convention, and that while observing its conception of the international amenities by subsequently confronting the British with a fait accompli, it would resist any attempt by the British to plan a consequential role in the negotiations looking to the setting up of a new regime for the control and administration of the Straits.

In my opinion the Anglo-French-Turkish alliance in 193921 was distasteful to the Soviets who regarded the alliance between the Turks and the British with little less disfavor and suspicion than they would have regarded a similar alliance between the Finns and the British. Obviously the outbreak of war between the Soviet Union and Germany and the subsequent Anglo-Soviet treaty prevented any outward manifestation of dislike by the Soviets for the Anglo-Turkish alliance, in addition to which until the summer of 1944 this alliance served to safeguard the southern extremity of the Soviet Union at a time when such protection was essential and of real value. Now however that there is no longer any doubt as to the outcome of the war and that the British have given evidence of their continued interest in the Balkans and that they intend to entrench and strengthen their position in Turkey and particularly in the light of the firm British stand in Greece I am inclined to the view that the Soviet Government is about to embark on its delayed program of seeking to make it clear to the British that the Soviet Union regards Turkey in much the same light as it does Poland, Rumania and Bulgaria, and that to achieve this end it will press its intention to carry on bilateral discussions with Turkey for a modification of the Montreux Convention.

If this hypothesis is correct, Soviet policy will follow the familiar pattern from which there has been little if any deviation since 1939—that is to say, criticism of the Turkish Government and outbursts in the Soviet press and on the radio against the Turks. These have in fact already begun. Rumors will be circulated of a nature tending to alarm the Turks. The first of these was put into circulation a few days ago by the Soviet Assistant Naval Attaché who stated two Bulgarian Army Corps were being concentrated on the Turk frontier, a statement which the Turkish, American and British military authorities inform me is not in conformity with the facts. After these tactics [Page 1227] have presumably “softened” the Turks the Soviet Government will expect them to enter into bilateral discussions. If the Turks are not too resistant to entering upon such bilateral discussions the proposals advanced by the Soviet Government for a modification of the Montreux Convention will probably be far less onerous than the Turks appear to anticipate. Nor would this be surprising for I am persuaded the Soviet Government does not desire territorial aggrandisement at the expense of the Turks but rather complete freedom to navigate the Straits with every type of vessel in times of war as well as in times of peace under a convention which in effect will constitute the Turks guardians of the Straits for the benefit of the Soviets, such convention if attainable not to include any non-Black Sea power other perhaps than for the purpose of underwriting the Soviet desiderata. Such a program, which would logically lead to a Soviet-Turkish alliance far transcending the treaty of friendship and neutrality of 1925, would accomplish what I have long believed the Soviet objectives to be in respect of the Straits in particular and Turkey in general. It would have the following advantages from the Soviet point of view:

1.
Joint free access to and egress from the Black Sea to Soviet vessels of every type in times of war as well as in times of peace while denying the same to non-Black Sea powers in times of war or threatened conflict.
2.
Automatically constitute Turkey an Ally of the Soviet Union in any future war involving the Soviets.
3.
Oblige Turkey to sustain the first impact of any contemplated attack on the Soviet Black Sea ports.
4.
Eliminate Great Britain from any direct voice in the control and administration of the Straits.
5.
Enhance Soviet and diminish British prestige throughout the Balkans and the Middle East.

While it is probable, having regard to existing Anglo-Soviet relations, that the Soviet Government will proceed with extreme caution in endeavoring to realize the objectives outlined above and that it will pay attention to British susceptibilities and may then accept some degree of compromise, I am convinced that the objectives outlined above are and will continue to be the Soviet goal. Nor do they reflect any material change from the objectives sought by the Soviet Government at the time of Potemkin’s visit to Ankara22 and Sobolef’s visit to Sofia.23

[Page 1228]

Insofar as concerns the Turkish attitude, it would be a mistake to measure the probable Turkish reaction to excessive Soviet demands by the meekness of the Turks toward Germany. I have little doubt that the Turkish reaction to excessive demands put forth by the Soviets would be pugnacious, their meekness toward Germany during the past 3 years having been intended to preserve their strength for this purpose. The dividends now being received by the Finns on their 5-year investment in uncompromising resistance to threatened Soviet domination as distinguished from present conditions in Poland, Rumania and Bulgaria is not being overlooked by the Turks with a population five times that of Finland, only two cities of any importance, little industry, a largely self-sufficient peasant population and a mountainous country with extensive areas suitable for guerilla warfare.

As to Saka’s expressed desire that Turk-Soviet relations be placed on a better footing in order that there would not be a hindrance in any way to the best possible Anglo-Soviet relations, this is but another way of seeing that the Turks are fully alive to the implications inherent in the Soviet objectives and seek the support of Great Britain as well as of the United States to counteract their fear of being swept into the Soviet sphere of influence by modifications of the Montreux Convention which would deprive Great Britain of a voice in the control and administration of the Straits.

I feel obliged to add that the Turks, who have been most reluctant to take up arms against Germany, would almost welcome an armed conflict between Britain and the Soviets and would throw themselves into any such conflict on the British side with enthusiasm. Their reluctance to participate actively at any time in the war against Germany has been motivated by their conviction that Britain and the Soviets would sooner or later come into conflict in the Balkans and that Turkey could and would tip the scales in Britain’s favor. Thus there has been ample evidence during the past 3 years that the Turks also have been engaged in wishful thinking.

Repeated to London as 21 and Moscow as 20.

Steinhardt
  1. Treaty of Mutual Assistance signed at Ankara October 19, 1939, League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. cc, p. 167.
  2. Vladimir Petrovich Potemkin, First Assistant People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, had visited at Ankara from April 29 to May 5, 1939, in the course of a series of visits to the capitals of the countries of eastern and southeastern Europe; see Max Beloff, The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union, 1929–1929, vol. ii (1936–1941), pp. 240–242; see also telegram 571, June 11, 1942, 10 a.m., from Ankara, Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. iv, p. 818.
  3. Arkady Alexandrovich Sobolev, Secretary-General of the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, had visited King Boris of Bulgaria at Sofia on November 25, 1940; for documentation concerning this visit, see ibid., 1940, vol. i, pp. 532, 535, 537, and 631632.