868.48/1–645: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Greece ( MacVeagh )

20. Please deliver the following message to General Sadler63 for his eyes only personal from General Hilldring64 on the responsibility for Greek relief distribution. It is desired that this message should not be discussed with any British official.

“The following is for your information: Discussions have now been initiated with British here looking toward relinquishment to UNRRA65 of responsibility for Greek relief distribution. U.S. view is that change-over should take place as soon as possible, with 1 March 1945 as target date.

UNRRA appears anxious to take over as soon as present hostilities terminate and they feel they are in a position to do so provided combined relief supplies are sold to them in adequate amounts and they receive some assurance of continued shipping. Neither point poses too difficult a problem to U.S. since UNRRA’s anxiety to get into business in Greece disposes them to insist on less tight commitments than they formerly asked. It will probably be necessary to lend assistance to UNRRA for some period after they take over in order to ease the transition. For this purpose it is likely that you and at least some of your staff will stay on until it is felt that UNRRA can carry on without military help.

The real problem will be to obtain British agreement to relinquish and their initial reaction is to oppose discussing a fixed date at this time. Reasons advanced by them are (1) unsettled conditions in Greece, (2) presence of a large British military force, and (3) question [Page 194] of UNRRA ability to perform. As to point 3 the British express some doubt whether UNRRA has in the field personnel adequate in skill or number to estimate supply requirements, process requisitions and handle other technical supply matters. Your views on this will be appreciated since it is desired to satisfy ourselves as well as the British that UNRRA really can do the supply job.

Related to this is the question of reintegrating UNRRA into MLHQ.66 British here appear to regard this as a prerequisite and U.S. is inclined to agree. However UNRRA Washington is informed by Archer67 that the UNRRA Greek Mission did not react favorably to integration as a matter of principle. Please give your viewpoint urgently for consideration of the U.S. in formulating a definite position on this.

Constant pressure upon the British to agree to early turn-over of Greek relief responsibility is intended to be exerted here. We will keep you currently advised.”

Stettinius
  1. Brig. Gen. Percy L. Sadler, Deputy Commander for Combined Operations with the British for relief and rehabilitation in Balkan countries.
  2. Maj. Gen. John H. Hilldring, Director of the Civil Affairs Division of the War Department Special Staff.
  3. United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.
  4. Military Liaison Headquarters at Athens; for description of functions, see footnote 36, p. 108.
  5. Laird Archer, Chief of UNRRA Mission to Greece.