Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, The Near East and Africa, Volume VIII

851R.00/8–345: Airgram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Egypt ( Tuck )

Washington , October 5, 1945.

A–490. For your strictly confidential information the following is a paraphrase of the Department’s telegram no. 3551 of July 30, 6 p.m. to Paris² relative to the situation in Algeria as mentioned in your A–330² and A–331 of June 21, 1945, together with a paraphrase of the Embassy’s reply (telegram 4684, August 3, 6 p.m.¹):

Begin paraphrase. Cairo Legation has sent us the text of a letter from the Secretary General of the Arab League with respect to the situation in Algeria subsequent to the May 8 native uprisings and the repressive measures instituted by the French authorities thereafter. According to this letter the Arab League cannot in accordance with its pact indefinitely ignore an atrocious state of affairs in which Arabs are suffering from a terrorist regime of martial law, sending the people to jail and to death by hundreds and thousands and killing by thousands. You should orally inform Bidault² of the receipt of this letter and tell him that the existing Algerian situation under reference is a source of anxiety not alone to the Government of the United States but also to public opinion in this country, which is deeply conscious of the sacrifices in American lives and equipment expended in the liberation of North Africa, and the economic aid subsequently made available to that area and envisaged for the future. In this connection you may mention the fact that we have taken note of Tixier’s broadcast address³ after investigating the uprisings in which he said that the maximum number of Moslems killed was fifteen hundred.

The casualties are estimated by the most reliable sources to have been far greater but even if this estimate of Tixier’s were accepted it would indicate an excess of repressive measures, as well as the existence of a situation in which the most dangerous possibilities might be found to exist. In conveying this letter to Bidault’s attention, you should stress, we are actuated by motives of the most friendly character as well as our anxiety lest there should arise a situation in North Africa which would have the most serious consequences not only to the French but to the relations between the Arab world and all the Western powers. Repeated to Algiers. End paraphrase.

Ambassador Caffery’s reply was as follows:

Begin paraphrase. The information transmitted with the Department’s telegram no. 3551 was at once brought by me to the attention of Bidault, who took note of it, sought to minimize the entire affair, gave the usual explanations, expressed understanding of our motives and so forth. Repeated to Algiers. End paraphrase.

In your discretion you may tell Azzam Bey for his strictly confidential information that we have not been inactive with regard to the subject matter of his letter to you and that we trust that our handling of the matter may have been helpful. You should make it clear to him, however, that our having shown an interest in the North African situation, to which he referred, should not be interpreted as acceptance on our part of his contention that the United States has acquired responsibility for developments in North Africa because of our military assistance in liberating the area.⁵

Acheson

2. Georges Bidault, French Minister of Foreign Affairs.
2. Georges Bidault, French Minister of Foreign Affairs.
1. Not printed.
2. Georges Bidault, French Minister of Foreign Affairs.
3. On June 29. Adrien Tixier was French Minister of the Interior.
5. In airgram A–596, November 13, 1945, the Chargé in Egypt (Lyon) stated that on the previous day “I took the opportunity to communicate to Azzam the gist of the Department’s A–490, October 5, on the action taken by the United States Government with respect to the French repression of the Arab uprising in Algeria. He expressed his profound gratitude for our help and interest and indicated his intention of informing the Council of the League … with a view to proposing a vote of thanks. In view of possible repercussions, I urged him to exercise restraint and pointed out that the information transmitted by the Department’s airgram under reference was for his strictly confidential information only. At his behest I have given him a written confirmation, not forgetting to stress the Department’s caveat that our military assistance in the liberation of North Africa should in no wise be interpreted as acceptance of responsibility for subsequent political developments in that area.” (890B.00/11–1345)