767.68119/9–345

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Truman

After consideration of the question of changes in the Montreux Convention, I am convinced that we should confine our proposal to what is set forth in the attached memorandum.

I do not believe that at this time we should recommend that Turkish control of the Straits should be impaired or that the Straits be neutralized. [Page 1243] I think that the United Nations Organization should be the court of appeal for any nation which considers that Turkey has abused its control or has failed to abide by its undertakings. As regards neutralization, it is difficult for us to request Turkey to dismantle her fortifications and agree to neutralization unless we are willing to give a guaranty to Turkey of assistance by the United States in case Turkey is later attacked.

I do not think we should make the guaranty unless we are prepared to fulfill our pledge and I do not think we should do this without first submitting it to Congressional leaders.

Reliance on prompt action by the United Nations is not satisfactory to Turkey in view of the veto power against such action enjoyed by all the permanent members of the Security Council. Furthermore, a suggestion that the Straits be neutralized encourages similar suggestions regarding Panama and Suez.

If you concur, I will draft a telegram to Turkey embodying the attached suggestions. At the same time, we would inform the British and Russian Governments of our actions.

J[ames] F. B[yrnes]
[Annex]

Proposals of the United States for Changes in the Montreux Convention of 193656

Changes Suggested Significance
1. Straits to be open to merchant vessels of all nations at all times. This would constitute a relatively small change from the present regime, since freedom of commerce is already assured with minor exceptions. Under the Montreux Convention Turkey may, when at war, refuse passage to the merchant vessels of her enemy. Moreover, when Turkey [Page 1244] considers herself threatened with imminent danger of war, she may limit passage of merchant vessels to certain routes and to daylight navigation. Our proposal would eliminate both these exceptions and provide for freedom of commerce at all times. While Turkey may be expected, in practice, to prevent the passage of vessels of her enemy if she can do so, regardless of treaty provisions, the change would deprive Turkey of the right to place restrictions on merchant vessels whenever Turkey decides she is threatened.
The change would bring the regulations governing the Straits into line with those governing the Suez and Panama Canals as far as merchant vessels are concerned. It would require a slight alteration in Article 2 of the Convention and the omission of Articles 4, 5, and 6.
2. Straits to be open to the warships of Black Sea Powers at all times. While the Straits are already fully open to the warships of Black Sea Powers in time of peace, the Straits are now closed, in time of war, to the warships of any belligerent powers if Turkey is neutral. Moreover, Turkey may now close the Straits to all warships whenever she considers herself threatened. Turkey has striven for these safeguards, to prevent hostilities between belligerents from taking place in Turkish waters. However, the Black Sea Powers can with propriety insist that they be assured the right to move their warships in and out of the Straits at all [Page 1245] times, and we should request Turkey to make this concession.
3. Straits to be closed to the warships of non-Black Sea Powers at all times, except with the specific consent of all of the Black Sea Powers. At present a maximum of 45,000 tons of non-Black Sea warships may be in the Black Sea at one time. This provision is not of vital concern to non-Black Sea Powers and may well be surrendered by them in the interest of harmony and as evidence of a lack of any hostile intent by non-Black Sea Powers.
4. Certain minor changes to bring the Montreux Convention in line with present day conditions, such as the substitution of the United Nations for the League of Nations and the elimination of Japan as a signatory. The present convention contains provisions requiring Turkey to cooperate with measures taken by the League of Nations against aggression. The United Nations Organization should be substituted for the League, and the provisions should make it clear that Turkey will open or close the Straits at any time and in such manner as the UNO may request for the purpose of preventing aggression.
  1. According to a memorandum of August 31, 1945, not printed, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson), proposals were discussed in the office of the Secretary of State regarding possible changes in the Montreux Convention. The Secretary suggested that a memorandum be drawn up of these proposals showing in parallel columns the significance of the changes as compared with the existing regulations, The procedure adopted by the Office, minuted Mr. Henderson, was to limit recommendations to topics without any attempt to draft changes in text, as “The Montreux Convention is based on more than 100 years of treaty regulations governing the Straits and its wording resulted from long debates and study at an important international conference.” (767.68119/9–2845) For extracts from the principal treaties and conventions affecting the Straits, 1774–1936, together with comparative charts, see Harry N. Howard, The Problem of the Turkish Straits (Department of State Publication 2752, Washington, 1947), pp. 13 ff.